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RELATED INFORMATION IN
ADOPTION
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Many adopted children have failed to receive critically
needed medical or psychiatric care because their adoptive parents
were not given accurate and complete information about their
medical and social history. Over the past decade, most state leg-
islatures have enacted statutes that increase to some extent the
amount of background information released to adoptive parenta
In this Article, Professor Marianne Blair examines the goals of
mandatory disclosure and the deficiencies in the majority of
these statutes that prevent achieving the goal of greater disclosure
of health-related information.
Professor Blair pays particular attention to the need to ex-
pand the scope of these statutes and the content of the informa-
tion disclosed. Especially important is the analysis of appropriate
and inappropriate methods of investigation and the impact of
different methods on the privacy interests of the birth family.
The difficult issues surrounding disclosure of a birth mother's
HIV status are given special attention.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Paul sat helplessly in the hospital room, watching his young son lying
critically ill with kidney failure. The doctors, desperately seeking an ex-
planation, stood questioning his wife intensely for information about her
family medical history. Paul, who was adopted in infancy, had none to
give. 1
When they adopted Karen at age four, Sarah and Glenn were given
only the slightest hint by the agency that she may have been mistreated. As
Karen grew older, her behavior became increasingly violent and disruptive,
necessitating lengthy therapy. She destroyed furniture, set a fire, and
threatened to kill her two brothers. Ultimately Karen was institutional-
ized. Not until she reached adolescence did her parents learn, through
litigation, that Karen had been severely physically and sexually abused as
a child. This knowledge, and the recovery of photographs taken to docu-
ment her severe injuries, proved to be the key to successful treatment. The
opportunity to confront and come to terms with her abuse brought about a
1. Based on an account given under a different name by an adult adoptee at a panel
discussion at a training conference for adoption social workers. Remarks in Panel Discussion
at Conference on Genetic Family History: An Aid to Better Health of Adoptive Children
(April 1984) [hereinafter Remarks in Panel Discussion], in WISCONSIN CLINICAL GENETICS
CTR. & WAISMAN CTR. ON MENTAL RETARDATION & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, GENETIC
FAMILY HISTORY: AN AID TO BETTER HEALTH OF ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 26 (National Ctr.
for Educ. in Maternal & Child Health 1984) [hereinafter GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY].
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remarkable turnaround, and Karen was able to return home to her
family.2
A. Overview
Until recently, it has been the longstanding policy of most adoption
agencies, public and private, to provide adoptive parents with little or no
information regarding the medical and social history of an adopted child
and the child's biological family.3 Not only did state statutes not require
such disclosure, they in fact often prohibited revealing this type of infor-
mation without a court order and a showing of good cause.4
Although many times this policy was enforced with the best of in-
tentions, these stories are just two examples of the countless lives that
have been adversely affected, often tragically. Children with severe medi-
cal, psychological, and emotional problems often were placed with fami-
lies unprepared to deal with their special needs.5 Lack of information
impaired diagnosis of children with physical or genetic disorders, causing
expensive, unnecessary, and painful testing,6 improper medical treat-
ment, and, occasionally, permanent disability.7 Children with severe
sociopathic behavior failed to receive appropriate therapy for years, often
resulting ultimately in their institutionalization, because their adoptive
families and medical personnel lacked sufficient information to diagnose
them properly.' In the meantime, some of these disturbed children vio-
2. Based on an account of one adopted family that ultimately brought suit for access to
their daughter's medical and social background information. The names have been changed.
Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan, Associate Dean, Southern Methodist University Col-
lege of Law (Aug. 8, 1990); Lisa Belkin, Adoptive Parents Ask States for Help With Abused
Young, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1988, at Al, B8 (discussing suit filed in Texas by adoptive
parents and describing some of the problems their children have had).
3. See, eg., Ginny Whitehouse, Remarks in Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 20; Daniel
Golden, When Adoption Doesn't Work, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 1989 (Magazine), at 16, 77-
78; Rob Karwath, Teenager's Adoptive Parents Sue, CHI. TRat., Dec. 29, 1989, § 2, at 1, 14.
4. See, eg., John R. Ball & Gilbert S. Omenn, Genetics, Adoption, and the Law, in GE-
NETICS AND THE LAW II 269, 275-77 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1980);
Frances S. Ryan, The Legal Implications and Obligations of the Adoption Records Law of 1981,
in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16 (noting that prior to passage of new Wis-
consin disclosure law, neither child nor adoptive parent could obtain medical history after
adoption was finalized, except by court order); Ann T. Lamport, Comment, The Genetics of
Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemination and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED.
109, 112 (1988). For an example of such statutes, see OKuLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17 (West
1987) (prohibiting disclosure), amended by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.17(D) (West Supp.
1992) (providing for disclosure).
5. See infra notes 104-07, 112, 134-39 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 104-06, 114, 119-20 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 115-16, 122-23 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 104-11, 114-18 and accompanying text.
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lently attacked siblings, adoptive parents, or other relatives, and many
seriously harmed themselves by intentional self-mutilation or attempted
suicide.' Families were beset with overwhelming medical bills for which
the state gave no assistance, and were ineligible for the government subsi-
dies they might otherwise have obtained had the condition been dis-
closed. ° The emotional toll was staggering. Some adoptions were
disrupted,11 leaving the child with further psychological scars. Other
members of the adoptive family also were devastated when these trage-
dies occurred, causing psychological problems for siblings and sometimes
contributing to the divorce of the adoptive parents. 2
Even when health problems do not appear in childhood, the absence
of a medical history follows adoptees throughout their lives. Their future
medical treatment and their ability to make informed reproductive
choices are forever adversely affected." The medical care of their off-
spring may also be impaired.' 4 Similarly, when all lines of communica-
tion are broken, members of the original biological family lose access to
medical information about the adoptee; this occasionally can pose grave
consequences for their own reproductive choices and medical care.'"
Part II of this Article therefore reviews the policy implications of
nondisclosure and examine the factors that have prompted a recent wave
of statutory reform. The purpose of this section is not merely historical,
however, as the disclosure of health-related information is still the sub-
ject of vigorous debate. 6 Moreover, an in-depth understanding of the
9. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
II. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. The term "disruption" as used in this
Article includes both revocations and dissolutions that occur after finalization of the adoption
and adoptive placements that are terminated prior to finalization. For a more complete discus-
sion of the term "adoption disruptions," see RICHARD P. BARTH & MARIANNE BERRY,
ADOPTION AND DISRUPTION: RATES, RISKS AND RESPONSES 20-22 (1988).
12. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
16. Professor Joan Hollinger, of the University of Detroit College of Law and Reporter to
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) on the Uni-
form Adoption Act, reports that during a discussion of an early draft of the revision to the
Uniform Adoption Act in July, 1990 the provisions of the proposed act relating to disclosure
of medical information generated a great deal of discussion and divergent views. Some of those
present were totally opposed to any disclosure; at the other extreme, one commissioner advo-
cated mandatory blood tests and DNA profiles of biological parents. Telephone Interview
with Joan Hollinger, Reporter to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws on the Uniform Adoption Act (Nov. 5, 1990); see, eg., Dirk Johnson, Debate on Adop-
tion is Focusing on Rights to See Family Histories, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, § 1, at 36.
19921
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arguments favoring disclosure illustrates the crucial need for statutes that
effectively serve those goals.
During the past decade the vast majority of state legislatures have
recognized the need for greater disclosure by enacting legislation al-
lowing some medical information to be released to adoptive parents.17
Close examination of these statutes, however, reveals that their content
varies widely. Most are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the needs
of all who are affected, nor do they fully address the concerns that have
been raised by social scientists and geneticists in recent literature. For
example, some states make disclosure discretionary rather than
mandatory;18 a few still require a court order. 19 Many states' disclosure
statutes do not apply to all adoptions.20 Although all of the recent legis-
lative efforts make information available to adoptive parents, 21 not all
allow adult adoptees access to health information, 22 and few address the
needs of others, such as descendants or biological siblings, for relevant
genetic information.23 Only a handful of states make health information
available to adults whose parents' rights were terminated in juvenile
court proceedings, but for one reason or another were never adopted.24
The statutory description of the content of information to be collected
and disclosed is rarely sufficiently comprehensive. Some states focus only
on the medical history of the birth parents, others on the medical history
of the child.25 Very few insist that the medical and genetic history of
relatives be included.26
In addition, state legislatures have not adequately prescribed effec-
tive methods of collection, retention, and disclosure of health-related in-
17. During the past twelve years, only four states-Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, and
Rhode Island-and the District of Columbia have failed to enact legislation increasing the
access of adoptive parents to some type of medical information.
18. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 201-03, 213, 220 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 241, 259 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
25. For a list of states whose statutes omit reference to the child's medical history, see
infra note 263. The following disclosure statutes refer only to the child's medical history:
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie Supp. 1991) (requiring only "written health, genetic and
social history" of the child); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-5-207 (Supp. 1991) (requiring written
report including "physicial and mental condition of the child" and the "child's family back-
ground"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1990) (requiring "doctor's certificate showing
the physical and mental condition of the child"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (1991) (re-
quiring only "information concerning the child's social and medical history").
26. See infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
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formation. Assuring that trained professionals27 assume responsibility
for collection through personal interviews2" is essential to obtaining accu-
rate information. Specifying the scope of "reasonable efforts" to investi-
gate is also critical.2 9 In most states the time of disclosure to adoptive
parents occurs far too late in the process.3" Fewer than half of the states
adequately address the need to collect, retain, and transmit to concerned
parties medical and genetic information acquired subsequent to the adop-
tion.31 Including a provision for use immunity from civil and criminal
liability must be given serious consideration.32 Part III of this Article
discusses these and other deficiencies in the current status of state
legislation.
B. Right to Privacy
Legislative efforts to regulate the collection and disclosure of such
sensitive and personal information as medical and social history must be
performed with careful attention to the privacy rights of birth parents,
adoptees, and other members of their biological and adoptive families.
This topic thus permeates each section of this Article. An individual's
legal "right to privacy" broadly encompasses both a fundamental consti-
tutional guarantee33 and a collection of rights actionable in tort.34 From
27. See infra notes 334-38 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 445-47 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 343-409 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 463-70 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 454-58, 477-85 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 432-43 and accompanying text.
33. The concept of a constitutionally protected right to privacy is of course relevant to
several different fields of federal constitutional law. In criminal proceedings, protection of an
individual's privacy interests underlies Fourth Amendment restrictions on governmental
search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The First
Amendment also protects privacy rights in speech and association. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA
ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.26, at 554
(1986). The constitutional right to privacy relevant to the issues raised in this Article, how-
ever, refers to a set of interests protected by the doctrines of due process and equal protection,
id. § 18.26, at 555, which apply to state actions through the Fourteenth Amendment of the
federal Constitution. See, ag., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
A fundamental constitutional right is one entitled to heightened protection under the doc-
trines of substantive due process and equal protection. 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra, § 15.7, at 79,
§ 18.1, at 316. When fundamental rights are impaired by state action, the state action must be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest in order to survive judicial scrutiny. Id. § 18.1,
at 316; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). The United States Supreme Court
repeatedly has recognized that privacy is a fundamental right. E.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-
84; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra, § 15.7,
at 79-82, § 18.27, at 558, § 18.28, at 564. Although this concept is broadly stated, the lan-
guage primarily appears in cases considering infringement of personal autonomy, in such areas
as marriage and procreation decisions. 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra, § 15.7, at 85. Fundamental-
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both a theoretical and a pragmatic perspective, the scope of an individ-
ual's right to privacy eludes precise definition.35 As judges and commen-
tators struggle with this issue in myriad contexts, each employs his or her
personal value system to reach a conclusion about the aspects of per-
sonhood that deserve protection from unwarranted intrusion. Moreover,
each individual strikes a different balance in determining what consti-
tutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in a society as complex and
technologically advanced as ours.
The Supreme Court has described the constitutional right to privacy
as the right to be free from unwanted36 and "unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters fundamentally affecting a person."37 More specifi-
cally, in Whalen v. Roe,3" a unanimous decision, Justice Stevens identi-
fied at least two different privacy interests protected by the federal
Constitution: "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions" and the "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.
39
Judicial development of the constitutional right to privacy has fo-
cused primarily on the first interest, the right of autonomy in personal
decisionmaking. ° Lower federal courts have recognized that an integral
part of this interest is the right to bodily integrity, which includes the
right to seek or refuse medical testing and treatment. 41 When state legis-
latures define the appropriate and permissible methods of obtaining med-
rights strict-scrutiny analysis is not apparent in cases such as Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), that acknowledge
a privacy interest in nondisclosure of personal information.
State constitutions also may protect a right to privacy. See, ag., Michele Schiffer, Com-
ment, Torts, Fraud in the Adoption Setting, 29 ARiz. L. REv. 707, 719 n.83 (1987) (discussing
the right to privacy guaranteed by the Arizona Constitution).
34. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
851 (5th ed. 1984); 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra note 33, § 18.26, at 554.
35. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 15-1 (2d ed. 1988).
36. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
37. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
38. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
39. Id. at 599-600.
40. GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 176 (1989); Walter J. Wadlington,
The Health Care Profession, in 1 BIOLAW 51, 61 (James F. Childress et al. eds., 1986). See
generally 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra note 33, § 15.7, at 85, § 18.26, at 554-608 (discussing pri-
vacy as constitutional right).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490-91 & nn.18-19 (1987), aff'd on
reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744
F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984); Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp.
1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985); Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 214-15, 741
P.2d 674, 681-82 (1987); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244-45 (D.C. 1990); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346, 355, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23, 1229 (1985).
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ical information from birth parents and other relatives they must
consider this facet of the right to privacy. In particular, should biologi-
cal relatives be compelled to undergo medical, genetic, or psychological
testing? 2 Adoptees have asserted contrasting reliance upon the privacy
doctrine by arguing, to date unsuccessfully, that their right to privacy,
along with other constitutional rights, entitles them and their adoptive
parents to view medical history records in order to make better decisions
about their own medical treatment and reproduction.43
42. See infra notes 410-19 and accompanying text.
43. Adoptees and adoptive parents have argued in a series of lawsuits that adequate medi-
cal and social history are so vital to the psychological well-being and health of both adoptees
and their descendants that their entitlement to this information should be treated as a funda-
mental right. They assert that adoptees have a due process liberty interest in appropriate
medical care and treatment, which is inhibited by withholding medical and social history. See
Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1438-39 (5th Cir. 1990). These litigants also have alleged
that the right to know one's identity and heritage is akin to the rights of family privacy previ-
ously recognized by the Supreme Court. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1231
(2d Cir. 1979); In re Roger B., 84 11. 2d 323, 327, 418 N.E.2d 751, 753 (1981). Adoptees also
have asserted constitutional entitlement to background information under an equal protection
theory, contending they are treated differently than nonadopted children, see, e.g., Mellon, 601
F.2d at 1233; Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 314, 372
A.2d 646, 652 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), or, alternatively, that they are treated differently
than children in state custody, whose medical caretakers have the benefit of medical history,
see Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1441. They also have relied on the First Amendment right to receive
important information, see In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1978); Mills, 148 N.J.
Super. at 312, 372 A.2d at 652, and the Thirteenth Amendment, claiming that "abolition
practically of the parental relation" is an incident of slavery, Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236-37.
Several commentators support some or all of these positions. See, e.g., Carolyn Burke, Note,
The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1196, 1220
(1975) (First Amendment right to information and right to privacy); Carol Gloor, Comment,
Breaking the Seak Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Adult Adoptees' Right to Iden-
tity, 75 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 316, 343-44 (1980) (fundamental right); Barbara Prager & Stanley A.
Rothstein, Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y. L.F. 137, 137-39
(1973) (equal protection); Nancy Sparks, Note, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record Laws-
Constitutional Violation or a Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REv. 575, 583-89 (1982)
("Preventing access to information about an adoptee's genetics may hamper the decisionmak-
ing process concerning such things as procreation and contraception."). But see Paul J.
Tartanella, Note, Sealed Adoption Records and the Constitutional Right of Privacy of the Natu-
ral Parent, 34 RUTGERS L. REv. 451, 488-90 (1982) (suggesting continued discussion of
adoptee rights).
Most disclosure advocates treat the right to background information and the right to the
identity of the birth parents as inextricably interwoven. The courts consistently have refused
to recognize a constitutional right to information, yet in each case except Griffith the court's
discussion focused entirely on the right to the birthparent's identity. In several decisions it was
specifically noted that the adoptee had been given nonidentifying background information
from the agency's files. See Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1233; In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d at 329-30, 418
N.E.2d at 755-56; In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 766-67, 323 N.W.2d 549, 551-52 (1982);
In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 766; Mills, 148 N.J. Super. at 317-18, 372 A.2d at 654; In re
Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1390 (R.I. 1986); Bradley v. Children's Bureau, 275 S.C. 622, 625,
274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (1981).
In Griffith v. Johnston adoptive parents and their children sued the State of Texas seeking
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Constitutional restrictions on the collection, retention, and disclo-
sure of personal information have received far less attention from the
courts. In 1977 the Supreme Court acknowledged in Whalen v. Roe "the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of per-
sonal information in computerized data banks or other massive govern-
ment files," and recognized that the duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosure of this information "arguably has its roots in the Constitu-
tion."'  Nevertheless, the Whalen Court upheld the constitutionality of
a state statute requiring that copies of all prescriptions for certain drugs45
be fied with the state health department, finding that the program as
administered did not pose a sufficiently grievous threat either to the pa-
tient's interest in nondisclosure of private information or in autonomy of
personal decisionmaking.46 That same year, in Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,47 the Court again recognized a constitutionally pro-
tected privacy interest in avoiding disclosures of a personal nature, but
rejected President Richard M. Nixon's privacy challenge to a federal law
authorizing the government to seize and screen all of his documents and
tape recordings.48
Since 1977 the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the consti-
tutional limitations upon governmental collection and disclosure of infor-
mation, except in the context of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
restrictions in criminal proceedings.49 Scholars have called for greater
both disclosure of nonidentifying medical information in their files and services for the chil-
dren. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that they had failed to
state a claim under either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1441. The court noted, however, that their request for the
information was moot because during the litigation Texas had passed legislation providing
adoptive parents a right to the information requested. Id. at 1434 n.4. Thus, the issue was
before the court in the context of a claim for ameliorative services.
44. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (constitutional challenge to 1972 New York
statute requiring that for certain drugs copies of prescriptions containing the name of the pre-
scribing physician, pharmacy, drug, dosage, and name, address, and age of the patient be filed
and recorded with the State Health Department).
45. The New York Legislature established a separate category of drugs considered to have
legitimate medical uses, but to be the most dangerous in terms of potential for abuse. This
category includes opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and
methaqualone. Id. at 592-93.
46. Id. at 600.
47. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
48. Id. at 457. Because the Act ordered that items of a personal or private nature were to
be returned to President Nixon, the Court found that any privacy interest in avoiding the
screening process itself was outweighed by the important public interest in preserving the vast
majority of the materials, which concerned official conduct of Nixon's presidency and for
which he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 465.
49. See 2 ROTUNDA et a]., supra note 33, § 18.30, at 600-01. For an earlier case in which
the Supreme Court confronted a constitutional privacy challenge to a state's recordkeeping
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judicial attention to defining a constitutional limitation emanating from a
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy." At present, however, the pa-
rameters of this limitation are extremely ill-defined.
When they attempt to regulate the collection of medical and social
history and the scope of permissible disclosure, state legislatures must
consider the constitutional dimension of the interests of adoptees and
their families in controlling access to personal information. To what ex-
tent should the adoptee's descendants have access to this information?5'
Should investigators be authorized to obtain medical records of birth
parents or other relatives without their consent? 2 Is it an invasion of a
birth mother's privacy to conduct diagnostic tests upon the infant that
may disclose her own medical status?53 This amorphous second branch
of the constitutional right to privacy affects these and other issues54 ad-
dressed in this Article.
Judges have paid far more attention to the interest in protecting per-
sonal information in the context of a developing body of tort law.
Throughout the last century state courts have recognized liability for vio-
lations of a common-law right to privacy. 5 Regarded initially as "the
right to be let alone,"5 6 the right now encompasses several distinct causes
regulations for abortion, see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976). In
Danforth the Court again upheld the recordkeeping scheme, holding that the requirements
were "reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health" and properly respected "a
patient's confidentiality and privacy." Id.
In another case concerning relief for invasion of privacy, parents of schoolchildren sued a
congressperson, the Public Printer, and the Superintendent of Documents for invasion of pri-
vacy resulting from dissemination of a congressional report identifying certain students in de-
rogatory contexts. The Court held that congressional immunity did not apply to the Printer or
Superintendent and remanded the case for a determination of the validity of the cause of action
and possible defenses. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324-25 (1973).
50. 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra note 33, § 18.30, at 605; TRIBE, supra note 35, § 5-24, at 399-
400.
51. See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 363-72 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 288-91 (access to records of biological relatives), 410-19 (mandatory
testing of biological parents or relatives), 421-31 (sanctioning parents for nondisclosure).
55. KEETON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 849-50. The origin of recognition of tort
liability for invasion of a right to privacy is often traced to a famous article by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195 (1890). KEn-
TON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 849; 2 ROTUNDA et al., supra note 33, § 18.26, at 554 n.1.
Allegedly the first case to afford recovery on a right-of-privacy cause of action was an unre-
ported New York decision, Manola v. Stevens (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890), discussed in N.Y. TIMEs,
June 15, 18, 21, 1890. KEnTON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 850 n.10.
56. KEETON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 849; Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 271. The
phrase is attributed to Judge Cooley, who used it in THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Chi-
cago, Callaghan & Co. 2d ed. 1888). KEETON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 849 & n.3.
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of action, including public disclosure of private facts.57 Several courts
have held that protection of a patient's privacy is a legal duty, as well as
an ethical one, and that unauthorized disclosure of a patient's medical
records constitutes an actionable invasion of the right to privacy.58
Closely related is judicial endorsement of liability for breach of the
duty of medical confidentiality, now recognized in some jurisdictions as a
separate tort.59 The duty of medical confidentiality prohibits physicians
and other medical personnel from revealing information they acquire
about their patients in the course of the patients' treatment.6 Originally
viewed as a professional duty mandated by the ethical codes of certain
health-care professions, 61 the existence of a legal duty giving rise to tort
liability now often derives from the statutory physician-patient testimo-
nial privilege, medical licensing statutes, or professional regulations.62
The underlying rationale for the duty of medical confidentiality is two-
fold: first, protection of the patient's right to determine who has access
to personal information, and second, the concern that patients will be less
likely to seek medical treatment or provide complete and accurate infor-
57. KEETON et al., supra note 34, § 117, at 851, 856-63.
58. See, eg., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 708-09, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1974); Valencia
v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 350, 645 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Ct. App. 1982); Vassiliades v. Gar-
finckel's Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985); Acosta v. Carey, 365 So. 2d 4, 5 (La.
Ct. App. 1978); Bratt v. International Business Machs., 392 Mass. 508, 522-23, 467 N.E.2d
126, 136-37 (1984); Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp. Inc., 20 Ohio App. 3d 4, 5, 484
N.E.2d 265, 266-67 (1985); see also Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1335-36
(D.D.C. 1978) (refusing to recognize cause of action for breach of the confidentiality of the
physician-patient relationship but recognizing the validity of the invasion of privacy claim);
Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician's Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confiden-
tial Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4th 668, 680-91 (1986) (summarizing cases in which
courts considered the tort liability of doctors for unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information).
59. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 717, 696 P.2d 527, 533 (1985); Zelin,
supra note 58, at 679.
Although both a claim for invasion of privacy based upon release of medical information
and a claim for breach of the duty of medical confidentiality can arise from wrongful disclo-
sure of health-related information, some jurisdictions recognize the different parameters of
each claim. Breach of medical confidentiality need not involve information considered per-
sonal or private to the same degree as is required for a claim for invasion of privacy. Breach of
medical confidentiality requires that the defendant obtain the disclosed information in a confi-
dential relationship, whereas, theoretically, if a disclosure otherwise qualifies as an invasion of
privacy, no confidential relationship with the wrongdoer is necessary to impose liability. Id.
60. Candace C. Gauthier, HIV Testing and Confidentiality, 2 BIOLAW S:349, S:351
(James F. Childress & Ruth D. Gaare eds., Mar.-Apr. 1990 Special Section); see ANNAS, supra
note 40, at 176.
61. ANNAS, supra note 40, at 176 (noting that both the American Medical Association's
Principles of Ethics and the American Nurses' Association Code mandate maintenance of
confidentiality); Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:351.
62. Humphers, 298 Or. at 718-19, 696 P.2d at 534.
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mation to medical personnel without an assurance of confidentiality.63
The duty has many exceptions, however. For example, courts have rec-
ognized that confidentiality may be violated to prevent harm to the pa-
tient, to prevent harm to an identifiable third party, or to protect the
public health."
While tort liability can, of course, be abrogated by statute, legisla-
tures must contemplate the policy considerations underlying the tort
doctrine regarding invasion of privacy and violation of medical confiden-
tiality in determining the appropriate extent of collection efforts and the
proper scope of disclosure."
Widespread recognition of certain conditions that merit a particu-
larly high degree of privacy protection has prompted the enactment of
specific nondisclosure statutes. These statutes typically prohibit releasing
information regarding persons who have been tested for or who have
contracted certain sexually transmitted diseases, such as acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and syphilis.66 The tremendous dis-
crimination in housing, employment, education, and other aspects of life
encountered by people with AIDS in particular,67 merits special atten-
tion to the application of the recommendations made throughout this
Article to information regarding human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
testing or treatment. The Article therefore examines this topic in a sepa-
rate section.6 8 States must carefully consider the extent to which excep-
tions to these specific nondisclosure statutes should be created to
implement the collection and disclosure of health-related information in
adoption. 9
A final point worth emphasizing is the central role that interest-bal-
63. Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:351.
64. Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 273; Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:352.
65. See infra notes 244-45, 359-61 and accompanying text.
66. See MICH. CoMP. LAws. ANN. § 333.5131(8) (West Supp. 1991) (stating that person
who violates HIV nondisclosure statute is liable in a civil action for actual damages or $1,000,
whichever is greater, and costs and reasonable attorney fees); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1991) (imposing civil liability for violation of HIV nondisclosure statute).
67. One physician reports that disclosure of a positive HIV test result caused his patient
to lose employment, housing, and insurance. Within 10 days after testing, the life he had
known for 10 years was in ruins. Ronalow Sherer, Physician's Use of the HIVAntibody Test:
The Need for Consent, Counseling, Confidentiality, and Caution, 259 JAMA 264, 264 (1988);
see, e.g., Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:361; Larry Gostin, Public Health Law: Current
Problems and Future Remedies, 1 BIoLA w R:31, R:47 (James F. Childress et al. eds., July
Supp. 1989).
68. See infra notes 373-93 and accompanying text; see also notes 404-09 and accompany-
ing text (discussing privacy implications of conducting tests upon child that reveal HIV status
of the birth mother).
69. See infra notes 399-409 and accompanying text.
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ancing plays in determining whether an individual's constitutional, com-
mon-law, or statutory right to privacy has been impaired. In both the
constitutional and tort doctrines of privacy, a determination that infor-
mation is highly sensitive or that a given action will impair an individ-
ual's decisionmaking ability does not automatically trigger judicial
protection. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that the right to
privacy is not absolute.70 When state action impairs decisionmaking
about fundamental aspects of one's life, the action will withstand judicial
scrutiny if it is found to be necessary to achieve a compelling state inter-
est.7 1 Courts have subjected state-mandated collection, retention, and
disclosure of personal information to a less rigorous constitutional re-
view. Tribunals have upheld state statutory schemes when the collection,
retention, and specified use of the data served reasonable public interests
and when the statute included sufficient procedures to guard against un-
warranted disclosure.72 Similarly, tort law recognizes a cause of action
for disclosure of private facts only when the public has no legitimate in-
terest in the information.7" The law creates exceptions to the doctrine of
medical confidentiality for situations in which substantial counterbalanc-
ing interests exist, such as the protection of third parties or the public.74
Even specific nondisclosure statutes provide for disclosure under certain
circumstances."
Recognizing the need for more extensive collection and disclosure of
health-related information in adoption thus requires analyzing many
complex issues and weighing the substantial interests of the many indi-
viduals affected by adoption. The line-drawing is sometimes not easy and
surely will remain subject to vigorous debate. This Article suggests
where these lines should be drawn; equally as important, however, it at-
tempts to stimulate that debate and draw renewed attention to the diffi-
70. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
154 (1973); see also In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1245-46 (D.C. 1990) (summarizing precedent
establishing that the right to accept or reject medical treatment is not absolute).
71. See, eg., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388; see also 2 ROTUNDA et. al, supra note 33, § 18.1,
at 316 (discussing judicial scrutiny of fundamental rights).
72. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 458, 462-65 (1977); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598, 602, 605-06 (1977).
73. RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (providing that one who gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) is not of a legitimate concern to the public); KEETON et al., supra
note 34, § 117, at 857; see Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 709, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1974).
74. Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 272-73.
75. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 /2, para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (HIV non-
disclosure statute); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West Supp. 1991) (same).
[Vol. 70
1992] HEALTH DISCLOSURES IN ADOPTION
cult issues that have not yet been addressed adequately in the majority of
adoption disclosure statutes now on the books.
II. THE DISCLOSURE DEBATE
An understanding of the contours of the debate over disclosure of
health-related information is critical to assessing the precise scope and
methodology of current disclosure statutes. This section therefore sum-
marizes the principal arguments of opponents and proponents of disclo-
sure, providing a framework for more detailed analysis of the appropriate
extent and implementation of disclosure in Part III.
A. Traditional Concerns About Full Disclosure
For most of the twentieth century76 adoption agencies commonly
gave very limited information about the medical and social background
of a child and the child's biological family to adoptive parents." One
explanation for this approach was philosophical. Adoption aimed to
provide a fresh start, severing all ties with the biological family and
building the illusion that the child was born into the adoptive family.78
Adoptive parents and children were matched by physical characteris-
tics, 79 and birth certificates were changed to indicate that the adoptive
76. The history of adoption in America indicates that even before the recent wave of
reform in the 1980s, secrecy has not always been the norm. Prior to 1851 adoption was a
private agreement, like a conveyance of real estate, that was authenticated by making a public
record and, in some instances, undergoing a proceeding for a name change. Ruth-Arlene W.
Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-83, 17 FAM. L.Q. 173, 175-76 (1983); Sanford
N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADvoc., Summer 1982, at 9, 9. In 1851 Mas-
sachusetts passed the first adoption statute that established judicial supervision over adoptions.
Katz, supra, at 9. Until the 1920s, when confidentiality statutes were enacted by many states,
adoptions were often open. It was a common practice for the birth mother to stay with the
adoptive family during pregnancy, or to be chosen by the birth mother's family. Newspapers
routinely reported details of adoption proceedings during the late nineteenth century. ADOP-
TION LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 1.03[4], 13.01[l][b] (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988); LINCOLN
CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPToN 85 (1990).
77. See, e.g., ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 35-36 (1978);
Golden, supra note 3, at 77; Karwath, supra note 3, at 12 (David Schneidman, spokesperson
for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, stated that prior to the enactment
of Illinois' disclosure law in 1985, the conventional wisdom of adoption agencies was that
adopted children and parents were better off not knowing background information.).
78. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 38; Katz, supra note 76, at 9, 10; Lamport, supra
note 4, at 110; Golden, supra note 3, at 77 (noting that the fresh start philosophy was fostered
by fact that adoptions during the mid-twentieth century occurred primarily with infants, and
were considered a rebirth; thus only a minimum of background information was provided to
new parents).
79. Katz, supra note 76, at 9.
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parents were the birth parents. 80 Emphasizing the child's biological ties
was inconsistent with this philosophy.
Concrete concerns related to the child's welfare also underlay lim-
ited disclosure. Caseworkers' fear that a child might not otherwise be
placed I was a major factor militating against full disclosure. Richard
Hochstra, director of Michigan's public adoption services, explained:
"You want the best for these children. So it is easy to withhold informa-
tion, not in a malicious sense, but in the sense that you are highlighting
some of the best in these children, and you tend to leave out some of the
problems.""2 Selective disclosure of this nature has been a particular
problem for many families who adopted older children from state agen-
cies, only to discover subsequently a long history of psychiatric
disorders. 83
Another concern is the serious potential for stigmatization of the
child-a prospect harmful in many respects. Knowledge of the existence
of a familial genetic disorder may limit placement options for a child,
possibly precluding homes that would otherwise be the best placement,
even though the child may never develop the disease.84 When the child is
adopted, knowledge of genetic disorders, a history of parental mental ill-
ness or drug use, or other factors perceived as negative in a child's back-
ground could affect adversely the attitude of adoptive parents or other
relatives toward the child, impairing these relationships and the child's
development. 5 Apart from the effects of specific information, social
scientists previously coined the phrase "the bad blood syndrome" to de-
scribe some adoptive parents' general anxiety that hereditary factors
might produce negative behavior.86 More specific knowledge of negative
80. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 38. This is still a common practice. See, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.18 (West 1987).
81. See KATHERINE A. NELSON, ON THE FRONTIER OF ADOPTION: A STUDY OF SPE-
CIAL NEEDS ADOPTIVE FAMILIES 87 (1985) (study conducted by Child Welfare League of
America of 177 families who adopted 257 children classified as "special needs" children).
82. Dianne Klein, "Special" Children, Dark Past Can Haunt Adoptions, L.A. TIMES, May
29, 1988, § 1, at 1, 33.
83. Belkin, supra note 2, at B8; Golden, supra note 3, at 77-78; Klein, supra note 82, at 1,
33.
84. Norman Fost, Disclosing Genetic Information to Adoptive Parents: Ethical Considera-
tions, in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 50, 51.
85. Rita B. Black, Genetics and Adoption: A Challenge for Social Work, in SOCIAL WORK
IN A TROUBLED WORLD: SEVENTH NASW SYMPOSIUM 199-202 (Miriam Dinerman ed.,
1981); Fost, supra note 84, at 50, 51; Gilbert S. Omenn et al., Genetic Counseling for Adoptees
at Risk for Specific Inherited Disorders, 5 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 157, 162 (1980).
86. Black, supra note 85, at 201-02. Black notes that until recently it was the prevailing
view in the adoption field that genetic factors played little role in influencing behavior, a view
that was communicated to adoptive parents. Nevertheless, studies of adoptive families indi-
cate that many adoptive parents retained an exaggerated fear of hereditary influence. See also
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factors could exacerbate this problem. Revealing newly discovered infor-
mation after the adoption could negatively affect an unstable family,
cause parental feelings or actions of rejection, or even provoke a
revocation. 7
A further concern is the impact of "negative" knowledge on the
adoptee's self-image. Aside from the effects of others' perceptions, an
adoptee could develop a negative sense of identity or predestiny by ac-
quiring genetic or social information about ancestors that the adoptee
perceives as undesirable.88 Knowledge may create tremendous anxiety
about a genetic disorder that may not have been transmitted to this
adoptee, or may not create symptoms until much later.89 Genetic coun-
selors have devised the term "shattered self-adequacy syndrome" to de-
scribe the acute and chronic stress that diagnosis of a genetic disorder
creates.90 Making such information available to adopted children means
that adoptees will not be spared that stress, and may not have the benefit
of the support that would be available to unadopted persons from family
members who are also at risk.
Others have posited a financial argument. Disclosure of medical in-
formation to adoptive parents and adult adoptees facilitates access to that
information by insurance companies, who may use it to screen out
adoptees from coverage of life or health insurance due to genetic risks
that would not otherwise be known.91
Opponents of disclosure also rely heavily on their expressed concern
for the privacy and anonymity of birth parents and relatives. 92 Such crit-
ics argue that extensive release of medical and social background infor-
mation, even with names and addresses redacted, could facilitate tracing
efforts by adoptees to find birth parents or relatives.93 Social and medical
history could also contain sensitive or potentially embarrassing revela-
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, 1989 ADOPTION FACTBOOK 205-06 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter ADOPTION FACTBOOK] (discussing myth of a negative "adopted child syndrome").
87. Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 162-63.
88. See Fost, supra note 84, at 51.
89. Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 162.
90. Black, supra note 85, at 199-200.
91. Fost, supra note 84, at 53-54. When adoptive parents have information of genetic
risks, they may be required to report the risks on insurance application forms.
92. See SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 50; Lamport, supra note 4, at 123; Timothy N.
O'Connell, Note, S.B. 340: Disclosure of Social and Medical History of the Biological Parents
of an Adopted Child, 4 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 533, 535, 537 (1979) (citing critics of Ohio's
newly-enacted nondisclosure statute who opposed the statute on the grounds that the privacy
of the biological parents was not adequately protected); Johnson, supra note 16, at 36. See
generally Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 162 (discussing importance of confidentiality of par-
ties to adoption in evaluating disclosure of supplemental medical information).
93. O'Connell, supra note 92, at 537.
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tions concerning such topics as mental illness, substance abuse, criminal
behavior, sexually transmitted diseases, prior pregnancies, or abortions.
In two states, Alaska and Kansas, the adoptee has a right to identifying
information upon reaching majority;94 in other states the adoptee may
find the birth parent through a registry95 or other consensual statutory
procedures.96 Identity disclosure down the road creates the possibility
that sensitive information could be revealed by the adoptee to others not
chosen by the birth parent or biological relative. In a similar vein, it has
been argued that birth mothers now may be motivated to seek independ-
ent rather than agency adoption to avoid intrusive questioning,97 and
that mandating extensive questioning could prompt them to choose other
options, such as abortion.98
Finally, some commentators have raised the specter that access to
medical information will promote searches by adoptive parents for "the
perfect child." 99 One article hypothesizing about a variety of evils of
genetic testing speculated that adoption "brokers" might use them to
"probe the genetic history of babies.' '""o Adoptive parents, critics de-
clare, must assume the same risks as biological parents.101
B. The Tragedy of Nondisclosure and Arguments for Transmission of
Health-Related Information
Despite the concerns outlined above, experts in the adoption field
now agree that medical and social background information should be
given to adoptive parents."0 2 The Child Welfare League of America, a
national affiliation of adoption agencies and one of the foremost Ameri-
94. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 13.01[3], at 13-21 (Supp. 1991).
95. Id. § 13.01[3][b], at 13-39 (Supp. 1991) (observing that at least 21 states have enacted
some form of mutual consent registry to assist with consensual meetings between those in-
volved in adoptions, most typically adult adoptees and their biological parents or siblings).
96. Id. § 13.01[3][c], at 13-39 (Supp. 1991) (stating that 16 states have adopted search-
and-consent statutes authorizing a public or private agency or a trained intermediary to assist
in locating biological parents to determine whether they will consent to disclosure of identity
or to meeting). Many states also have statutory provisions allowing release of identifying in-
formation by court order for good cause. Id. § 13.01[3][d] (Supp. 1991).
97. Johnson, supra note 16, at 36 (quoting William Pierce, President of the National Com-
mittee for Adoption).
98. Lamport, supra note 4, at 123.
99. See Kay Kitzman, Remarks in Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 24 (Kitzman is an
adoptive mother).
100. Dorothy Nelkin & Laurence Tancredi, Threats to Privacy in Biological Testing, S. F.
CHRON., Feb. 7, 1990, § Z-1, at 8.
101. See Fost, supra note 84, at 52-53.
102. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 13.01[l][c], at 13-10 to -11;
SOROSKY et a., supra note 77, at 36. For a summary of testimony by adoption experts stating
that it is the policy of their agencies to provide nonidentifying background information, see
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can authorities on adoption standards, endorses full disclosure of this
information in its guidelines for adoption professionals.1l 3
Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 186, 189, 191, 192, 509 A.2d
283, 287, 289, 291 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
The recommendation of psychologists who deal with disturbed children is identical.
"[A]gencies should fully disclose to adoptive parents the background of the child and fully
prepare prospective parents if they are to receive an unattached child." KEN MAGID & CAR-
OLE A. McKELvEY, HIGH RISK 153 (1987).
103. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 36 (observing that the Child Welfare League of
America has recommended since 1971 that adoptive parents be given nonidentifying medical
and social background information). Current Child Welfare League Standards provide:
4.13 Discussion of Information about the Child
Except as limited by statute, special circumstances, or the wishes of the parties to the
adoption, adoptive parents should be given full disclosure of information about the
birth parents and the child to be adopted. (3.1-3.6)
This information should include:
" Developmental history-birth history, weight and height, feeding and sleep-
ing habits of infants, and deviation from normal development of the older
child that may affect current or future functioning (3.1, 3.2)
" Level of current development (3.2, 3.3, 3.5)
" Personality and temperament-ways of responding and relating to people,
sensitivities, likes and dislikes, special aptitudes and interests, preferred
method of being cared for (3.1)
* Medical data-immunizations, illnesses, handicapping conditions; any ex-
tended or expensive medical care that may be needed, probable length of med-
ical care, probable expenses for adoptive parents and possible subsidies for the
care; and extent or limitation of activities and/or interference with educa-
tional, social, or vocational functioning and achievements that might be ex-
pected (3.2, 5.10, 6.27, 7.6)
" Known hereditary and other conditions-problems that may either appear
later or adversely affect future development (the advice of appropriate consul-
tants is important both to determine scientifically any risks and to know how
to interpret them) (3.2, 3.4, 6.27)
" Prior placement history, if any. (3.1)
Both the adoptive family and the physician caring for the child after placement
should be provided with a medical history in writing. The adoptive parents should
be asked to keep the agency informed of newly discovered medical or genetic infor-
mation of importance to the health of the birth parents or the development of their
other children. The agency should advise the adoptive parents that the birth parents
have also been asked to add any newly discovered significant family history that can
affect the future development of the adopted child.
4.14. Information about birth parents
Adoptive parents should be provided with information about the birth parents that
they would need in order to have an understanding of the birth parents and the
reasons for the placement of the child for adoption and to feel comfortable later in
addressing the child's questions about his or her birth parents.
Information about the birth parents is helpful for the adoptive parents to know
and be able to share with the child throughout childhood. Examples of descrip-
tive information include age, physical characteristics, special abilities or inter-
ests, education, temperament, adjustment, and capacity for relationships. (4.15)
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The reasons for this shift can best be appreciated by examining a
case history that vividly illustrates the disastrous impact of nondisclosure
on many families. Lisa, a blonde, blue-eyed six year old, was placed for
adoption with Joan and Bob after four short visits to their home.t"
They were told she had been physically abused by her mother as a young
child, and that she was removed from a foster home, where she was
adored, when her foster father died. The social worker advised them of
some problems in a subsequent foster home, but assured them she was
emotionally intact and would be fine in a good home. During the five
years she lived with her adoptive family, Lisa's behavior deteriorated.
She set a fire that almost burned down the house, stole things from class-
mates and family members, and fought repeatedly with her parents and
older sister. Tension was so high that her sister's friends stopped coming
over. Outpatient therapy proved useless. The situation climaxed when
Lisa attempted to poison her father with Lysol. When she was subse-
quently institutionalized, Joan and Bob learned that the state had evalu-
ated Lisa before the adoption, and that psychiatrists had recommended
that she be institutionalized for long-term psychiatric care. Instead of
providing that care, the state had placed Lisa for adoption, revealing
Agencies should engage applicants in individual and group assessment and prep-
aration that will educate the applicant to child and family issues in adoption.
This process should stress that the needs of the child are paramount. During
the assessment and preparation, adoptive applicants should have been informed
about the usual reasons of why children are in need of adoption; that most in-
fants and young children are born to single parents and that older children may
have experienced abuse and neglect. (1.2)
Attitudes of adoptive parents about birth parents should have been considered
during the assessment and preparation process and should be discussed in the
postplacement period. Adoptive parents need help in understanding the circum-
stances of single parents: parents who were unwilling or unable to care respon-
sibly for a child; and their own feelings about them. (5.5, 5.19)
In the case of older children, adoptive parents should be provided with informa-
tion about the child's birth family situation that they will need both to help the
child and to be aware of what the child knows about the birth parents.
Birth parents have a responsibility to provide the child welfare agency and/or
the adoptive parents with information regarding any significant changes in their
medical conditions resulting from hereditary conditions and any social informa-
tion that may prove helpful to the adopted child.
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 37-39 (rev.
ed. 1988).
Also in 1971, the American Academy of Pediatrics' Council on Child Health recognized
an adoptee's need to learn his ancestry and encouraged pediatricians to make available infor-
mation that they had acquired. Lamport, supra note 4, at 111.
104. Golden, supra note 3, at 16, 73. The names of the adoptive parents have been
changed.
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nothing of this evaluation to the adoptive parents.1 05 By the time she
was institutionalized five years later, it was too late. Lisa had not re-
ceived the treatment she desperately needed. The family was torn apart.
Bob and Joan filed a petition to revoke the adoption that was subse-
quently granted.106 A few months later, Joan and Bob separated.1 °7 The
stress of the failed adoption had left their marriage and family in ruins.
This case history is not unique. The policy of adoptive placement
without full disclosure of psychiatric disorder has denied numerous
adopted children effective therapy, at a staggering emotional and physi-
cal toll both to the children and to adoptive parents and siblings. Many
of these children mutilate themselves or attempt suicide. 108 Many adop-
tive parents who were not given accurate information regarding their
child's mental problems prior to placement report children setting fires,
violently attacking siblings and adoptive parents, and engaging in other
destructive behavior. °9 In addition to the threat of physical harm, the
stress is psychologically injurious to siblings,110 and can cause the adop-
105. Id. at 82.
106. Prior to revocation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the family court had
inherent power to grant nullification of an adoption on grounds of fraudulent conduct by the
public adoption agency. See In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1988).
107. Golden, supra note 3, at 82.
108. Id. at 77. Tommy Colella, another child whose adoption revocation received national
media coverage, attempted repeatedly to set fires, mutilate himself, and commit suicide by
hanging prior to his institutionalization. Only later did his parents learn that the state had
extensive files on his psychiatric disorder. Jack Friedman, He's Not Our Son, PEOPLE, July 11,
1988, at 38, 40, 41; Dianne Klein, Adopted Boy's Hidden Past Led Family to Life of Terror,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, § 2, at 1 (Orange Co. ed.); see also BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11,
at 176 (describing eight-year-old child who practiced Satanic worship and sliced his penis to
draw blood for ceremonies was placed with adoptive father who was unaware of this behavior
at time of placement); Marshall Marvelli & Sylvia Marvelli, Tom and Janice Colella, PEOPLE,
Aug. 1, 1988, at 6, 6 (letter to editor describing adopted daughter's self-abuse and preoccupa-
tion with fire).
109. See Belkin, supra note 2, at 1 (reporting that adopted child attempted to burn down
his home and threatened younger brother with knife; parents subsequently learned state main-
tained large file on child describing abuse by birth father; attacks by other children also de-
scribed); Golden, supra note 3, at 79, 82 (Jacob Clemens, in apparent suicide attempt, killed
two younger brothers in fire; in another instance, "Debbie" attacked adoptive mother with
knife); Bonnie Jacob, Raising Cain, NEw DOMINION, May/June 1989, at 33, 37; Klein, supra
note 82, at 1 ("Monica" twice tried to suffocate baby sister; threatened mother three times with
knife); Andrea Sachs, When the Lullaby Ends, TIME, June 4, 1990, at 82, 82 (adoptive parents
learned after adoption that "violently disturbed" adoptee had been abused as a child; adoptee
had tried to cut off adoptive cousin's arm and, on another occasion, to set fire to the cousin's
room while he slept).
In Colorado an organization founded for parents of adoptive children who are violent and
mentally ill gained 2,000 members in its first five months of operation. Belkin, supra note 2, at
I.
110. See account of Lisa G. in Golden, supra note 3, at 1; see also Jacob, supra note 109, at
35 (indicating that a previously well-adjusted sister began staying in her room behind closed
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tive parents' marriage to crumble.III Although attempted adoption revo-
cations are rare, they are increasing as adoptive parents feel defrauded,
betrayed, and helpless to meet the emotional and financial demands of
the child's disorder. 11 2 A more common response is the wave of "wrong-
ful adoption" suits currently being waged against adoption agencies that
failed to disclose their knowledge of the child's psychological or physical
problems, genetic disorders, medical history, or other critical back-
ground information.1 1 3
doors); Klein, supra note 82, at 16 (mother stated that other children lived in constant turmoil
and fear because of "Monica's" behavior). The impact on siblings can be particularly harmful
if biological siblings are adopted together and the adoption of one is later revoked, causing
their separation. See generally Belkin, supra note 2, at I (describing how younger brother was
terrorized by adoptee); Sharman Stein, Spurned.Adoptee Just Wants to See Brother, CHI. TmB.,
Apr. 5, 1990, § 1, at I (adopted siblings separated when adoptive parents surrendered one back
to state and kept the other).
111. Golden, supra note 3, at 79 (quoting one adoptive mother, who now leads workshops
for adoptive families: "A lot of people stay in the [adoptive] commitment after it doesn't work
out. And to me, that's really unhealthy because it affects the rest of the family. I've seen so
many marriages break up over it."); Jacob, supra note 109, at 35 (noting that stress caused the
adoptive couple to fight continuously).
112. See In re Adoption of Kay C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741, 746, 757, 278 Cal. Rptr. 907,
909-10, 917 (1991) (upholding adoption revocation granted because adoptive parents had not
been told prior to adoptive placement of child's serious mental illness and expert opinion advis-
ing against adoption); M.L.B. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 599 So. 2d 87,
87-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that one-year period in which to attack validity of
adoption does not preclude motion to set aside adoption on grounds of alleged fraudulent
concealment of child's psychiatric disorder); In re Adoption of Haggerty, No. CA-741, 1991
Ohio WL 115978, at *5 (Ct. App. June 7, 1991) (rejecting as not timely a motion to vacate an
adoption decree on grounds of fraudulent nondisclosure of child's behavior and emotional
problems).
In a case reported by the Los Angeles Times, see Klein, supra, note 82, at 1, social workers
failed to tell the adoptive parents of "Monica" about a long history of mental illness and drug
abuse in her family. When the child was finally diagnosed as schizophrenic with a multiple-
personality disorder, medical bills for her institutionalization forced the parents to seek termi-
nation of their parental rights. The court granted the parents the right to continue to visit with
the child weekly and participate in her therapy; the court also allowed the child to visit the
adoptive parents on weekends as her condition permitted. See also Belkin, supra note 2, at B8
(describing action to surrender custody of adopted child); Golden, supra note 3, at 82 (revoca-
tion action filed by parents never told of pre-placement psychological report that advised
against adoption); Klein, supra note 108, at I (Tommy Colella); Marvelli & Marvelli, supra
note 108, at 6 (attempted revocation of adoption of institutionalized child to obtain govern-
ment assistance for staggering medical bills).
113. See, eg., Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1990); Collier v. Krane,
763 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D. Colo. 1991); Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions,
201 Cal. App. 3d 859, 863, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1988); Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child
Care Servs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373 (1980); Wallerstein v. Hospital
Corp. of Am., 573 So. 2d 9, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Krueger v. Leahy, No. 89-L-1 8751
(Cook County Civ. Ct., Ill., filed Dec. 28, 1989); M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 475 N.W.2d
94, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 968 (Miss. 1990); Allen v.
Children's Servs., 58 Ohio App. 3d 41, 42, 567 N.E.2d 1346, 1348 (1990); Wristen v. Jansen,
No. 86CV-10-6421 (Ct. of C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, filed Oct. 15, 1986); Allen v. Allen,
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The most compelling argument for full disclosure of medical and
social background information is that it can facilitate appropriate diagno-
sis and treatment for adopted children at an early stage. Children with
psychiatric disorders often receive ineffective treatment for years, some-
times resulting in their being institutionalized, because adoptive parents
and medical caregivers lack knowledge that could provide a clue to effec-
tive treatment.114 By the time the severity of their condition is appreci-
ated, it can be too late. Psychiatrists who work with psychopathic
children, often referred to as "unattached children," say the chances of
therapy being successful are greatly increased if the child is diagnosed
when young.'1 5 For children over seven, the chances of success are only
about fifty percent, and for children over eleven, the likelihood of recov-
ery is even lower. 116 Information regarding substance abuse during preg-
nancy can facilitate diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome or other drug-
related problems.' Knowledge of the occurrence of schizophrenia or
214 Or. 664, 667, 330 P.2d 151, 154 (1958); Gibbs v. Ernst, No. 90003066 (Ct. of C.P., Bucks
County, Pa., filed Apr. 4, 1990); In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131, 132 (R.I. 1988); Martin v.
Methodist Home, No. 90-07815 (Dallas County Dist. Ct., Tex., fied July 2, 1990); Phillips v.
Texas Dep't of Human Servs., No. 90-07815 (Travis County. Dist. Ct., Tex., filed July 2,
1990); Richards v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., No. 476799 (Travis County Dist. Ct., Tex.,
filed Apr. 18, 1990); Meracle v. Children's Servs. Soc'y, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 20, 437 N.W.2d 532,
533 (1989); see also Golden, supra note 3, at 16 (describing wrongful adoption suit filed by
Linda and John Murphy for $4.1 million in Massachusetts); Klein, supra note 108, at 1
(wrongful adoption suit filed by Tom and Janice Colella); One Million Sought in Adoption Suit,
CHI. TRIB., May 23, 1990, § 2 (Chicagoland), at 3 (wrongful adoption suit by Thomas Tinor
and Elisabeth Novakovich against Bethany Christian Services in Illinois). Professor Neil
Cogan of Southern Methodist University has fied 12 wrongful adoption actions, including
three of the actions listed above. Telephone Interview with Neil Cogan, supra note 2.
114. See Dianne Klein, An Adopted Boy-And Terror Begins, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, § 1
(Home edition), at 3 (The adoptive mother of Tommy Colella, whose diagnosis of fetal alcohol
syndrome with psychotic behavior was not shared with adoptive parents, observed, "[a]s awful
as it was, we know that Tommy suffered more than we did. He was denied the treatment he
needed. The system failed him."); Klein, supra note 82, at 1 ("Monica" endured years of
inappropriate therapy before she was diagnosed as having multiple personality disorder and
schizophrenia. She was ultimately institutionalized. Aware of her disturbed behavior, social
workers for years withheld from the family an extensive history of schizophrenia in her biolog-
ical family.); see also Johnson, supra note 16, at 36 (noting that knowledge of medical history
allows families to anticipate health problems of adopted children); Karwath, supra note 3, at
12 (quoting adoptive mother of an institutionalized mentally retarded son who learned 12
years after adoption that both birth parents had been institutionalized for mental problems:
"If we had had this information earlier maybe we could have been more aware of things to
look for and gotten more expert help sooner.").
115. MAGID & MCKELVEY, supra note 102, at 149, 216.
116. Id. at 149. Psychologists are developing increasingly effective therapies for abused
children, but proper implementation is aided by specific knowledge of the abuse. See John W.
McInturf, Preparing Special Needs Children for Adoption Through Use of a Life Book, 65
CHILD WELFARE 373, 376, 378, 381 (1986).
117. See Jacob, supra note 109, at 36. One adoption agency withheld information collected
from a foster mother that provided strong indications that the child suffered organic brain
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manic-depression in other biological relatives can hasten diagnosis and
appropriate drug therapy. One adopted child underwent years of ther-
apy until she was diagnosed at age seventeen with bipolar disorder, a
manic-depressive illness. Around the same time, her adoptive mother,
after a long search, succeeded in obtaining information on the family
history and discovered her daughter's biological father had been hospital-
ized for bipolar disorder. "Laura had so much pain and went undiag-
nosed for so long," her mother lamented. "She didn't just need family
therapy, she needed lithium."11
Although the focus of the above discussion has been on psychiatric
disorders, the need for information is equally compelling for adopted
children at risk for physical disabilities and other genetic disorders. Ge-
neticists,119 adoptees, and adoptive parents' 20 relate that adopted chil-
dren often undergo painful, expensive, and sometimes hazardous
diagnostic testing that could have been avoided if adequate medical his-
tory had been available. Some hereditary disorders, such as familial
polyposis of the colon, can be life-threatening if not properly diagnosed
and treated. 21 The ill effects of other hereditary disorders, such as
phenylketonuria 1 2 or homocystinuria, 123 can be almost entirely avoided
damage from fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition that ultimately caused his institutionaliza-
tion. Id. at 48. 'The cruel thing is that not knowing about John's condition has cost him so
much time," said his adoptive father. "Time we spent on therapies that didn't work, time
wasted when the doctors said, 'He's just a hyperactive, normal kid. He'll grow out of it.' Now
it may be too late to help John or it may take 10 times longer than it would have if we'd started
right in the first place." Id.
118. Deborah Franklin, What a Child is Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1989, § 6, at 36, 41.
119. Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 277 (authors are geneticists who at time of publication
were affiliated with the Federal Office of Science and Technology Policy); Omenn et al., supra
note 85, at 162 (authors are geneticists and physicians who were affiliated with the Division of
Medical Genetics, Depts. of Medicine and Pediatrics, University of Washington, Seattle).
120. See Whitehouse, supra note 3, at 19 (discovery by adult adoptee of history of fibrous
breast lumps avoided repetition of painful treatment that might otherwise have been neces-
sary); Franklin, supra note 118, at 40 (adoptee underwent painful tests to reach a diagnosis of
juvenile chronic arthritis, a disease he later discovered was prevalent in his birth family).
121. Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 162. Familial polyposis causes polyps to form in late
childhood, creating symptoms of chronic colitis. Carcinoma of the colon almost invariably
develops if the disease is untreated. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1238 (25th ed. 1990).
122. Phenylketonuria is a metabolic disease caused by an inherited enzyme defect, which
causes brain damage resulting in severe mental retardation and, at times, seizures, cerebral
palsy, and microcephaly. Early diagnosis and proper treatment, which consists of changes in
the infant's diet, can prevent all symptoms of the disease. Screening is normally performed at
birth. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 1185. In Foster v. Bass, 575 So,
2d 967 (Miss. 1990), an adoptive family received ambiguous information that led them and
their pediatrician to conclude mistakenly the test had been performed. It had not, and the
adopted child suffered permanent brain damage. Id. at 969 n.3.
123. Homocystinuria is a "congenital metabolic disorder resulting in an excess of the
amino acid homocystine in the blood and urine," leading to "mental retardation and skeletal
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if diagnosed early and treated properly. In other cases, knowledge of a
disorder may warn families to watch for certain symptoms or avoid cer-
tain activities, including surgery or common medical treatment, that may
create a higher risk for their child.124 Identification, evaluation, and
therapy for children with developmental delay is particularly critical to
maximize their potential, because developmental impairment may in-
crease if not treated early. 25
Medical and social information continues to be relevant to proper
diagnosis, treatment, and preventive measures throughout the adoptee's
lifetime. 26 One adoptee, for example, reported that learning as an adult
about a history of alcoholism on both sides of his biological family con-
vinced him to be cautious about his own drinking pattern. 27 Adoptees
also need accurate medical and genetic history to make informed choices
about their own reproductive decisions.' 28 Forewarning of a possible he-
reditary disorder may alert them to the need for prenatal genetic testing
and counseling or amniocentesis. Access to their genetic history may
also diminish the stress experienced by many adoptees in the past who,
without access to medical history, suffered tremendous anxiety about the
possibility of having children with severe deformities. 29
Access to information regarding genetic heritage and background
also enhances an adoptee's development of a personal sense of identity.
The importance of this information has been increasingly recognized by
defects if untreated." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 722. Children of
incestuous relationships have increased risk for this and other recessive disorders. Lamport,
supra note 4, at 114 & n.32.
124. For example, a genetic clinic contacted the adoptive parents of a child after her birth
mother was diagnosed with a bleeding disorder known as von Willebrand Disease. The child
had a 50% chance of contracting the disease. The clinic felt that the adoptive parents needed
to be warned to take protective measures in situations where bleeding might occur and to
perform certain tests before any elective surgery was undertaken. Omenn et al., supra note 85,
at 161.
125. Susan Heighway, DevelopmentalApproach to Casefinding (pt. 1), in GENETIC FAMILY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 93.
126. See SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 126-27; Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 277-78;
Diane Plumridge et al., ASHG Activities Relative to Education: Heredity and Adoption, A Sur-
vey of State Adoption Agencies, 46 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 208, 212-13 (1990).
127. Adoptee Robert Morse observed, "Like a lot of kids in college, I used to go out and
drink a lot on weekends. Now I know that's a danger for me, and I've stopped." Franklin,
supra note 118, at 41. Robert Plomin, a developmental psychologist at Pennsylvania State
University, has noted that it is just as important to tell an adoptee that the birth father was
alcoholic as it is to share information on genetic diseases. He observes that if people know
their genetic history and see symptoms of alcoholism developing, they are more likely to get
help early. Id.
128. See Black, supra note 85, at 198; Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 162; Plumridge et al.,
supra note 126, at 209.
129. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 124, 142, 144; Black, supra note 85, at 205.
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professionals in the mental health and social services fields who work
with adolescent and adult adoptees 3° The term "genealogical bewilder-
ment" has been used in psychological literature to describe symptoms
associated with the identity conflict--caused by their lack of knowledge
of the medical, social, and ethnic background of their biological parents
and families-that many adoptees experience.1 31
Creation of an effective disclosure system that provides a mechanism
for supplementation and transmission of information both before and af-
ter the adoption benefits not only the adoptee, but also facilitates medical
treatment and reproductive planning for the adoptee's descendants and
other biological relatives.132
Despite the importance of the benefits of full disclosure, however,
the legitimate concerns of opponents must be addressed. One major con-
cern is the adverse effect negative information could have on placement
options for the child.1 33 Professionals who place children with special
needs for adoption now contend, however, that placing a child with a
family prepared to meet the child's special needs must be a priority.1 34
130. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 132-42; Black, supra note 85, at 203-05; Robin M.
Henig, Body and Mind: Chosen and Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. I1, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 70,
72. In Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646
(Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977), the court summarized testimony by adoptees and psychologists
emphasizing the importance of information about an adoptee's background to one's identity,
self-image, and perceptions of reality. Id. at 309, 318-19, 372 A.2d at 650, 655. For similar
stories, see Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Services, 210 N.J. Super. 186, 192-93,
509 A.2d 283, 286-87 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985), and Maureen Sweeney, Between Sorrow and
Happy Endings: A New Paradigm of Adoption, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 329, 348 (1990).
131. In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1388 & n.5 (R.I. 1986) (summarizing testimony of
expert witness Dr. Brandon Quails); CAPLAN, supra note 76, at 82; SOROSKY et al., supra note
77, at 113. The term was originally introduced by H.J. Sants, who described it as a state of
confusion and uncertainty in adoptees who become obsessed with questions about their biolog-
ical roots. H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 87 BRIT.
J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133-41 (1964).
132. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see infra text accompanying notes 239-45
(descendants), 251-59 (biological relatives), 454-62 (duty to update), and 477-85 (disclosure of
updated information).
133. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
134. Diane Mahon, national director for AASK America Adoption Exchange, which spe-
cializes in placing special-needs children, states that the Exchange's policy is to make certain
all health information it has is disclosed and explained. The more you tell a family about the
child's needs and history, she stresses, the more likely the family is to take and deal with the
child. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon (Sept. 24, 1990). Similarly, Gloria Hochman,
communications director for National Adoption Exchange, another national agency focusing
on special-needs adoption, agrees that prospective adoptive parents must be given all available
health information and that agencies must be truthful. Telephone Interview with Gloria
Hochman (Sept. 18, 1990); see also NELSON, supra note 81, at 85-86 (reporting that study of
special-needs adoption establishes importance of adequate information to adoptive parents);
Black, supra note 85, at 195 (advising social workers that for children of incest, complete
genetic information should be made available to potential adoptive parents because informed
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Providing prospective adoptive parents with the most complete informa-
tion available is essential to ensuring that the family is both emotionally
and financially able to cope with the challenges such a child presents. 135
In fact, social scientists have discovered that failure to provide accurate
information contributes significantly to adoption disruption, 136 which
scars both the child and the adoptive family. In California alone, the
state's records attribute sixty-nine annulled adoptions between 1983 and
1987 to fraudulent misrepresentation of a child by a county agency. 137
Even if the adoption does not disrupt, an adoptive family can better cope
with potential difficulties if it is prepared to meet them. 138 Gloria Hoch-
man, communications director for the National Adoption Exchange, ob-
served that "it makes no sense to place a child with a family who won't
be able to deal with that child.... This is not a poker game. These kids
need families with the ability to nurture" them. 39
Moreover, while some families will choose not to adopt a child with
special needs, professionals who specialize in placing such children indi-
cate that many adoptive families are willing to undertake this special
challenge." 4 There are waiting lists of families seeking to adopt spina
decisionmaking remains an absolute necessity). See generally Barbara Biesecker, Genetic
Counseling: A Case Study, in GENETIC FAMILY HIsToRY, supra note 1, at 79, 87 (noting that
in genetic counseling, truthfulness with families is mandatory: "The sooner they learn the
truth, the sooner they will find the strength to deal with the information.").
135. NELSON, supra note 81, at 48-49, 85-86. "Arguably, the parents' own informed opin-
ion about the suitability of a placement is one of the best predictors of outcome. The most
effective preparation, then, does not merely educate parents; it enables them to take charge of
placement decisions." Id. See generally John R. Maley, Note, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary
Damages is a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized By Adoption
Fraud, 20 IND. L. REv. 709, 725 (1987) (asserting that if fully informed, adoptive parents are
better "able to deal with the emotional hardships which might result when the risks become
reality"); Klein, supra note 82, at 1 (arguing that incomplete disclosure may cause parents to
be ill-prepared to deal with physical or mental illness; most professional guidelines stress the
importance of complete disclosure).
136. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 169; MAGID & MCKELVEY, supra note 102, at
296-97; NESON, supra note 81, at 84 (providing insufficient or inaccurate information about
child contributed to most disruptions occurring in group of special-needs adoptions studied).
137. Klein, supra note 82, at 32.
138. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 175-76.
139. Telephone Interview with Gloria Hochman, supra note 134.
140. Gloria Hochman, communications director of National Adoption Exchange, com-
mented that there is no child for whom she would say that the Exchange could not find a
family. At the time of this telephone interview, it had recently placed very quickly a blind,
mentally retarded child who had difficulty walking. The Exchange has even found families for
children in essentially vegetative states. She conceded that while it does find homes for most
children, the Exchange has not found homes for every one. Some grow too old while waiting.
Id.; see Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon, supra note 134; see also Black, supra note 85,
at 195 (arguing that many parents may be willing to adopt a newborn in the face of a higher
risk of genetic disorders due to incest); Lamport, supra note 4, at 115 (reporting that prospec-
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bifida children 4 ' and Down's Syndrome 42 children at all functioning
levels. Diane Mahon, national director of AASK America Adoption Ex-
change, reports that the Exchange has no trouble finding homes for chil-
dren with all types of special needs, whether the disabilities are physical,
mental, or emotional. 43 Its primary problem is "getting the kids out of
the system"-confronting the bureaucratic morass that accompanies
adoptions, particularly those that are inter-state. 44 Psychologists and
adoption specialists are also beginning to recognize that adoption may
not be the most appropriate way to meet some children's needs at a given
time.14 5 For the vast majority of special-needs children for whom adop-
tion is appropriate, however, full disclosure will not prevent them from
finding an adoptive home, and should instead enhance their chances for a
successful placement.
The concern that disclosure of negative information will cause stig-
matization cannot be dismissed lightly. 146 This issue, however, is better
addressed by providing education and counseling to adoptive parents and
tive adoptive parents advised of significant risk of schizophrenia and chose to adopt child
anyway); San Francisco, AIDS POL'Y & L., July 11, 1990, at 7, 7 (noting that program in
Yonkers, N.Y., placing HIV-positive children abandoned by parents reports 52% of foster
families were willing to adopt HIV children placed with them).
141. Telephone Interview with Judy Gustafson, coordinator, Spina Bifida Adoption Refer-
ral Program (Sept. 18, 1990).
142. Telephone Interview with Janet Marchese, director and founder, Down's Syndrome
Adoption Exchange (Sept. 18, 1990).
143. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon, supra note 134. Mahon stated that the Ex-
change normally is able to find homes for all its children. She observed that her most difficult
challenge was placing groups of siblings. She also emphasized that all of her families must
successfully complete home studies to ensure that they are appropriate adoptive homes. Id.
144. Id. Mahon related that if she finds a family willing to adopt a special-needs child
residing in another state, the receiving state will often be reluctant to facilitate the adoption
due to concern over public services and expenditures the child might require. Janet Marchese
of the Down's Syndrome Adoption Exchange also commented on problems with interstate
transfer and bureaucratic delays. Telephone Interview with Janet Marchese, supra note 142.
145. Jeffrey Rosenberg, director of public policy for the National Committee for Adoption
and a strong advocate of agency adoption, has observed that some children are not adopta-
ble-a lesson, he cautions, that adoption agencies sometimes forget. "Some children aren't
meant for some parents, some parents aren't meant for some children, and some children
probably aren't meant to be adopted." Jeffrey Rosenberg, Some Kids Can't Be Adopted,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 12, 1988, at Z4 (letter to the editor). Mr. Rosenberg's letter was written in
response to a story about the adoption of Tommy Colella, a severely disturbed child whose
adoption was ultimately revoked. See supra note 108. In another article Rosenberg was
quoted as saying, "There are some kids that have been so abused that they'll never attach or
bond. It's so scary that they'll do whatever they can to prevent it." Golden, supra note 3, at
18.
Public agencies have placed children for adoption after psychiatric evaluation recom-
mended long-term residential psychiatric care. See id. (preplacement psychological reports
advised against adoption); supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
146. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
HEALTH DISCLOSURES IN ADOPTION
children than by denying access to information. 4 7 For example, parents
and adoptees advised of an increased risk of schizophrenia or alcoholism
must be made aware that the overwhelming majority of children born to
parents with those problems do not develop the disorder. 148 Their atten-
tion should be directed to the fact that environment remains an impor-
tant component of human development.149 Experts stress the need for
preplacement counseling to assist families who adopt children known to
be at risk for physical or mental problems.'50 Also critical to overcoming
adverse consequences to adoptive family relationships is a follow-up sup-
port network that provides contact with other adoptive families and
trained professionals who can offer information and counseling.'
Moreover, while the potential effects of stigmatization on the adoptive
family's interaction and the child's sense of identity are serious concerns,
the psychological effects of nondisclosure on both adoptive parents and
children, as described above,' 52 can be equally troubling. Even when a
physical or mental disorder does not immediately appear, both adoptive
parents and children suffer anxiety over the unknown. 3 One adoptive
mother and social worker, who worked in the field for twenty years,
countered the stigmatization concern: "'Everyone I have ever worked
with has said it is always better to know the history than to not know.
Because, believe me, it's the parents who don't know who imagine the
worst if they have a child who seems troubled.' "'""
While adverse genetic information could create insurance problems
for some families, 155 nondisclosure has been financially devastating for
many who adopted without awareness of their child's medical needs.
The cost of residential psychiatric care can reach as high as $15,000 per
147. Black, supra note 85, at 198-99; Omenn et al., supra note 85, at 161-63.
148. Black, supra note 85, at 202.
149. See id. at 158; Franklin, supra note 118, at 49 (citing Robert Plomin, a developmental
psychologist at Pennsylvania State University, who cautions that "the current infatuation with
genetic influences has obscured the very real importance of environment in human
development").
150. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 169-70.
151. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.04[4], at 9-27 to -28; Black, supra
note 85, at 199; Golden, supra note 3, at 76. AASK America Adoption Exchange, which
specializes in the placement of special-needs children, offers postadoption services and support
groups throughout the lifetime of the adopted child. Telephone Interview with Diane Mahon,
supra note 134.
152. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
153. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 85, 185; Black, supra note 85, at 205.
154. Franklin, supra note 118, at 41 (quoting Marietta Spencer, social worker for the Chil-
dren's Home Society of Minnesota in St. Paul).
155. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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month.5 6 Some adoptive parents have been forced to seek revocation to
force the state to assume these costs. 15 7
Sometimes these financial burdens can be lessened if prospective
adoptive parents are given the necessary medical information to qualify
for federal and state adoption assistance benefits. 18 These benefits are
available to families who adopt special-needs children and meet certain
eligibility criteria.' 59 They can include medical assistance under Medi-
caid and various state programs,' ° as well as such social services as res-
pite care, specialized day care, counseling, and in-home support
services. 16 1 To be eligible for adoption assistance, however, it must be
established that the child had special needs at the time of the adoption.1
62
Adoptive parents cannot apply for federal adoption assistance after the
156. Johnson, supra note 16, at 36; see also Belkin, supra note 2, at B8 (discussing costs of
care).
157. Klein, supra note 82, at 33-34 (noting adoptive parents forced to sell family business
and ultimately seek revocation to pay mounting bills); Marvelli & Marvelli, supra note 108, at
6 (attempted revocation to obtain governmental assistance).
158. Since passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the federal
government has reimbursed states for adoption assistance benefits they give to families that
adopt eligible children with special needs. In addition, each state has its own state-funded
adoption assistance program. The federal program was created to complement rather than
replace the state programs, which often cover children who do not meet the requirements for
federal assistance and to provide benefits not available in the federal program. ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.01[2].
159. To be eligible for federal benefits, a child must be determined by a state to be one with
special needs, 42 U.S.C. § 673(c) (Supp. 1991), and within the financial and categorical criteria
of either the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program or the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program. Id. § 673(b). To classify a child as one with special needs, a
state must find that the child cannot or should not be returned to the child's parents; that there
is a specific factor which makes it reasonable to conclude that the child cannot be placed for
adoption without assistance; and that reasonable efforts have been made to place the child
without assistance, unless such efforts would not be in the best interest of the child-Le., the
child has become attached to the prospective adoptive parents. Id. § 673(c); ADOPTION LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, §§ 9.03, 9.03[l]. Factors that may make a child eligible include
physical, mental, or emotional handicaps. Id. § 9.03[1][b].
State eligibility requirements vary, although they also tend to limit adoption assistance to
children who, because of special needs, are more difficult to place. Id. § 9.03.
160. Federal Medicaid benefits include inpatient hospital services (except institutions for a
mental disease or tuberculosis), outpatient hospital services, laboratory and X-ray services,
early periodic screening and diagnosis for physical or mental disorders, and some types of
medical treatment. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(2), (4)(B), (5) (Supp. 1991). Some states may
choose to include in their Medicaid programs home health care services, private-duty nursing
services, physical therapy, dental care, prescription drugs, inpatient psychiatric services, or
other diagnostic, preventative, or rehabilitative services. Id. § 1396d(a); ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.04[3], at 9-25.
161. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.0414], at 9-27 to 9-28.
162. To be eligible for federal adoption assistance, the child must meet eligibility criteria at
the time the adoption agreement is made. 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(2)(A)(i). Some states will allow
adoptive parents to apply for state adoption assistance benefits based upon pre-existing condi-
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adoption has been completed, unless they can show they were not pro-
vided with all of the relevant information about the child's condition at
the time they requested assistance. 63 Full disclosure is thus necessary to
alert prospective adoptive parents to their potential eligibility and the
need to apply for these benefits prior to finalization, and to ensure that
eligible adoptive families receive these benefits for the full period they are
entitled to them.'6
The argument that medical and social history should not be dis-
closed to prospective adoptive parents or adoptees to protect the privacy
of birth parents 61 is overbroad. Certainly, in defining the scope of col-
lection efforts and identifying those to whom disclosure is made, state
legislatures must consider the privacy interests of all concerned parties.
This problem is discussed in greater detail in Part J11.166 But no reason-
able expectation of privacy should foreclose absolutely the disclosure of
medical and social background information to adoptive parents and
adoptees. In most instances, the information can be collected in a non-
threatening, cooperative manner and released with all identifying infor-
mation redacted. Any benefit this history might provide to an adoptee
searching for birth parents would be slight.
In addition, many birth parents would welcome the release of back-
ground information to adoptive parents. Currently, much of this infor-
mation is voluntarily obtained from birth parents as part of the adoption
process. In a sociological study of birth parents in the id-1970s, ninety-
five percent of the respondents indicated an interest in updating informa-
tion about themselves in the agency records.167 One scholar, herself a
tions if the adoptive parents had no knowledge of these conditions at the time of the adoption.
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.04[6][a].
163. 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(5); ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 9.04[6][a]
(Supp. 1991) (citing Eligibility for Title IV-E Adoption Assistance, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Human Development Service, Policy Interpretation Question ACYF-
PIQ-88-06 (Dec. 2, 1988)).
164. Federal law allows states and adoptive parents to negotiate an adoption assistance
agreement that will take effect upon placement, so that the family will be eligible for benefits
without having to wait for issuance of an interlocutory or final decree of adoption. ADOPTION
LAw AND PRACTIcE, supra note 76, § 9.0416][a].
165. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
166. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 239-45.
167. SORoSKY et al., supra note 77, at 53. It should be noted, however, that the study
could not be conducted upon a "random sample" of birth parents. The group interviewed was
among hundreds who responded by letter to advertisements and media coverage of the study.
Thirty-eight birth parents were interviewed, of whom 36 were birth mothers. Id. at -50-51.
In this study, 82% of the birth parents stated that they would be interested in a reunion
with their child if the adoptee desired it. On the other hand, 53% favored opening sealed
records to adult adoptees. Id. at 53-54.
Other social workers in the adoption field also have reported that the response they re-
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birth mother, argues that secrecy has been overemphasized in traditional
adoption procedure due to society's prejudices surrounding illegitimacy,
a concept rooted in sexism and one that does not bear the same impor-
tance in a birth mother's decisionmaking.168  Her assessment is sup-
ported by the absence of any significant decrease in adoptions in states
that allow adult adoptees access to records to obtain their birth parents'
identity.1 69
Although some birth parents may not approve the release of any
background information, particularly if the information is perceived as
negative or embarrassing, their right to privacy must be balanced with
the needs of the adoptee. 170 Statutorily authorized disclosure of medical
and social history to adoptive parents, adoptees, and descendants serves
an important public interest-it contributes to the physical and mental
health of adoptees and their descendants. Courts traditionally have ap-
proved disclosure of private information to protect a third party from
harm. 171 When sufficient procedures exist to guard against unwarranted
disclosure, these interests should take priority.
Finally, some critics of disclosure suggest that prospective adoptive
parents who desire information on the medical and social history of a
child, and who might allow their decision to adopt a particular child to
be influenced by that information, are unworthy of parenthood."12 They
speak derisively of the search for the "perfect baby." Given today's
demographics, however, the notion that couples wishing to adopt can
somehow use the process to seek a "perfect baby" is patently absurd.
The National Committee for Adoption estimates that there are at least
twenty prospective adoptive couples per adoptable child. 173 Such critics
would probably not suggest that couples who undergo prenatal genetic
counseling or amniocentesis are unworthy of parenthood. It is unfair to
expect that a couple will feel a commitment to parent a particular child
whom they have never met and who simply has been described to them,
ceived from birth parents to opening adoption records was overwhelmingly positive. Ryan,
supra note 4, at 16.
168. Sweeney, supra note 130, at 355-57. The role of the "stigma of illegitimacy" in pre-
serving secrecy is illustrated in Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J.
Super. 302, 307, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
169. Sweeney, supra note 130, at 359; see also Prager & Rothstein, supra note 43, at 150
(reporting that adoption consultant for state allowing adult adoptees to learn birth parents'
identity has found no problems resulting from law).
170. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
171. Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 273; Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:352.
172. Cf supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (noting that couples with such infor-
mation might seek the "perfect child").
173. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 6.
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despite all obstacles, in the same way parents might immediately after
birth. Adoptive parenting is different from biological parenting in some
respects. 174 Bonding comes through development of a relationship, not
from biological ties. Many adoptive families willingly accept the chal-
lenges of adopting a child with special needs. 75 It is in everyone's best
interests, however, for prospective adoptive parents to make informed
decisions about the nature of the challenges with which they can cope.1 7
6
Starting out with realistic expectations increases the chances that the re-
lationship will be rewarding both for the child and for the adoptive
parents.
In sum, while one cannot altogether dismiss concerns about disclo-
sure of social and medical history, the benefits of disclosure and the
tragic consequences of nondisclosure outweigh them. For this reason
most states have moved during the past twelve years to adopt legislation
permitting some disclosure of medical and social history as part of the
adoption process.
III. REvIEw OF CURRENT LEGISLATION AND THE NEED FOR
FURTHER REFORM
While the attempt by many states to permit fuller disclosure of
health-related information in adoptions has been praiseworthy, the ef-
forts of most remain incomplete. This section examines deficiencies in
the existing statutory regulation of this field and offers proposals to maxi-
mize the transmission of medical and social history to everyone with a
legitimate need, while giving due consideration to the privacy interests of
all concerned.
174. One adoption social worker observed:
[A]doptive parents are entitled to know more genetic information than birth parents.
We must recognize adoptive parenting differs from biological parenting. If adoptive
parents are going to be realistic parents, they must recognize the differences too. The
primary difference is that the child does not come to the family through their own
means or biological processes, but rather through another family. Adoptive parents
should have as much information available as possible. It is far better for them to
decide they can't parent a child before the child is placed, having been given all the
information, than making that decision when the child is already in the home.
Fost, supra note 84, at 55.
175. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
176. One expert in special-needs adoptive placement emphasized that an agency must work
to get a good match between the child's characteristics and the family. Some families can
tolerate one kind of behavior, such as setting fires, but not another, such as chronic depression
and sulking. Telephone Interview with Gloria Hochman, supra note 134.
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A. Mandatory Versus Discretionary Disclosure
The vast majority of states mandate that certain background infor-
mation "shall" be provided to adoptive parents. 177 Several states, how-
ever, have chosen to leave the decision regarding disclosure of
information to the discretion of the state or a private adoption agency, 175
and a few leave the decision to the discretion of the court by requiring a
court order for the release of information. 179 South Carolina, for exam-
ple, allows the release of nonidentifying health information to adoptive
parents, biological parents, or adoptees "in the sole discretion of the chief
executive officer of the agency" if he perceives release would "serve the
best interests of the persons concerned." '1 80
Allowing a state social services department or private adoption
agency sole discretion to determine what, if any, background information
will be released fosters continuation of the same practices that generate
disrupted adoptions, untreated or misdiagnosed children, and myriad
177. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 224.76 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-207 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1991); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578.14.5 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-14 (Burns
1987 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2130 (Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-329.1 (Supp. 1991);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5A (Law. Co-op 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68
(West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-8-122 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
B:19 (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. Soc. SERV..
LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-16 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.342 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2909 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-
15.2 (Supp. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-30-17 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 461 (1989 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-223 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West Supp. 1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991); see also UNIF. ADOITON ACT § 16 (Tentative Draft
Aug. 1991) (requiring individual or agency placing a child for adoption to provide prospective
adoptive parents with comprehensive medical and social history of child and child's biological
family).
178. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
179. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (West
Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.140 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (Supp. 1991); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 925 (Supp. 1990) (giving public or private adoption agencies
discretion to release nonidentifying information; otherwise requiring court order for release of
health-related information).
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
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wrongful adoption suits."'1 While many agencies have determined that
full disclosure is the best policy and that professional guidelines require
it,'82 the cost and effort required to obtain complete data,8 3 the financial
pressure to place special-needs children quickly in order to conserve pub-
lic or agency resources, 8 4 and the bureaucratic pressure to generate
placement statistics'85 all may influence social workers to release incom-
plete information. Specialists in the adoption field concede the effect of
these factors. Reuben Pannor, one of the nation's leading adoption spe-
cialists and a former director of a private Los Angeles agency, Vista del
Mar, has been openly critical:
"The goal is to get them off the rolls, find permanent homes,
adoptive homes, which means that the state and county no
longer have financial responsibility.... [But] there has been an
over-zealousness about placing these 'special needs' children.
Many have been placed without proper preparation, back-
ground testing, without information about what problems the
child has, or about recessive problems that may show up
later." 18
6
Jeffrey Rosenberg, director of public policy for the National Committee
181. For a discussion of the repercussions of such practices, see supra notes 104-29 and
accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
183. See Klein, supra note 82, at 31. Despite professional guidelines that stress the impor-
tance of complete disclosure, social workers admit that at times, "because information may be
difficult, expensive or time-consuming to obtain, it is simply left out." Id. An adoption super-
visor with the Los Angeles Department of Children's Services, one of the nation's largest adop-
tion agencies, states: "[lit is extremely difficult to do.... Those pieces [of information] are
missing. We know that. We have to cut corners in efforts to gather all available information
about a child's background." Id.
184. See id. at 33 ('[P]ublic adoption officials describe a system swamped with children
who need to be placed, a situation that social workers say has created pressure to place more
and more children at a faster rate.").
The shortage of staff necessary to carry out the appropriate investigation, testing, and
evaluation can result in children waiting years for adoption. Because social workers know this
delay may exacerbate a child's emotional problems, the shortage of agency resources thus
contributes to hasty placements. Id.
185. Id. ("What has become important are numbers. Placement numbers in adoptions be-
come the ranking of how efficient a worker is."). The importance placed on statistics often
results from the relationship between the number of placements and state funding. Frank
Guzevich, regional manager at Riverside County's Department of Public Social Services in
California, acknowledged the necessity of generating statistics to justify retention of staff. Id.
Private adoption agencies are not immune from these pressures. Although some of them
are funded in part by donations, private agencies recover most of their costs through fees paid
by adoptive parents. Thus, placements are necessary for their survival. Sharon F. Gustafson,
Regulating Adoption Intermediaries: Ensuring that the Solutions Are No Worse than the Prob-
lem, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 837, 848 (1990).
186. Klein, supra note 82, at 33 (quoting Reuben Pannor).
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for Adoption, 18 7 acknowledged that "'[t]here is a great deal of pressure
to place these kids, "move 'em, move 'em, move 'em" .... [S]o what
happens is this wrongful adoption stuff. We hope not too much, but we
don't know.' ""8 One adoption social worker reported to the media that
the director of her agency told her to "'[p]lace them as rapidly as you
can. If we have to disrupt [a placement], fine. We can disrupt it. That
makes for more placements and that means better statistics.' "0189
When the choice is left to an agency or social worker, the extent of
nondisclosure is significant.'9 ° For example, a study of older child adop-
tions and adoption disruptions conducted at the University of California
at Berkeley in the early 1980s involving interviews with both adoptive
families and social workers revealed that more than half of the families
interviewed had not been told prior to placement that their adoptee had
been sexually abused.' 9' The study also revealed that almost one-third of
the families whose adoptee had been physically abused were not in-
formed of this abuse.' 92 Twenty-eight percent of the families had not
been told of a physical or medical disability prior to placement, one-
fourth had not been told of a developmental disability, and over one-
third had not been told of a learning disability, or emotional or behav-
ioral problems.' 93 In only 23% of these cases did the social worker claim
that the reason for nondisclosure was that the worker did not know of
187. The National Committee for Adoption is an advocacy organization that represents the
interests of public and private adoption agencies and promotes agency adoption. ADOPTION
FAcTBooK, supra note 86, at 10.
188. Klein, supra note 82, at 34 (quoting Jeffrey Rosenberg).
189. Id. at 33 (quoting Charleen Morrow, former social worker in Riverside County,
California).
190. Id. at 1. Adoption experts "contend that vital information on adopted children, rang-
ing from past abuse to important medical and psychological information about birth parents, is
frequently withheld from adoptive parents, despite professional guidelines-and in some cases
laws--calling for full disclosure." Id.; see also Jacob, supra note 109, at 48 (reporting that
agency failed to provide adoptive parents with information from foster mother of tremors,
convulsions, spasms, and rages that led her to conclude the child was a drug or alcohol baby).
191. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 78-87. The overall sample of cases in which the
social worker or parent(s) were interviewed was 120. In 69 cases both the parent(s) and the
social worker were interviewed, in 22 cases just the parent(s) were interviewed, and in 29 cases
only the social worker was interviewed. Of the 120 interviews with a social worker or par-
ent(s), in 57 an adoption disruption had occurred; 63 were stable families. Of the 69 cases in
which both the parent(s) and the social worker were interviewed, disruption had occurred in
18. Of the 22 cases in which only parent(s) were interviewed, 13 had disrupted adoptions, and
in 26 of the 29 cases in which a social worker only was interviewed, disruption had occurred.
Id. at 80 tbl. 4.1.
192. Id. at 108. In all of these cases, interviews with a parent or parents had taken place.
Id.
193. Id. at 109 tbl. 6.3.
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the condition.194 A study sponsored by the Child Welfare League of
America of families who adopted special-needs children reached similar
conclusions. Of the 102 families in which the adoptive parents had not
been foster parents to the child they adopted, 52% were dissatisfied with
the information they had been given about the child and 36% responded
that the information had been partly or completely inaccurate. 9
Although the parents most often attributed the lack of information to
organizational factors such as worker overload, seven suspected informa-
tion was deliberately withheld and seventeen felt the social worker had
misled them. 196 Corroborating these findings are reports from adoptive
parents of severely disturbed children that they were pressured to agree
to immediate placement with little or no information-in one case with-
out even seeing the child.' 97
Requiring a court order for disclosure is also problematic. Ob-
taining a court order requires parents to incur further legal fees to obtain
medical information, creating a significant deterrent to seeking health in-
formation-until a crisis occurs.'98 Broad standards leave the decision
totally dependent on the discretion and idiosyncracies of the judge to
whom application is made.' 99 Thus access to health information may
194. Id.
195. NELSON, supra note 81, at 34-35.
196. Id. at 35.
197. Tom and Janice Colella, who recently settled a wrongful adoption case with the De-
partment of Social Services of Orange County, California, report that they were called by a
social worker who told them that a seven-year-old boy was available for adoption and asked
them to take the child that day, sight unseen. Although they insisted on meeting the child
first, they were never told of his long record of sociopathic behavior. Friedman, supra note
108, at 40. The Walters, adoptive parents of two boys with severe psychological and emotional
problems, reported that after one meeting with a pair of five- and eight-year-old brothers, the
social worker wanted an answer: yes or no? No information on their history of abuse or
neurological problems was provided. Klein, supra note 82, at 34.
One journalist reporting on the overrepresentation of adopted adolescents in mental-
health treatment facilities observed that "[b]y placing these disturbed children with adoptive
parents without providing enough support, society delayed their access to treatment and per-
haps lost the chance to cure them.... [T]he government temporarily avoided picking up the
tab, only to pay a bigger bill later." Golden, supra note 3, at 80.
198. An adoptive parent may well be unlikely to pay the expensive legal fees necessary to
initiate a court proceeding to obtain information unless the parent feels the need is critical and
the court is likely to find "good cause." Information on such things as allergies or genetic
conditions, that have not caused dramatic symptoms are likely to remain undisclosed.
199. In Tennessee a judge or chancellor may "open the record, if, in the opinion of the
judge or chancellor, it is in the best interest of the child or the public to have such information
disclosed." TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-131 (1991). A District of Columbia statute provides
that adoption files shall be inspected only upon order of the court, and then only "when the
court is satisfied that the welfare of the child will thereby be promoted or protected." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-311 (1989).
An illustration of the wide disparity created by broad standards for judicial discretion in
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vary widely among adoptive parents in the same state.
If the goals of disclosure are to be effectively served, the release of
nonidentifying health-related information to adoptive parents and to
others, as described below,'co should be mandatory and not left subject to
the real or imagined pressures felt by state or private agencies, or to the
discretion of a particular judge.
B. Applicability to All Adoptions
1. Independent Adoptions
The mandatory disclosure laws currently in force do not uniformly
apply to all adoptions occurring within the state. Perhaps the most strik-
ing example of this is Oklahoma's recently amended disclosure statute,
which allows state or private adoption agencies to release the medical
history of the child and the child's natural parents and grandparents to
prospective adoptive parents, but fails to grant the same authority to at-
torneys who handle independent adoptions, 201 a significant percentage of
the state's adoptions.2 2 The disclosure statutes of several other states
that permit independent adoptions also refer only to state and private
203agencies. Clearly, access to medical information is equally important
this area can be seen in courts' interpretation of "good cause" for opening adoption records for
identifying information. See Gloria L. Kelly, Note, Getting to Know You: Disclosure of Infor-
mation Contained in Sealed Adoption Records Under Connecticut Public Act 87-555, 5 CONN.
PROB. L.J. 81, 86-91 (1989). One New Jersey court held that a psychological need-to-know
may constitute good cause to receive identifying information, and that requests for medical,
hereditary, or ethnic background information should be granted unless there is a showing of
compelling reasons to withhold the information. See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 318-22, 372 A.2d 646, 655-56 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
Other courts have rejected a psychological need-to-know without proof of serious psychologi-
cal disorder as sufficient for good cause to obtain identifying information. See In re Maples,
563 S.W.2d 760, 766 (Mo. 1978); Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Servs., 210 N.J.
Super. 186, 204-05, 509 A.2d 283, 293 (Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1985); Bradey v. Children's Bureau,
275 S.C. 622, 628-29, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (1981). One court denied the information to a
woman with a severe depressive illness despite her psychiatrist's recommendation that it would
benefit her treatment. In re Dixon, 116 Mich. App. 763, 771, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552-53 (1982).
200. See infra notes 226-62 and accompanying text.
201. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West Supp. 1992).
202. Although exact statistics are not available, Jane Connor, program supervisor in
charge of adoptions for the Child Welfare Unit of the Oklahoma Department of Human Serv-
ices, noted that a large percentage of nonrelative adoptions in Oklahoma, perhaps even a slight
majority, were independent rather than agency adoptions. Telephone Interview with Jane
Connor (Nov. 6, 1990).
Nationally, in 1986, private individuals-as opposed to agencies-handled 31.4% of non-
relative domestic adoptions in the U.S. ADOPTION FAcTBOOK, supra note 86, at 4. It also has
been estimated that nationally approximately two-thirds of newborn adoptions are handled
independently. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 1.05[3], at 1-64 n.31.
203. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para.
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to parents who adopt through private placement, and to children who are
adopted in this manner.2' The private attorneys who handle these adop-
tions are all licensed to practice law by the state and are thus subject to
regulation through disciplinary proceedings for unethical behavior.205
Allowing them to disclose nonidentifying information should pose no
greater threat to the privacy of birth parents than allowing a state or
private agency to disclose the same information.
It seems possible that the exclusion of independent adoptions may
be an oversight on the state legislatures' part.20 6 Even if it is a conscious
omission, influenced by a desire to deter independent adoptions, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the omission will prove effective in this regard. Re-
ducing adoptive parents' access to medical information is unlikely to
deter birth mothers from placing children through private attorneys.
Birth mothers often prefer private adoptions because they feel they have
a greater degree of control over placement,207 because the process feels
less institutional and more personal,20 8 and because they perceive it as
less complicated or intrusive.' 9 As long as birth mothers continue to
place through independent adoption, the large number of couples desper-
ate to adopt and the shortage of available children210 dictate that in-
1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
204. The National Committee for Adoption estimates that relatively few handicapped or
special-needs children are placed through independent adoption, whereas over 50% of the
handicapped and special-needs children are placed by public agencies. ADOPTION FACTBOOK,
supra note 86, at 175. Nevertheless, even children who do not have an obvious handicap or
special need at the time of adoption would benefit by disclosure of their genetic and prenatal
history. When health problems do occur during childhood or later in life, this information is
extremely valuable to accurate diagnosis.
205. See, eg., Oklahoma Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, app. 1-A (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (setting forth Oklahoma rules governing disciplinary
proceedings); see also Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 983
(Okla. 1988) (upholding disciplinary action against attorney for misconduct in connection with
independent adoption).
206. Representative Linda H. Larason, cosponsor of the recent amendment in Oklahoma
allowing this limited disclosure, states that the application to independent adoptions was not
discussed. The bill was requested and drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Human Serv-
ices. Representative Larason did not know if the legislature would be opposed to having the
disclosure provisions apply to private adoptions. In discussing any opposing arguments she
could foresee, she suggested that it might be easier to monitor what information is given out if
one has more control over the disclosing entity. Telephone Interview with Linda H. Larason,
Member, Oklahoma House of Representatives (Aug. 14, 1990).
207. ADOlrION LAW AND PRACTIcE, supra note 76, § 13.02[3], at 13-58; Gustafson, supra
note 185, at 851-52.
208. See David K. Leavitt, Counseling Clients in Independent Adoptions, 6 CAL. CONTINU-
ING EDUC. B. §§ 1-3 (1980).
209. Gustafson, supra note 185, at 855-57.
210. The National Committee for Adoption estimates that
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dependent adoption will continue to be a highly desirable option for
prospective adoptive parents, who view it as an option that may increase
their opportunity to adopt and require a shorter waiting period.211
Wherever independent adoptions remain a legal alternative,212 access to
health-related information should be equal to the disclosure allowed for
agency adoptions.
2. Stepparent or Relative Adoptions
Several states exclude (or allow for exclusion of) stepparent or rela-
tive adoptions from coverage under their mandatory disclosure laws.2" 3
Presumably the rationale is that a stepparent and the adopted child
would have access to health-related information through the stepparent's
spouse, who is the adopted child's biological parent. Although it may be
true that the stepparent's spouse would know both the child's medical
history and his or her own medical and genetic history, the spouse's
knowledge of the terminated parent's medical and genetic history may be
incomplete. Moreover, since the adoption may terminate the parental
rights of one biological parent, including the right to visitation,2 14 the
[a]t least one million American couples with infertility problems and who want a
baby will never conceive. These couples compete for and wait for the 50,000 adopta-
ble children who become available each year. The "adoption demand" is such that
there are at least 20 prospective adoptive couples per adoptable child.
ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 6.
211. Gustafson, supra note 185, at 852. The National Committee for Adoption reports
that the usual wait for a healthy white infant through a private agency is two to ten years, and
few are available through a public agency. This contrasts with a waiting period of three
months to two years for a healthy white infant through independent adoption. ADOPTION
FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 175.
212. All but six states apparently allow parents to place their children with unrelated pro-
spective adopters, either through a direct private placement or with the assistance of an inter-
mediary. In the states that do not allow private placements, only licensed state or private
agencies are authorized to place children with unrelated prospective adopters. Those six states
are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota. ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 1.05[3], at 7 & n.36 (Supp. 1991).
213. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.70-.76 (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16
(West 1981 & Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107
(Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.342 (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp.
1991).
214. See ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 13.02[1]; HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.10, at 929 (2d ed.
1988).
Oklahoma's statute on the effect of adoption decrees is typical. It provides in part:
After a final decree of adoption is entered, the natural parents of the adopted child,
unless they are the adoptive parents or the spouse of an adoptive parent, shall be
relieved of all parental responsibilities for said child and shall have no rights over the
adopted child or to his property by descent and distribution.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (West Supp. 1992).
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adopted child may lose contact with a biological parent and thus be de-
nied access to medical or genetic information that surfaces after the
adoption."' Similar problems exist with other adoptions by relatives.
The adoptive parents may be unfamiliar with the medical and genetic
history of the "other" side of the child's family and, unless the two sides
of the family remain in close contact, the child may lose access to future
information. Depending upon the circumstances, relatives who adopt
also may know far less about the child's medical history than would be
available in a stepparent adoption.
Although in stepparent and relative adoptions the concern that the
adoptive parent make an "informed choice" '216 may not be paramount, it
is nevertheless important to the child's medical and reproductive future
that access to health-related information be as complete as possible.217
Therefore, disclosure statutes should not exclude stepparent and relative
adoptions. If a state is particularly concerned with simplifying steppar-
ent adoptions, waiver of the medical and genetic history of the steppar-
ent's spouse (who will continue to be a part of the child's life) should
suffice.2"' In addition, statutory provisions for collection and transmis-
215. A few courts have granted visitation to a biological parent following adoption based
on contract, or because it was believed that it would be particularly beneficial to the child
under the circumstances. CLARK, supra note 214, at 929 & nn.10-12. One court granted visi-
tation rights to an adopted child's sibling, id. at 929 n.l, and some states allow grandparent
visitation after adoption under limited circumstances, id. at 929-30.
216. For a discussion of the importance of informed-choice adoptions, see supra notes 134-
39, 176 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
218. One obstacle to including stepparent adoptions in disclosure statutes may be finding
an appropriate mechanism to collect the information from a parent whose rights are involunta-
rily terminated. Often medical and social history is collected as part of the general investiga-
tion of the adoptive placement required by statute. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West
Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp.
1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989). Normally a public or private
agency employee or an investigator appointed by the court performs the investigation. See,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 50 (Law. Co-op. 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 710.27 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.12 (Anderson 1989). Such statutes often exempt stepparent adoptions. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114(b)(3)(E) (1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp.
1991). While the full investigation conducted in nonrelative adoptions may not be necessary,
these statutes could easily be amended to require a professional to complete the portion related
to collection of health-related information from the parent whose rights are to be terminated.
A professional investigator, preferably a licensed social worker, would be better trained and
more skilled at eliciting complete and relevant information. See infra notes 334-36 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, contact by a professional might facilitate cooperation that could be
absent if the request came from a hostile ex-spouse attempting to terminate involuntarily the
rights of the parent from whom information is sought. Although this might involve some
added expense to the petitioner, since the investigation is limited, it should not be prohibitively
expensive and is worth the cost given the potential benefit to the child in the future. States
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sion of postadoption health information should apply to stepparent and
relative adoptions so that the adoptee and other biological relatives have
access to this vital information.219
3. Adoptions Subsequent to Involuntary Termination
A few states' disclosure laws are drafted so that they appear to apply
only to adoptions in which at least one biological parent voluntarily sur-
renders the child for adoption.220 All of the reasons that adoptive par-
ents, children, and other relatives need access to health-related
information apply equally to adoptions preceded by involuntary termina-
tion of parental rights. Public agencies place the majority of handi-
capped or special-needs children.22 1 Because it is public agencies that
most frequently place children following involuntary termination, it is
logical to conclude that many such children have special needs. Thus, it
is critical that adoption disclosure statutes apply to these adoptions as
well.
concerned about the expense to stepparent petitioners could allow their state social services
agencies to perform these investigations on a sliding fee scale.
When this information should be collected may also be problematic. The factors that
suggest health information should be disclosed to prospective adoptive parents prior to place-
ment play less of a role in stepparent and relative adoptions in which a pre-established relation-
ship with the child exists and the information is unlikely to affect the adoption decision.
Spouses of biological parents or relatives may fear that if they or a third party contacts and
seeks participation from the parent to be terminated, the parent may be more likely to chal-
lenge the adoption. On the other hand, the court always has the duty to determine whether
the grounds to terminate have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, see Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982), and a termination of parental rights should not be
granted in any event unless it is in the best interest of the child. See D. Marianne B. Blair,
Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights, 24 TULSA L.J. 299, 327-31 (1989) (contending
that termination of parent-child relationship without finding that termination is in the best
interest of the child deprives the child of constitutional rights). If collection is delayed too long
after the adoption, it may be more difficult to locate the biological parent(s) whose rights have
been terminated. Moreover, if the information must be collected before the adoption is final-
ized, the court has greater ability to ensure, for the benefit of the child, that reasonable efforts
were made to obtain the information.
If a parent voluntarily consents to termination of parental rights in a stepparent or rela-
tive adoption, the parent could be required to provide the necessary information prior to or at
the time consent is given, preferably with the assistance of a trained professional.
Kansas recently amended its disclosure statute to include stepparent adoptions among
those in which a complete written genetic, medical, and social history of the child and parents
should be gathered. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1990).
219. See infra notes 229-45 and accompanying text.
220. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (West Supp.
1991).
221. The National Committee for Adoption estimates that more than 50% of the handi-
capped or special-needs children placed for adoption were placed by public agencies. ADOP-
TION FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 175.
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4. Retroactivity of Newly-Enacted Disclosure Laws
Because mandatory disclosure of health-related information in
adoption is a relatively recent statutory phenomenon, it is important to
include in these statutes specific provisions mandating disclosure of the
nonidentifying social and medical history that is available for adoptions
that occurred prior to the enactment of these laws. Although the investi-
gations may not have been as extensive as those that should be mandated
by the new statutes,222 agencies and other intermediaries have for a long
time collected at least some information. 223 All of the persons whom
current legislation should assist-adoptive parents, adult adoptees, bio-
logical descendants and other relatives, and persons whose parents'
rights were terminated-are entitled to the same statutory rights to
whatever information is available in agency files.224 In addition, the state
agency responsible for adoption investigations for public adoptions, or
some other appropriate government entity, should be given the responsi-
bility to conduct an investigation, when medically necessary, to locate
biological relatives and acquire information that is not contained in the
current files.225
222. See infra notes 263-326, 342-409 and accompanying text.
223. See generally Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 23 Ohio St. 3d 69, 71, 491 N.E.2d
1101, 1104 (1986) (showing that records of agency adoption conducted in 1964 revealed exten-
sive health and social history information that had not been revealed to adoptive parents);
Karwath, supra note 3, at 1, 12 (reporting that agency failed to reveal health information it
possessed in 1975, prior to disclosure law taking effect).
224. Although some disclosure statutes are written so broadly that one may infer that per-
sons involved with adoptions taking place prior to enactment might also have disclosure privi-
leges, see, eg., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Anderson 1989), the better approach is to
provide specifically that available information will be released to such persons, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-68f (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.24 (Smith-
Hurd 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(d)
(1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(12) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 460(7) (Supp.
1991).
225. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432(4)(a) (West Supp. 1991). The statute provides:
Whenever any person ... wishes to obtain medical and genetic information about an
individual whose birth parent's rights have been terminated in this state at any time,
or whose birth parent consented to his or her adoption before February 1, 1982, or
medical and genetic information about the birth parents of such an individual or
adoptee, and the information is not on file with, the department, the person may
request that the department conduct a search for the birth parents to obtain the
information. The request shall be accompanied by a statement from a physician cer-
tifying either that the individual or adoptee has or may have acquired a genetically
transferable disease or that the individual's or adoptee's medical condition requires
access to the information.
Id.
Because the proposal suggested in the text requires investigations only when medically
necessary, the number should not be unduly burdensome for the state social services agency.
If such investigations are frequently requested, the legislature must consider allocating funds
1992]
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C. Who Is Entitled To Disclosure?
1. Adoptive and Prospective Adoptive Parents and Legal Guardians
Recent legislative reform has focused on providing adoptive and
prospective adoptive parents access to health-related information.226
Such disclosure is, of course, critical in order for these parents to provide
necessary medical care and meet any special needs that might exist, as
well as to assist them with the initial placement decision. 2 7 Parents,
however, are not the only people who may have to make health care
decisions for children. If adoptive parents were to die or lose custody of
the child, a court (or the parent's will) would name a legal guardian who
would then have responsibility for the child's well-being. A legal guard-
ian has equally compelling needs for information about the child because
of this duty. Some states have had the foresight to provide equal access
to the legal guardian of an adopted child, in order to facilitate appropri-
ate medical treatment under these circumstances.22 8
2. Adult Adoptees
There are equally strong reasons to mandate disclosure of health-
related information to the adopted person, at least when she reaches the
age of majority and becomes responsible for her own health care.229 The
adoptee's own pre-adoption medical history and the medical and genetic
necessary to staff this service rather than overwhelm existing governmental social workers who
already face huge caseloads.
226. See statutes cited supra note 177; see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1988)
(requiring adoptive parents to sign an affidavit acknowledging any abnormal physical or
mental condition set forth in doctor's certificate).
Several other states permit disclosure of some health-related information to adoptive par-
ents. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.27 (West
Supp. 1992) (inferable from statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie 1989); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 57 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
227. See supra notes 114-25, 134-39 and accompanying text.
228. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie
1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121
(Vernon Supp. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.432 (West Supp. 1991) (guardian or legal custodian). UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17
(1987) specifically provides that access to the health history, genetics, and social history shall
be available to the adoptee's legal guardian "in the event of the death of the adoptive parents."
Id.
229. The response of state adoption agencies to a survey on the release of adoption infor-
mation indicated they received fairly frequent requests from adult adoptees for information
about their genetic background. Plumridge et al., supra note 126, at 208-12. In Minnesota,
during a 13-month period after a law went into effect opening sealed birth certificates, 56% of
the adults who filed requests for birth certitcates asked for information on their genetic histo-
ries. Black, supra note 85, at 198.
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history of her birth parents and other biological relatives will be relevant
to diagnosis and medical treatment throughout the adoptee's lifetime, not
just during childhood.23
Many states assume that adoptive parents will transmit information
to their child. Adults who have been adopted, however, are entitled to
information about their backgrounds that is as complete as possible and
not filtered through the memory or discretion of adoptive parents.
Although ideally adoptive parents should keep a copy of all medical and
social background information provided to them, this may not be possi-
ble because the information is not always disclosed in writing.231 Due to
the excitement and anxiety that are typically present when prospective
adoptive parents meet with a social worker or adoption intermediary to
discuss a potential placement or finalize an adoption, not to mention the
passage of many years, it is entirely possible that by the time the child
reaches majority, the adoptive parents' memory may be incomplete.232
In addition, adoptive parents might choose not to disclose important in-
formation to their adopted child for a variety of reasons. They might
desire to protect the child from information they perceive as unpleasant
or disturbing; finding it psychologically threatening, they might be un-
comfortable discussing the adoptee's biological family at all;233 they
might fear that somehow the information could help the adoptee trace
the biological family; or they could have a particularly strong desire to
have (or not have) grandchildren.
As an adult, it is the adopted person, not the parents, who must
convey relevant medical and genetic history to medical personnel. It is
the adoptee who must consider this information when making choices
about childbearing. Thus, adult adoptees need complete and accurate
information and should not be forced to rely upon the memory or prefer-
ences of their adoptive parents.234 Moreover, information that becomes
230. Black, supra note 85, at 198.
231. For a discussion of the advantages of written disclosure, see infra notes 471-73 and
accompanying text.
232. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 37 ("It has been of concern to adoption workers
stressing openness that many adoptive parents forget what they know about background infor-
mation once placement has occurred, therefore much of the information is never transmitted
to the children.").
233. Id. One adoptive couple, for example, could not bear to tell their adopted son he had
siblings in his birth family, because they feared it would create resentment on his part that he
was an only child in their family. Id. at 21. See generally FLORENCE FISHER, THE SEARCH
FOR ANNA FISHER (1973) (one adoptee's narration of her parent's efforts to keep from her the
fact that she was adopted).
234. It might be argued that children raised by their biological parents must rely upon their
parents to transmit medical and genetic history. Memory impairment, however, would be less
of a threat because it is the biological parents' own medical and genetic history that is con-
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available after the adopted person reaches majority should be transmitted
directly to the adoptee.235
Although the majority of states have mandated the direct disclosure
of health-related information to adoptees,236 a significant number have
yet to include this provision in their statutes.237 It is noteworthy that
veyed, not someone else's. The biological parent normally would be totally familiar with the
child's own medical history, unlike an adoptive parent who was not present for the prenatal
period, or normally for birth, nor for any medical treatment required prior to placement. Fur-
thermore, other members of the family in addition to biological parents, are accessible, a factor
absent in nonrelative adoptions.
235. Since many states keep information for 99 years after the adoption, see, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991), the adoptive parents would be unlikely to be alive to
transmit it to the adoptee or the adoptee's descendants. The adoptive person not only has a
right to have access to the information, but should also be advised of the opportunity to report
medical and genetic information to the appropriate authority if it would be relevant to other
biological relatives. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text. This is more likely to
occur if the adopted adult has direct access to information.
236. At present, the following states provide for mandatory disclosure of some medical or
social information to adoptees: ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31 (Supp. 1991) (19 or older); ALASKA
STAT. § 18.50.500 (1991) (18 or older); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989) (18 or older);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991) (18 or older); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.73 (West
Supp. 1991) (18 or older or married); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991)
(adult); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1991) (adult); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23
(Michie 1991) (21 or older); HAw. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (Supp. 1990) (upon majority); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (18 or older); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-3-4-14 (Bums 1987) (no age restriction); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West Supp. 1991)
(adult); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2122 (Supp. 1990) (adult); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (adult); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991) (18 or
older); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5D (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (18 or older); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.68(7) (West Supp. 1991) (18 or older); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.47
(West Supp. 1992) (implies 19 or older); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (21
or older); NEn. REV. STAT. § 43-146.02 (1988) (no age provision); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-1:19 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (21 or older); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie 1989) (18
or older); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991) (adopted, former foster
child; when discharged to own care); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(e) (1991) (age 21); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-16 (1991) (adult); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Anderson 1989) (age of
majority); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1991) (age of majority); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-15.2 (Supp. 1991) (18 or older); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(2)(i)(3) (West Supp.
1991) (adult); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1987) (no age restriction); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 461(a) (1989) (no age restriction); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991)
(18 or older); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-116 (1988) (age of majority).
Other states allow the release of nonidentifying medical or social information to adoptees
at agency discretion or upon court order. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (West Supp.
1990) (18 or older); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-329(a)(1) (Supp. 1991) (no age restric-
tion); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2905 (1991) (18 or older); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780(D)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (no age restriction); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-131(a) (1991) (no age
provision); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.340 (West Supp. 1991) (no age restriction); W.
VA. CODE § 48-4-10(a) (1986 & Supp. 1991) (no age restriction).
237. The jurisdictions with no provision for disclosure of medical or social background
information to the adoptee are Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
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Ohio recognizes the autonomy of adopted persons by providing that after
the adoptee reaches the age of majority, the social and medical history
forms can no longer be disclosed to the adoptive parents. Only the
adoptee may inspect the forms.238
3. Descendants of Adoptees
Biological descendants of an adoptee have a strong interest in access
to medical and genetic information that might be relevant to their own
medical diagnosis, treatment, and childbearing decisions. Many genetic
conditions, for example, skip generations; the adoptee could be symp-
tom-free, providing her children with no clue as to their risk.239 Unlike
descendants of unadopted persons, descendants of adoptees frequently do
not have access to other biological relatives who could provide the infor-
mation, 24° and thus a mechanism must be created to facilitate their ac-
cess to important medical data.
States should provide, as only a handful have done,241 that adult
descendants of the adoptee have access to relevant medical information
under specified circumstances. Information about hereditary factors that
could affect an adoptee's children or their offspring certainly would be
relevant. On the other hand, disclosure of information that has no hered-
238. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Anderson 1989).
239. For example, autosomal recessive conditions such as sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis,
or phenylketonuria, and X-chromosome-linked recessive conditions, such as hemophilia,
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, or X-linked retardation, do not appear in every generation.
Catherine A. Reiser, Basic Principles of Genetics: A Human Approach, in GENETIC FAMILY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 63, 65-66.
240. Contemporary adoption statutes still reflect the traditional concept that once an adop-
tion is final, the child's biological relatives have no right to any further personal or legal role in
the adoptee's life. ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 13.021]. In recent years
some adoption specialists have advocated open adoption to varying degrees. Id. § 13.02[3], at
13-56 to 13-57. The argument has been most forceful in relation to the adoption of older
children who have had some relationship with their birth families. Id. § 13.02[2], at 13-53 to
13-54, § 13.02[3), at 13-64, 13-70. Nevertheless, it is estimated that open adoption involving
postadoption contact with birth parents in nonrelative adoptions is stifl infrequent. Id.
§ 13.0213], at 13-60. Although grandparents under certain conditions have been awarded visi-
tation following a step parent adoption, id. § 13.03[3](a), app. 1-A, at IA-10 to 1A-11, gener-
ally when adopters are unrelated to the child, grandparents have no right to such visitation
absent a prior visitation or custody order. Id. § 13.0314], at 13-97.
241. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(3)(d) (1989) (to any progeny after adoptee's
death); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.24(s) (West Supp. 1991) (to child or grandchild; death of
adoptee not required); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West. Supp. 1991) (to adult de-
scendants after adoptee's death); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 534 (West 1981 & Supp.
1990) (to all descendants on petition to the court; death of adoptee not required); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.500(1)(d)(B) (1991) (to any progeny of the adoptee 18 or older; upon death of
adoptee); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(i)(5) (West Supp. 1991) (to adult progeny after
adoptee's death); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17(4)(e) (1987) (to child or descendant, no age
restriction).
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itary effect may unjustifiably invade the privacy of the birth family.2 42 If
the adoptee is deceased, relevant information should be disclosed to adult
descendants without a court order. In addition, a spouse or guardian
who has legal custody of an adoptee's minor children after the adoptee's
death also should have access to relevant medical and genetic informa-
tion to facilitate medical diagnosis and care of these children.243
If the adoptee is still alive, however, bypassing her to allow descend-
ants access to the adoptee's medical or social history could invade the
adoptee's right to privacy under circumstances in which an unadopted
person's privacy would not be similarly invaded. 2 4 Access to this infor-
mation while the adoptee is alive and without the adoptee's consent
should be allowed only by court order upon a showing of medical neces-
sity for the information.245
242. Under both constitutional and tort doctrines, information deemed personal can be
released if there is a reasonable public interest in doing so and procedures guard against un-
warranted disclosure. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. Although much of the
information contained in the medical and social history will have a hereditary effect, some very
personal information will not. Child abuse to the adoptee, HIV infection of a birth mother,
and in some cases the reason for adoptive placement, may be examples. While there is psycho-
logical justification for adoptees to have background that goes beyond information of heredi-
tary factors, that justification diminishes greatly when applied to descendants and would not
outweigh the birth family's privacy interests. By the time a descendant is an adult, it is quite
possible that the birth family will be known to descendants, if contact has been made by an
adoptee through registry or mutual consent statutes. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying
text.
There is a risk in allowing the history to be screened for hereditary information only,
however. The person who screens, if not properly trained, may be unaware of the hereditary
impact of many factors, such as alcoholism or breast cancer, and may therefore screen out too
much.
243. The following states have enacted such a provision: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8.
129(B)(a)(c) (1989) (spouse or legal guardian); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505(2)(c) (Michie
1991) (spouse or legal guardian); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.500(l)(d)(A) (1991) (spouse); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(i)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (spouse); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-
17(4)(d) (1987) (spouse).
244. In defining the right to privacy and medical confidentiality under tort law, courts have
determined that immediate family members do not have an automatic right to access to their
relatives' medical files. See Marlene Huggins et a., Ethical Dilemmas Arising During Predic-
tive Testing for Adult-Onset Disease: The Experience of Huntington Disease, 47 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 4, 5-6 (1990). See generally Zelin, supra note 58, at 678, 711-12 (summarizing cases
in which court addressed potential liability for disclosure to patient's spouse). Some courts
have refused to find liability, however, when a physician releases information to a patient's
spouse. See, eg., Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591, 598 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd without opinion,
716 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1983); Curry v. Corn, 52 Misc. 2d 1035, 1037, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Zelin, supra note 58, at 711-12. But see MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d
482, 488, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982) (holding that disclosure by psychiatrist to patient's
wife of intimate statements by patient is actionable breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality).
245. Although an adoptee's need for privacy must be respected, courts also have recog-
nized a privilege to disclose otherwise confidential or private information to prevent harm to
others. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal.
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4. Unadopted Children Whose Parents' Rights Are Terminated
Disclosure issues similar to those discussed above arise in the con-
text of children whose biological parents' rights have been terminated but
who were never adopted. One state refers to these individuals as "adopt-
able persons."'" Upon reaching adulthood, they also require access to
their medical, genetic, and social background information for all the
same reasons it should be provided to adoptees. Their offspring may also
require genetic information after their death because other avenues of
acquiring it (such as through relatives) may be foreclosed as a result of
severed ties. Each state should consider following the lead of Connecti-
cut and Wisconsin, which have provided in their disclosure statutes that
persons whose parents' rights were terminated but who were never
adopted have the same access to medical records as adoptees, 47 and
should provide equivalent disclosure to their descendants248 and other
biological249 relatives. 5 0
Rptr. 14, 27 (1976); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 720, 696 P.2d 527, 535
(1985); see supra notes 64, 70-75 and accompanying text.
The conflict between the duty of confidentiality to a patient and the duty to warn third
parties also is a source of current concern among medical ethicists, both nationally and inter-
nationally. In a recent questionnaire mailed to medical geneticists in 18 countries, to which
677 (64%) responded, 58% (63% outside the United States) replied that the duty to warn
relatives at risk overrides the duty of confidentiality to a patient discovered to have Hunting-
ton's Disease who has refused to permit disclosure of the diagnosis to relatives at high risk for
the same disorder. Similarly 60% (66% outside the United States) would warn relatives of the
diagnosis of a patient with hemophilia A who refused to permit disclosure. Dorothy C. Wertz
et al., Medical Geneticists Confront Ethical Dilemmas: Cross-cultural Comparisons Among 18
Nations, 46 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1200, 1208 (1990); see also Marguerite A. Chapman,
Invited Editoriak Predictive Testing for Adult-Onset Genetic Disease: Ethical and Legal Impli-
cations of the Use of Linkage Analysis of Huntington Disease, 47 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1, 2
(1990) (Experts in medical ethics have explored the option of making access to genetic testing
conditional on prior agreement to disclose information to other at-risk relatives who need the
data for their own risk assessment.). When information is essential to proper diagnosis and
treatment of biological descendants, the court should have the power to make it available.
246. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-743(1) (West Supp. 1991) (providing that statute
applies only to those persons to whom the parental rights of both the biological father and
mother have been terminated).
247. See id. § 45a-746(4); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432(3) (West Supp. 1991). The Wisconsin
statute is broader than the Connecticut statute because it also applies when only one parent's
rights have been terminated. This approach is preferable, as access to medical information
from that side of the family presumably would be affected by the termination.
248. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746(5) (allowing disclosure of information to
adult descendants of adoptable persons after the death of the adoptable person); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.432(3)(a)(4) (allowing disclosure at any time to offspring of individuals whose birth
parent's rights have been terminated in the state).
249. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432(7)(b) (requiring notice to a birth parent whose rights to
a child were terminated that the child has acquired or may have a genetically transferable
disease).
250. The disclosure of medical, genetic, and social background information to foster par-
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5. Birth Family
Disclosure statutes should also permit members of the adoptee's bio-
logical family to have access to genetically significant information about
the adoptee or the adoptee's descendants that is voluntarily provided to
the recordkeeper 5 after the relinquishment." 2 Information that an
adopted child or descendants have been diagnosed with a hereditary con-
dition may significantly affect the medical diagnosis, treatment, and
childbearing plans of birthparents, biological siblings, and other rela-
tives.253 For example, one physician reported examining an adopted
child with a probable diagnosis of a mild form of Meckel Syndrome, a
generally lethal genetic illness. Due to the current level of secrecy in the
adoption process, she was unable to alert the birth parents to the risks of
future childbearing.254 Even if some genetic disorders already are known
to exist in the family, assessing one family member's risk for certain dis-
eases, such as Huntington's Disease,2 5 often requires the development of
a complete family pedigree identifying the other family members who
have developed this disease.256 Lack of information about biological sib-.
lings or other family members could alter significantly the results of the
predictive testing.25 7 Moreover, allowing biological parents access to the
medical and social history records affords them an opportunity to make
corrections or supply missing information.25 8 Several states have recog-
ents, legal guardians, or other caregivers for children whose parents' rights have been termi-
nated is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted that although such disclosure
would not involve all of the same considerations that affect disclosure to adoptive parents, such
individuals require much of this information in order to provide the child with appropriate
medical treatment and care. Wisconsin does provide that guardians or legal custodians of
children whose birth parent's rights have been terminated should have access to medical infor-
mation about the child and the child's birth parents. Id. § 48.432(3)(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
251. For a discussion of the need to impose a statutory duty on adoption agencies and
other intermediaries to maintain new or corrected information made available after an initial
investigation has been completed, see infra notes 454-62 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of a proposed duty to transmit updated information, see infra notes 477-85 and accompa-
nying text.
252. Such provisions should include biological relatives of unadopted persons who were the
subject of termination proceedings. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
253. Plumridge et al., supra note 126, at 209; see also Reiser, supra note 239, at 65-66
(describing autosomal and X-linked recessive conditions that skip generations).
254. Lamport, supra note 4, at 114.
255. Huntington's Disease, also called Huntington's Chorea, is a chronic degenerative neu-
rological disease characterized by spasmodic involuntary movements and intellectual deterio-
ration, ending in dementia. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 299.
256. Chapman, supra note 245, at 1; Huggins et al., supra note 244, at 6; Lamport, supra
note 4, at 113.
257. See Huggins et al., supra note 244, at 6.
258. For example, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(4) (Anderson 1989), provides
that a biological parent or any other person who provided information to assist in preparation
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nized the need for disclosure of some medical information to birth par-
ents, siblings, or other relatives of the adoptee,25 9 but the majority have
neglected this group.
6. Medical Personnel
A small number of states allow an agency or the court discretion to
release information to a provider of medical services. 2 ° Direct release to
medical caregivers after adoption should be limited to circumstances in
which the adult adoptee, an adoptive parent or legal custodian of a minor
adoptee, or the patient who is related to the adoptee is not capable of
requesting the information directly. A provision for direct release may
be useful for emergencies, 261 but direct release to medical personnel
should never be contemplated as a substitute for release of information to
the patient involved or the minor patient's parent or custodian. Such a
substitution, absent an emergency, would deny the autonomy of adoptive
of the social and medical histories of the biological parents may correct or expand the histories
to include different or additional types of information. Presumably, they would need to see the
original record to correct it. To protect privacy, persons other than the biological parent
should see only the information they contributed.
259. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(G)(2) (Supp. 1991) (birth parents); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-129(3)(e) (1989) (birth parents or other biological children of birth parents); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-505(b)(2)(D) (Michie 1991) (birth parents); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-
207(3) (Supp. 1991) (birth parents); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-6(2), -6(4), -14(a)(1) (Burns
1987) (birth parents and relatives of birth parents); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5D(2) (Law.
Co-op. 1981) (birth parents); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68a(2) (West Supp. 1991) (birth
parents and adult siblings); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.47(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1992) (birth
parents and adult siblings); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.500(l)(b) (1991) (birth parents); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-17(4)(f)-(g) (1987) (birth parents and adult siblings); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.340 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (birth parents).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780(D) (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1990) and WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.33.340 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) make release of medical information to
birth parents discretionary.
Although some states indirectly allow relatives access by allowing anyone with a need for
the information to seek a court order, see ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-31(a) (Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-131(a) (1991), this general legislation fails to recognize the specific interests
of biological relatives. If only nonidentifying information is supplied without a court order (a
court order may be appropriate if identifying information is needed), and the information pre-
sumably is provided voluntarily to the entity retaining records by the adoptive parent or
adoptee, it seems unnecessary to impose the expense of obtaining a court order and to subject
the disclosure to the discretion of the court.
260. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(d) (Michie 1991) (providing that agency may petition
court to release medical information to provider of medical services or to a party of interest in
the adoption); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16(l)(c) (West 1981) (medical history may be released
to any person approved by the department for the purpose of treating a patient in a medical
facility); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-146.03 (1988) (court may order release of information on birth
certificate on request of licensed doctor or psychologist if necessary to treat an adoptee).
261. An obvious example would be an adult adoptee who lapses into a coma or uncon-
trolled seizures, the cause of which is undiagnosed.
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parents, adult adoptees, and their biological relatives.2 62
D. Content of Information Collected and Disclosed
1. Medical History of the Child
Surprisingly, many states in their adoption disclosure statutes omit
reference to obtaining and transmitting information about the child's
own medical history.263 Perhaps this oversight occurred because adop-
tion statutes are often drafted with a focus on the adoption of newborn
infants. 261 Although that is the image that the public often carries of
nonrelative adoption, infant adoptions in fact comprise slightly less than
half of all domestic unrelated adoptions.265 Moreover, even newborns
have a medical history-their prenatal and neonatal records-that can
be vital to their care. It is extremely important that a complete medical
history of a child be transmitted to prospective adoptive parents, so they
can make a realistic assessment of their ability to meet the child's special
needs, and so that they can obtain any medical or psychological treat-
ment the child may need.2 66 Because early medical history can be rele-
vant to diagnosis throughout a person's lifetime, it also should be
available to the adult adoptee.267
Although it is probably unnecessary and cumbersome for every rele-
vant disease or condition to be listed in the statute,268 statutes regulating
262. In addition to the categories of persons discussed above, it is interesting to note that
Iowa authorizes its department of human services to approve the release of nonidentifying
health information on adoptees to persons for the sole purpose of conducting legitimate re-
search projects. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16(l)(C) (West 1981).
263. The following states with disclosure statutes omit reference to the inclusion of the
child's medical history: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont, and West Virginia.
In addition, Hawaii includes only medical records relating to the birth of the child. HAW.
REv. STAT. § 578-14.5(a) (Supp. 1990).
264. See UNIF. ADOPTION AcT prefatory note at 1, 3 (Tentative Draft 1990). The prefa-
tory note observes that most states' adoption laws "address the consensual adoption of pre-
sumably healthy newborns or young children by vnrelated adults, and leave the characteristics
of other kinds of adoption to be ferreted out and pieced together from negative inferences from
statutory language intended to deal with the adoption of unrelated infants." Id.
265. The National Committee for Adoption reports that 48.1% of all unrelated adoptions
of children born in the United States were infants. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 4.
266. See supra notes 104-25, 133-39 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
268. Detailed administrative regulations or distribution by a state agency of well-
researched forms to use for collection can facilitate the collection of a comprehensive history.
For example, an excellent pair of forms was developed in 1984 for the Wisconsin Department
of Human Services, with the assistance of the Wisconsin Clinical Genetics Center. See Divi-
sion of Community Services, Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Form No.
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collection should specify more than simply "the medical history of the
child." Prenatal and neonatal information should be specifically re-
quired.26 9 The prenatal history and the history of labor, delivery, and
neonatal evaluation and testing are essential to risk analysis, diagnosis,
and treatment of many subsequent problems.270 Studies have estimated
that twenty percent of birth defects may be related to drug or alcohol
ingestion or poor prenatal care of the expectant mother.271 For example,
consumption of alcohol during pregnancy may create a risk of fetal alco-
hol syndrome, characterized by growth retardation, mental retardation, a
small head, and particular facial characteristics.272 The only way to con-
firm the presence of this syndrome is to obtain accurate information
about the quantity and nature of the alcohol that the mother consumed
while pregnant.273 Sudden, rapid weight gain by the mother during the
DCS-149, Family History Questionnaire: Medical/Genetic (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Wiscon-
sin Medical/Genetic Form]; Division of Community Services, Wisconsin Department of
Health and Social Services, Form No. DCS-149A, Family History Questionnaire: Medical/
Genetic-Pregnancy and Delivery (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Wisconsin Pregnancy & Delivery
Form]. The forms are available by writing to Joan K. Burns, Project Director, Wisconsin
Clinical Genetics Center, 1500 Highland Ave., Room 331, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
WI 53706. Another sample medical history form is currently being developed by Diane
Plumridge, MSW, project coordinator of the Pacific Northwest Regional Genetics Group, and
was scheduled to be presented to the American Society of Human Genetics and the American
Academy of Pediatrics by mid-October, 1990. Letter from Diane M. Plumridge, Project Coor-
dinator, Pacific Northwest Regional Genetics Group, to D. Marianne B. Blair (Aug. 22, 1990).
269. Currently only nine states specifically require prenatal or prenatal and neonatal infor-
mation to be collected and disclosed. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 578-14.5 (a)-(h) (Supp. 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-14(1)-(3) (Bums 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp.
1991); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 60.5A(A) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(2)(a) (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.032(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990);
WYo. STAT. § 1-22-116 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
270. See Don Hadley & Barbara Petterson, Family History Workshop, in GENETIC FAMILY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 100, 108; Renata Laxova, Minor Signs of Major Problems, in GE-
NETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 69, 72; O'Connell, supra note 92, at 534.
271. O'Connell, supra note 92, at 534 n.14 (citing letter from Professor Stella B. Kontras,
M.D., Ohio State University College of Medicine, to Ohio State Senator O'Shaughnessy (Feb.
22, 1978)).
272. Laxova, supra note 270, at 72. A few states specify by statute that information on
drug and/or alcohol consumption be indicated in the medical history. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-41.1(a) (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A(A)(2)(b) (West 1987);
WYO. STAT. § 1-22-116 (1988).
273. Laxova, supra note 270, at 72. This is only one example of many environmental fac-
tors during pregnancy that can affect the health of the child. Much has been written in recent
years about the plight of "crack babies" and the horrible effects they suffer from their mothers'
drug ingestion. See, eg., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Wo-
men of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. R~v. 1419, 1429-30 (1991);
Laurie Rubenstein, Note, Prosecuting Maternal Substance Abusers: An Unjustified and Ineffec-
tive Policy, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 130, 133-35 (1991). Certainly ingestion of other street
drugs creates risks for the child as well. See Mary K. Kennedy, Note, Maternal Liability for
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pregnancy also can signal future health problems for the child.274 Low
birth weight may be a predictor of future medical, psychological, or de-
velopmental abnormalities.27 Minor abnormalities at birth, such as an
extra finger and a small piece of extra skin about the ear, may be signs
that a baby is at high risk for more severe medical problems. 6 Such
examples illustrate the importance of collecting prenatal and neonatal
information, which might be overlooked if the topic is not included in the
statute.
Several other categories of information related to the medical his-
tory of the child should be specifically identified in the disclosure stat-
utes. Information regarding the child's medical problems, including
diseases, illnesses, accidents, allergies, and congenital defects,2 77 and a
history of medical treatment, including hospitalizations and surgeries,immunization records, the results of significant diagnostic testing,278 and
Prenatal Injury Arising from Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: The Possibility of a Cause of
Action in Pennsylvania, 29 PA. ISSUE 553, 556 (1991).
Ingestion by the mother of prescription drugs can also create risks for the child. For
example, fetal Dilantin syndrome, which consists of prenatal growth deficiency, microcephaly,
and mental deficiency, can sometimes result from the mother's ingestion of Dilantin, an anti-
epileptic drug, during pregnancy. PHYSICIAN's DESK REFERENCE 1600 (44th ed. 1990); Lax-
ova, supra note 270, at 77.
The Family History Questionnaire developed by the Wisconsin Clinical Genetics Center
inquires about medications, including prescription, over-the-counter, and street drugs taken
during pregnancy; cigarette smoking; alcohol consumption, including the kind of alcohol con-
sumed and the number of drinks per day for each trimester of pregnancy; and whether the
mother was exposed to unusual fumes or chemicals (through work or otherwise), X-rays, or
other forms of radiation during pregnancy. See Wisconsin Medical/Genetic Form, supra note
268; Wisconsin Pregnancy & Delivery Form, supra note 268; see also Hadley & Petterson,
supra note 270, at 108 (listing information that should be collected in a pregnancy history).
The trimester during which the exposure occurs will indicate the type of damage for which the
fetus may be at risk. Hadley & Petterson, supra note 270, at 108.
274. Laxova, supra note 270, at 74.
275. Id. at 72. A low birth-weight baby is not necessarily premature. Id. at 72, 74.
276. Id. at 74.
277. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A(A)(1)(b) (West 1987) (diseases, disabili-
ties, birth defects); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(2)(a) (1991) (diseases, accidents, allergies, birth
defects); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350(2)(a) (West Supp. 1991) (medical history, X-
rays, examinations, hospitalizations, immunizations of child and birth family).
278. For example, the results of the normal newborn screening tests for phenylketonuria,
hypothyroidism, and any others that may have been performed always should be included and
disclosed. See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 971-72 (Miss. 1990) (reporting that adopted
child suffered permanent brain damage resulting in severe retardation due to pediatrician's
lack of awareness that phenylketonuria test had not been performed prior to transfer of cus-
tody of newborn to adoptive parents). Even if the test results are negative, later caregivers
such as adoptive parents need to know this so that the tests will not be unnecessarily repeated.
It should not be necessary to report every negative culture for a strep throat, for example, but
the results of any laboratory, X-ray, or other diagnostic test that would assist further medical
personnel in diagnosis or treatment should be included.
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dental treatment, should be required to be collected and transmitted. 9
A developmental history, tracing the age at which the child acquired ba-
sic gross motor, fine motor, speech/language, and congenitive skills,
should be included.280 The statutes must mandate inclusion of psycho-
logical or psychiatric evaluations of the child and a record of psychiatric
or psychological treatment,28' because this is precisely the type of infor-
mation that has been susceptible to selective nondisclosure in the past.28 2
Texas's disclosure statute has a very useful provision that requires collec-
tion, retention, and disclosure of "any information necessary to deter-
mine whether the child is entitled to or otherwise eligible for state or
federal financial, medical, or other assistance." '283 Although most of that
information would be provided under the general description of medical
history, such a provision places squarely on the entity responsible for
collection and disclosure the obligation to ensure that adoptive families
be given all the information they need to apply for such assistance, and
may require greater efforts to obtain that information, if it is not readily
available.284
2. Medical and Genetic History of Parents and Other Biological
Relatives
The vast majority of states require collection and disclosure of the
medical history of the biological parents.28 5 The medical history of the
279. See, ag., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(b) (West Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.350(1). It would be extremely useful to make all previous medical records of
older children, with identifying information extracted, available to adoptive parents in order to
provide current physicians, dentists, and other medical personnel with a complete history, if
those records are available.
280. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 222.26(a) (West Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
41(a) (West Supp. 1991). An unusual developmental history can provide important diagnostic
information for a myriad of neurological and sensory deficit problems. See generally Laxova,
supra note 270, at 77-78 (listing exposure to teratogens and mutagens and other prenatal and
postnatal factors as diagnostic indicators).
281. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(b); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350(2)(a).
282. See supra notes 83, 104-18 and accompanying text.
283. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(e)(10).
284. For a discussion of relevant assistance programs, see supra notes 158-64 and accompa-
nying text.
285. See ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-19 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1991); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-505, -506 (Michie 1991); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 224.70(a) (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-8-20, -23 (Michie
1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-14.5 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-4-25, -26 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1990); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13
(West 1991); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-328 (Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210,
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parents is, of course, extremely important. One expert estimates that
"approximately three-fourths of the information a physician seeks in
evaluating the health of a baby involves medical history, ' 286 of which the
parents' history is an important component. Especially vital is informa-
tion on maternal disease, particularly during pregnancy, that can affect
the health of the child.28 7
The statutes should also require collection and disclosure of the
medical history of extended family members and should refer specifically
to genetic diseases or disorders as a topic to be covered. Currently, fewer
than half the states mandate collection and disclosure of the medical his-
tory of other biological relatives, such as siblings or grandparents, 288 and
fewer than twenty actually specify that "genetic" history or information
is to be included.289 This information is vital to accurate diagnosis and
§ 5A (Law. Co-op. 1981); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.27 (West Supp. 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 259.46-.49 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon
Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-122 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (Supp. 1990);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West
Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie 1989); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12
(Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.342(2)(a) (1991) (mother only); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2909 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (Supp. 1991);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 436(c), 460,
461 (1989 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-223 (Michie 1991); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.350 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-10 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-203 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
286. O'Connell, supra note 92, at 533 (citing testimony by Professor Stella B. Kontras,
M.D., Ohio State University College of Medicine, on Senate Bill 340 (Feb. 22, 1978)).
287. For example, the infants of diabetic mothers may have a particular syndrome called
focal femoral hydroplasia, which consists of a cleft palate and very small thigh bones. Laxova,
supra note 270, at 73.
288. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1991); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-748 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West
Supp. 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 578.14.5 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (Vernon Supp. 1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-107 (Supp. 1990);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19 (1990 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1991);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60-5A
(West Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-15.2 (Supp. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-22-203 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
289. See AJiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-505, -506
(Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.70(b) (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23
(Michie 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 578.14.5 (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West
Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.46-.49 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.342(2)(a) (1991); S.C.
19921 HEALTH DISCLOSURES IN ADOPTION
treatment of many medical problems29° that may not be apparent from a
history including only medical problems the birth parents have
experienced.291
Certain other categories of medical history should be identified spe-
cifically in the statute. Chief among them is information about any psy-
chological, psychiatric, or substance-abuse problems, evaluations, or
treatment, again because this is information the agency might be tempted
to omit.2 92 It would be useful to mention physical descriptions in the
statute, simply because they might otherwise be overlooked. In addition
to their importance to the adopted child's building a sense of identity,2 93
unusual physical features can often be important diagnostic clues.294 Re-
quiring information on the identity of providers of medical care to the
natural parents, 295 such as physicians, clinics, hospitals, or psychologists,
might be extremely useful for unforeseen future emergencies during
which the biological parents cannot be found. In such circumstances
critical information might be sought directly from the medical personnel
by court order.2 96 While the laundry list of diseases about which inquiry
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West
Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-16, -17 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West
Supp. 1991). Approximately two-fifths of the states require neither the medical history of
biological relatives nor "genetic" information.
290. See Black, supra note 85, at 176-78; O'Connell, supra note 92, at 533-34. Following a
study of the problems encountered by adopted persons who seek access to their medical and
genetic history, the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) recently endorsed a state-
ment declaring that genetic history should be included in an adoptee's medical ifies as "a
routine part of the adoption process" and that "every person should have the right to gain
access to his or her medical record, including genetic data." American Soc'y of Human Ge-
netics, American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Committee Report on Genetics and
Adoption Points to Consider, 48 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1009, 1009-10 (1991) [hereinafter
ASHG Report].
291. As mentioned previously, many genetic conditions skip generations. See Reiser, supra
note 239, at 65-66. Predictive testing for other genetic conditions may require information
about many family members. See Chapman, supra note 245, at 1. Beyond the relatively infre-
quent genetic conditions discussed in the above articles, such as Huntington's Disease and
myotonic dystrophy, information on such common diseases as cancer and heart disease, given
their tendency to occur in a given biological family, is most useful for health planning and
diagnosis. Knowledge of a history of breast cancer, for example, forewarns a woman to be
especially alert to danger signals that might otherwise be overlooked.
292. See supra notes 81-83, 104-05, 182-97 and accompanying text; see also TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991) ("any psychological, psychiatric, or social evalua-
tions, including the date of any such evaluation, any diagnosis, and a summary of any
findings").
293. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
294. Hadley & Petterson, supra note 270, at 104. For example, extremely short or tall
height "commonly occurs in many genetic, chromosomal, or inherited disorders." Id.
295. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1991).
296. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of statutes requiring disclosure
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should be made is far too cumbersome to list in a statute,297 states may
wish to consider specific reference to certain conditions, such as venereal
disease" or maternal AIDS,2 99 that are particularly critical. If the stat-
ute does not do so, the regulations or forms prepared and distributed to
implement the statute clearly should request information regarding the
age at and cause of death of family members."c°
3. Social and Educational History of the Child
Because many of today's adoptions are of older children,301 it is tre-
mendously important for collection and disclosure statutes to include in-
formation on the social and educational history of the child. Few states
currently address this category of information, 2 despite its effect on the
child's future development.
The social history303 of the child should include information on the
child's pre-adoption relationships with parents, siblings, and extended
of parental medical history by medical personnel, see infra notes 363-66 and accompanying
text.
297. For example, the Wisconsin Family History Questionnaire lists 58 specific conditions
about which it seeks information on the adoptee's parents, full and half-siblings, grandparents,
aunts, uncles, and cousins. See Wisconsin Medical/Genetic Form, supra note 268.
298. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A (West Supp. 1992).
299. See infra notes 375-93 and accompanying text.
300. See Hadley & Petterson, supra note 270, at 106. This information is useful to help
identify diseases or conditions to which the child might be more susceptible because of their
occurrence in the family.
301. See BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 8. The authors define older-child adoption as
adoption of children age three or older. Id.
302. Only 10 states currently specify that the social history of the child should be collected
and disclosed. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.70(a) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162
(West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210,
§ 5A (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.47-.49 (West 1982 & Supp.
1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-114, -131 (1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West
Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350
(West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991). Several others focus on
certain aspects. See ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-31 (Supp. 1991) (circumstances under which child
is placed, pre-adoption sibling relationships, care prior to adoption by others); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991) (child's personality, temperament, and development);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie 1989) (length of time in care of persons other than peti-
tioner).
Only three state statutes specifically require the collection and disclosure of educational
history. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.70(a) (West Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210,
§ 5A (Law. Co-op. 1981); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991).
303. Because the information described in this category as social history is critically tied to
the adoptee's emotional well-being, it is logical to include it as health-related information that
should be disclosed. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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family.3°4 To better accommodate a child's adjustment into a new fam-
ily, it is important for the adoptive parents to be knowledgeable about
previous relationships that were important to the child. The child may
need support through a grieving process if termination has disrupted re-
lationships the child perceived as positive.30 5 Moreover, as an adult, the
adoptee may desire information on siblings and other biological relatives
to help him or her develop a sense of identity. Social history also should
include the nature (relative, foster care, institutional, group care, or
adoptive placement) and length of time the child was in the care or cus-
tody of someone other than the biological parents or the current adoptive
placement, and what is known about the child's relationship with these
caregivers.30 6 Information on the child's personality, temperament, and
behavior must be included.307 The circumstances under which the child
was placed for adoption should also be disclosed.30 The adoptive par-
ents must be able to respond, at the appropriate time, to the child's ques-
tions about why the child was adopted.3"9 It is also extremely important
that the statutes specify that any history of physical, sexual, or emotional
304. See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(d)(9) (Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(c)
(West Supp. 1991).
305. In one family, known to the author, an adoptive mother was concerned about her
eight-year-old son's adjustment to placement in her home. After a month with her, he re-
vealed he had two siblings still in foster care about whom the mother had never been told. She
subsequently adopted both siblings so the children could be together.
306. See ALA. CODE § 26-1-A-31(g)(5) (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53(D)(5)
(Michie 1989). The number of placements a child has been through, particularly disrupted
adoptive placements, may greatly affect a child's ability to adjust in a new adoptive placement.
Studies on adoption disruption indicate characteristics of multiple pre-adoptive placements
and previous adoptive placements contribute to adoption instability. BARTH & BERRY, supra
note 11, at 72. Sometimes former foster parents can be of great assistance to adoptive parents.
In one instance a foster mother was a significant asset to a single adoptive father of an eight-
year-old boy with a history of sexual abuse, emotional problems, and self-mutilation as part of
satanic worship. Id. at 49, 176.
307. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West Supp. 1991). One of the stressors that may lead
to maladaptive coping on the part of the adoptive parent is the lack of everyday information
concerning the child's behavior. For example, a new adoptive mother has no background to
assess whether her child's lying is "just a temporary lapse in honesty or an indication of a
deeply ingrained habit." BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 56. Older children may come to
an adoptive placement with seriously disturbed behavioral patterns-stealing, destruction of
property, mutilation of self or animals, or sexual or violent attacks on siblings or adoptive
parents. Id. at 175; see supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Experts have observed that
adoptive families handle these behavioral problems better if they are prepared. "The greater
the surprises, the greater the difficulty." BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 175.
308. Several studies have shown that adoptive placements following contested parental-
rights termination are at higher risk for disruption. BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 73.
309. Failure to provide an adopted child with honest answers to such questions can be
psychologically damaging. SOROSKY et al., supra note 77, at 91-94; McInturf, supra note 116,
at 376; Burke, supra note 43, at 1201-04.
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abuse be included in the information to be disclosed.31° This information
is critical to ensuring that a child receives proper diagnosis and treatment
if mental, emotional, or special behavioral problems develop after
placement.311
A child's educational history should include information about the
child's enrollment and performance in schools the child has attended, the
results of any psychometric or other educational or standardized testing,
and information about any learning disabilities or other special education
needs the child may have.312 This information is essential to place the
child in a proper educational setting after placement in the adoptive
home, to assess the child's needs adequately, and to facilitate intellectual
and social growth and development.
4. Social History of Biological Parents and Ancestors
To give birth is to establish the hereditary link. It forces you to
think back about your own heritage-to think of the traits and
talents, the shapes and sizes of ancestors whose genes you
carry. The adoptee goes back only into himself. Beyond that
there is a wall. And it is the fear of what is behind that wall-
magnified a thousand rational and irrational times in one's im-
agination-that causes all the mischief. 313
Although transmitting social background information on the biolog-
ical parents and other extended relatives may seem to be unrelated to and
comparatively less important than other medical history and the child's
social history, it is tremendously important in fostering the adoptee's
sense of identity, which is critical to healthy emotional development.314
This social background information should include information
about the racial, national, and ethnic origin of the adoptee's ancestors.
This information is important to the adoptee both for psychological rea-
sons and because it has value for diagnosing genetically-inherited dis-
eases that occur frequently in certain ethnic or racial groups.31 5
310. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a) (West Supp. 1991). Prior to enactment of the
abuse-disclosure provision, many families who adopted in Texas were denied information
about previous physical or sexual abuse experienced by their children, which delayed proper
treatment for their subsequent emotional problems and contributed to years of severely dis-
turbed behavior. Belkin, supra note 2, at B8; see also BARTH & BERRY, supra note 11, at 15
(reporting that a child's history of abuse is critical to pre-adoption assessment).
311. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
312. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(d) (West Supp. 1991).
313. FISHER, supra note 233, at 52.
314. Black, supra note 85, at 203-05; Whitehouse, supra note 3, at 20; see supra notes 130-
31 and accompanying text.
315. Hadley & Petterson, supra note 270, at 103. For example, Tay Sachs disease is preva-
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Information about tribal membership of ancestors should be required so
that adoptees as adults can seek the benefits of tribal membership.316 In-
formation regarding the parents' age at the time of the birth of the
adoptee, their religion, their educational background, their employment
history, talents, hobbies, and special interests all should be provided to
the adoptive parents, so that they can share this information with their
adopted children at appropriate times to help them resolve issues regard-
ing their adoption and who they are,317 and to adoptees themselves upon
reaching adulthood. Information about whether the biological parents
are related to each other should also be disclosed. Children of incestuous
relationships have a significantly increased risk for severe mental retarda-
tion and other genetic conditions.318 States might also consider allowing
the collection and disclosure process to transmit other nonidentifying in-
formation that the biological parents voluntarily provide, such as photo-
graphs or a letter to the child, with the intent that it be shared with the
child.319
lent among those of Jewish ancestry, sickle cell anemia is most common among African-Amer-
icans, cystic fibrosis is most common among Caucasians, and spina bifida more frequently
strikes those of Irish descent. Id.
316. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510(a)(2)(C) (1991).
317. See Kitzman, supra note 99, at 23 (adoptive mother describing her children's delight
upon learning their interests and hobbies were similar to those of their birth parents); see also
supra note 130 and sources cited therein (discussing the importance of background informa-
tion to the adoptee's sense of identity).
Several states require collection of this type of information. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.50.510 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-746 (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53(D) (Michie 1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(3) (Anderson 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-
6-15.2 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 436(c) (1989).
318. Black, supra note 85, at 194-95. Black reports a study conducted by Bundey which
found that in children of first-degree relatives (parent and child or siblings), the risk of severe
mental retardation was one in four, the risk of an autosomal recessive disease, a generation
skipping genetic disorder (such as Tay Sachs, sickle cell anemia, or cystic fibrosis) was one in
seven, and the risk of polygenetic malformation was one in eight. In Bundey's study of 215
such children followed into adolescence, fewer than half were normal. Id. at 194. The risk of
such genetic disorders and mental retardation among offspring of second-degree relatives (un-
cle/niece, for example) or first cousins was less, but still much higher than in the general
population. Id. at 194-95; see also Lamport, supra note 4, at 114 (relating that because incest
often is not revealed, clinicians have developed a standard set of criteria for evaluating children
of suspected incest).
In M.H. v. Caritas, 475 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), adoptive parents sued an
adoption agency for its failure to advise them that their son was conceived in an incestuous
relationship between siblings. Id. at 97. The child had serious emotional problems and was
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Id. The appellate court recognized
these allegations as sufficient to sustain claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation,
and reversed a summary judgment for defendants. Id. at 97-99.
319. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510(a)(9) (1991) (allowing state registrar to release to
adoptive parents or adult adoptees "information provided by the biological parent for disclo-
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5. Identifying Information
Every state with a statute allowing disclosure of medical and social
history specifies that the disclosure include only "nonidentifying infor-
mation., 320 Frequently states have developed separate disclosure mecha-
nisms that allow adult adoptees to obtain the identity of their biological
parents, 321 normally requiring consent or at least a lack of objection by
the biological parent.322 The pros and cons of allowing adult adoptees an
absolute right to discover the identity and location of their biological par-
ents have been extremely controversial in recent years, 323 and extensive
discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this Article. It is of note
that one of the arguments favoring disclosure is that allowing adult
adoptees potential access to biological relatives fosters communication of
health information that might not otherwise have been disclosed.324
Many advocates of disclosure contend that this information is crucial to
an adult adoptee's psychological well-being.3 25 In any event, it is impor-
tant for the state to maintain a system for acquiring and recording cur-
rent names and addresses of both adoptees and biological relatives, so
that each could be located, by court order, if further information or even
participation in medical treatment is necessary to preserve the health of
either the adoptee or the biological relative.326
sure to the child, which may include such items as photographs, letters, and a statement ex-
plaining the reasons for the adoption").
320. See, eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505(a)
(Michie 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(f)(2) (Michie 1991).
321. Section 18.50.500(a) of the Alaska Statutes requires the state to disclose to an adopted
person who is 18 or older an uncertified copy of his birth certificate, without obtaining the
consent of the biological parent. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500(a) (1991). In addition, any infor-
mation on the current name or address of the biological parent that has been voluntarily sup-
plied will also be disclosed. Id. The state will disclose the name and address of the adoptee to
the biological parent upon written request by the adoptee. Id.
322. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(f)(3)(A) (Michie 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 710.68a (West. Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.40 (Anderson 1989); see
also supra notes 95-96 (discussing mutual-consent registries and search-and.consent statutes).
323. See, eg., FISHER, supra note 233; Sweeney, supra note 130, at 343.69; Burke, supra
note 43; Gloor, supra note 43; Prager & Rothstein, supra note 43; Tartanella, supra note 43.
324. See generally Whitehouse, supra note 3, at 19-20 (biopsy patient obtained information
that lumps, but not breast cancer, were common in her family).
325. See Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 186, 193, 509
A.2d 283, 286-87 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics,
148 N.J. Super. 302, 318-19, 372 A.2d 646, 655 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Burke, supra note
43, at 1202-04; Prager & Rothstein, supra note 43, at 139-40.
326. For example, Iowa provides that the court may open adoption or termination records
if necessary to prevent irreparable physical harm to an adopted person or the person's off-
spring. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.16 (West 1981 & Supp. 1991). The law also permits, where
necessary, revelation of the identity of the natural parents to medical personnel, who must try
not to reveal the identity to the adoptee. Id. Delaware allows the release of identifying infor-
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E. Privacy, Efficacy, and Other Concerns Related to the Methods for
Collection, Retention, and Disclosure of Information
1. Responsibility for Collection
Current statutes vary widely on the question of who is ultimately
responsible for collecting medical and social history. Many states place
this duty on the state department that handles adoptions, the private
agency making the placement,327 or some other intermediary who places
the child.328 Some states place the burden on the court,32 9 others on the
petitioner for adoption,33 ° the parent who surrenders the child for adop-
tion,331 or the state or agency designee who does the investigation.332
One state simply requires the adoptive parents to submit a doctor's certif-
icate showing the physical and mental condition of the child. 33
If a public or private agency is handling an adoption, that agency
should be required by statute to collect the information described in the
previous section. Adoption agencies are licensed by the state and subject
to state regulation, 334 and it would be easy to provide uniform training to
their personnel in the procedure and skills necessary to collect and tran-
scribe relevant data properly, and prepare the necessary reports.33 Since
mation by court order when it is needed for the health of an adopted individual or blood
relative, and allows the disclosure of the location and identification of siblings if siblings are
needed to participate in any medical treatment. DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 13, § 924 (Supp. 1990).
327. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-748 (West Supp. 1991); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25 (1991).
328. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.185 (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie 1991).
329. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.27 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.342 (1991).
330. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2128 (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17
(1987).
331. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 436
(1989).
332. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-19 (Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West
Supp. 1991).
333. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1988).
334. "Every state has some procedure for the licensing of adoption agencies." ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, § 3.03[2].
335. A survey of social workers from public adoption agencies in all 50 states has indicated
strong recognition of a great need for genetic education programs appropriate for the staff of
adoption agencies. Plumridge et al., supra note 126, at 213. Another expert, reflecting on the
implication of "wrongful adoption" litigation, observed that all adoption agency employees
who are responsible for placement in a direct or supervisory capacity must receive "routine
instruction through staff development programs and in written policy guidelines on the impor-
tance of" disclosure and appropriate disclosure procedure. Carol Amadio, Wrongful Adop-
tion-A New Basis for Litigation: Another Challenge for Child Welfare, J.L. & Soc. WORK,
March 1989, at 23, 30; see also Belkin, supra note 2, at Al, B8 (explaining that many social
workers do not understand the need for pre-adoption information).
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these agencies often are affiliated with national or regional social work
organizations, they are also the group most readily accessible for updat-
ing training and implementing procedural changes. Moreover, their pro-
fessional personnel, who should be the ones actually collecting the data,
are already trained to deal with difficult interpersonal situations336 -un-
like court employees, for example, whose training may be more clerical
in nature.
If an agency is not involved in the adoption, the ultimate responsi-
bility for ensuring that necessary information is collected should be
placed upon the attorney who is serving as intermediary or representing
the petitioners for adoption.337 The attorney is licensed by the state and
therefore subject to discipline, and is also part of a training network
through continuing legal education. Limitations should be placed upon
the attorney's ability to delegate the collection responsibility if the attor-
ney does not herself collect the information and prepare the report. Con-
tracting with a licensed social worker, training a paralegal in the
attorney's office, or allowing the information to be collected by a profes-
sional in the obstetrician's office, if the birth mother's contact is directly
with the obstetrician, might all be acceptable options. Although it would
be tempting to require that only a licensed social worker perform the
task, such a limitation might unnecessarily deter adoptive placements.
Many birth mothers choose to place their babies through independent
adoption rather than through an agency because they prefer to deal only
with a lawyer or doctor, a relationship they may perceive as more per-
sonal and confidential. 338
2. The Extent of the Duty to Investigate and the Duty to Provide
Information
Most disclosure statutes offer little guidance regarding the extent of
the investigation that must be performed or the responsibility to provide
information to the intermediary charged with gathering the information.
Several statutes require collection or disclosure of "available" or "reason-
ably available" information.339 A few states specifically require a parent
336. See Plumridge et al., supra note 126, at 213 (collecting genetic information "is a re-
finement of already existing social work skills and can be enhanced through specialized
training").
337. See Gustafson, supra note 185, at 857.
338. Linda J. Davie, Note, Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated In-
dependent Adoptions, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 933, 973 (1984).
339. See, eg., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (1989) ("reasonably available"); IDAHO
CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1991) ("reasonably known or available"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1
(West Supp. 1991) ("available"); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1991)
("available"); WYO. STAT. § 1-22-116 (Supp. 1991) ("available").
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who relinquishes a child for adoption to provide medical or other back-
ground information.3" One state requires that any person who has rele-
vant background information about a child to be adopted "shall, upon
request" cooperate with the investigator and disclose the information,
"whether contained in sealed records or not."34' This relatively cursory
treatment belies the complexity of the issues related to the parameters of
appropriate investigation, and the extent to which disclosure should be
pursued or compelled.
a. Reasonable Efforts Requirement-Obtaining Information
Through Voluntary Cooperation of Parents or Other
Guardians
The agency or other intermediary342 who places a child for adoption
should be required by statute to make reasonable efforts343 to obtain all
of the medical and social information described in Part III(D)3" of this
Article. Describing the duty as one to make "reasonable efforts" to ob-
tain information, rather than a duty to collect and disclose "available"
information, better conveys the agency's or intermediary's responsibility
to seek out the required information actively as opposed to passively re-
cording whatever information is offered. While an all-inclusive descrip-
tion of "reasonable efforts" cannot be achieved,345 the statute or state
regulations implementing the statute should offer guidance regarding the
essential steps. Obtaining all information available from the parent(s) or
other legal guardian who relinquishes a child for adoption should always
340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082 (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13(A) (West
1991).
341. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8(4) (West 1981).
342. See supra notes 334-38 and accompanying text.
343. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-748 (West Supp. 1991). Hawaii's statute provides
that:
[a]ll affected public agencies and all child-placing organizations... shall make rea-
sonable efforts to complete this form with medical information on both natural par-
ents, to obtain from the natural parents written consent to the release of this
information to or for the benefit of the adopted child, and whenever possible, to
obtain from the natural mother a signed release to receive a copy of all of her medical
records, relating to the birth of the adopted child, which are within the possession of
the hospital or other facility at which the child was born.
HAW. REv. STAT. § 578-14.5(b) (Supp. 1990).
344. See supra notes 263-326 and accompanying text.
345. What is reasonable in every conceivable circumstance obviously cannot be statutorily
regulated in detail. Nevertheless, requiring reasonable efforts affirms the agency's or intermedi-
ary's statutory duty to investigate to the extent reasonable under the circumstances, mirroring
the "reasonable person standard" used in determining negligence on a case by case basis. See
generally KEETON et al., supra note 34, § 32 (discussing reasonable person standard for
negligence).
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be required. 3" If the child has been in the physical custody of someone
other than the relinquishing parent(s) (such as grandparents or foster
care) for any significant period of time, those caretakers should also be
interviewed."4a "Reasonable efforts" should also include requesting a re-
lease from the relinquishing parent or other legal custodian and ob-
taining a copy of all of the child's medical records.34
Efforts must also be made to interview parents who are not volunta-
rily relinquishing a child, although special considerations may dictate the
timing and circumstances of the contact. The issue of interviewing the
birth father of a child born out of wedlock is particularly difficult. Often,
an expectant mother who contacts an adoption agency or intermediary is
strongly opposed to any contact with the child's biological father.349 A
requirement that contact be made prior to birth or earlier than is other-
wise necessary may prompt mothers to choose another option, such as
abortion or black-market adoption. Both birth mothers and prospective
adoptive parents may fear that an inquiry of this type, which emphasizes
the genetic link, may prompt a father to appear and oppose an adoption
that he might otherwise have ignored. Viewing this dilemma from the
perspective of the best interests of the child, it is extremely difficult to
quantify the risks each alternative creates. Delaying the inquiry until
after the adoption is final may result in prospective adoptive parents or
social workers lacking medical information that could alter their decision
and result in an inappropriate or unhappy placement for the child. Some
necessary medical treatment could be delayed, for finalizing an adoption
can sometimes take more than a year. More probable is that the delay
could decrease the possibility that the father can be located. Even if in-
quiry is delayed only until the point at which the father's right to contest
the adoption is foreclosed, in rare instances some critical newly-un-
346. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989) for an example of a detailed
statute describing the manner in which an investigation to obtain medical and social history
should be conducted.
347. It is important to obtain this information from the actual caregivers who would be
most familiar with any medical problems or special needs the child has exhibited, regardless of
whether that caregiver had legal custody. For an illustration of the kind of tragedy that may
result when an agency fails to relay to adoptive parents information recorded by foster parents,
see Jacob, supra note 109, at 48 (asserting that failure to relay information indicating fetal
alcohol syndrome resulted in years of ineffective therapy and upheaval for family).
348. To the extent these records can be located, a child should enter an adoption with the
same access to his own medical records that an unadopted child would have. In addition to
retaining a copy of these records in a permanent file, a copy should be provided to the adoptive
parents, with identifying information redacted, so that the child's postadoption medical or
psychiatric health-care providers will have access to necessary history.
349. Not infrequently, a mother who has consented to the adoption of her infant will assert
she does not know who the father is, or does not know his whereabouts, to avoid involving him
in the adoption process. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 36.
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earthed information might cause a placement to be disrupted, or the
child could be forced to remain in foster care longer than is desirable.
On the other hand, increasing the incidence of contested adoptions does
not serve the child's best interests, nor would awarding custody to a fa-
ther who, upon receiving notice, would not otherwise have been moti-
vated to contest.
These conflicting considerations cannot be totally reconciled. Ulti-
mately, constitutional 350 and state statutory requirements 351 usually ne-
cessitate giving fathers of both infants and older children notice and the
opportunity to appear prior to finalizing an adoption. Mandating that
efforts be made to obtain the required information from the father at or
shortly after the time notice is given should not additionally deter birth
mothers from legal adoption. In many states the majority of fathers enti-
tled to notice already have some relationship or have taken steps to estab-
lish a relationship with the child, and their decisions are unlikely to be
affected by the medical inquiry.3" 2 Even in states that require notice to
350. The United States Supreme Court has unanimously held that the Due Process Clause
requires that notice of adoption proceedings be given to the father of a child born in wedlock.
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 552 (1965).
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that if a father of a child born out of wedlock
has developed a relationship with his biological child and accepted "some measure of responsi-
bility for the child's future," his parental rights cannot be terminated in an adoption without
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983). By
contrast, the Lehr Court determined that a father who has never had any significant custodial,
personal, or financial relationship with a child (and in fact failed to attempt to establish pater-
nity until the child was over two) was not entitled to notice of adoption proceedings. Id. at
262; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123, 130 (1989) (plurality opinion) (four
justices expressing willingness to narrow due process rights of biological father further if the
parental relationship did not develop within traditional unitary family).
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of the constitutional rights of putative
fathers of children who are adopted as young infants.
351. See generally ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 76, §§ 4.10[1], 2.04[2] (dis-
cussing adoption procedures at length and detailing the problems of notice to unwed fathers).
The Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act requires that notice of adoption pro-
ceedings be given to all putative fathers known to the person seeking termination in adoption
proceedings. UNIF. PUTATIVE & UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 33-34 (Supp.
1991). A putative father, with certain exclusions, includes any man who claims to be, or is
named as the biological father or possible biological father of a child, and whose paternity has
not yet been adjudicated. Id. § 1, 9B U.L.A. 30.
352. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1988). The statute provides that a
father of a child born out of wedlock must consent before adoption occurs if he has supported,
visited, or communicated regularly with a child placed for adoption more than six months
after birth, or, for a child placed younger than six months of age, if he lived with the mother
for six months preceding placement, held himself out as the father, and paid pregnancy or
birth-related expenses. Id. Section 11 l(a) provides that, in addition to the above fathers enti-
tled to withhold consent, other fathers are entitled to notice of the adoption, including those
who have been adjudicated to be the father, those who have filed an unrevoked notice of intent
to claim paternity or an instrument acknowledging paternity, those recorded on the child's
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fathers who have not made previous efforts to establish a relationship
with the child, 53 the risk that medical inquiry would influence a father
who is already entitled to notice is minimal and should not outweigh the
importance of the information to be gathered. If such a state's legislature
determines that the risk of creating contested adoptions is substantial,
however, it could choose to leave the timing of the inquiry to the discre-
tion of the agency or intermediary, provided that inquiry is made shortly
after a court determines the adoption can proceed without the father's
consent.
In states such as New York that do not require notice to all fa-
thers, 54 the risk of medical inquiry prompting challenges from fathers
who would not otherwise receive notice at all is magnified. An inquiry
prior to termination of their parental rights would, of course, provide de
facto notice of the adoption proceedings. The corresponding concern
that the birth mothers would be harassed or seek an alternative to legal
adoption is also heightened. Many states may conclude that these risks
do not outweigh the importance of seeking medical information from the
father early in the adoption process. 355 States that have determined that
notice creates an undue risk of harassment for the mother or adverse
consequences for the child, however, could still mandate that efforts to
obtain this information occur after the father's parental rights have been
terminated in the adoption proceeding.
In addition to biological fathers of infants, reasonable efforts must
also be made to collect information from any other parents whose rights
have been involuntarily terminated prior to an adoption. This informa-
tion is especially crucial because these children have normally been in the
custody of at least one parent for a significant period of time. Incorpo-
rating such an inquiry into the early stages of state-initiated dependency
or neglect proceedings in which children are removed from a parent's
custody might help ensure that the necessary information is available in
cases that do proceed to termination and subsequent adoption.35 6
birth certificate, those living with the child and the child's mother and holding themselves out
as the father, those identified as the father by the mother in a sworn statement, and former
husbands of the mother married to her within six months of the child's birth. Id. § 11 (a).
353. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.7 (West Supp. 1992).
354. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1988).
355. This conclusion undoubtedly is influenced by the author's belief that all putative fa-
thers, as a matter of constitutional right and public policy, should be entitled to notice of
adoption proceedings.
356. Social workers are taught that the best time to get information may be upon initial
contact with the agency, when a parent often depends upon the agency for a service or a
favorable report, or at the time of initial contact with the court system, when the parent's fear
of the legal system may motivate cooperation. Diane Knight, Working with the Resistant or
Reticent Client Workshop, in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note I, at 56, 56. While gath-
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b. Obtaining Information from Other Sources
When complete information cannot be obtained from these sources,
efforts should be made to contact other relatives, medical care providers,
and other community resources,357 to the extent that such contacts can
be made without invading the parents' right to privacy. Obtaining medi-
cal records or supplemental information regarding the child's medical
care and educational testing from medical providers or schools should
not be problematic. In most cases, a parent or other legal custodian of a
child voluntarily relinquished for adoption should voluntarily sign a con-
sent authorizing this disclosure. Children to be adopted following invol-
untary termination by the state would be in the state's custody, so
releases could be signed by the appropriate official. On the rare occasions
when such a release could not be obtained, however, the statutes should
authorize schools and medical personnel to release such records. The
focus of the child's educational or medical records-would be information
on the child's own medical or educational problems, not the parents', and
such information, for the reasons discussed previously, is essential to the
care of the child.35
Such records could reveal information about a parent's conduct,
such as child abuse, that the parent would prefer to shield; a parent's
right to privacy in this context, however, should not supersede the child's
need for appropriate future treatment and counseling. There is already
widespread agreement, as evidenced by the enactment of child abuse re-
porting laws, that the principles of medical confidentiality359 and the
right to privacy" are not inviolate when prevention of harm to an iden-
ering the history at this stage will necessitate collection of information on many children who
will never be adopted, the benefit to those who ultimately are adopted sufficiently offsets this
disadvantage.
On the other hand, if states adopt a provision for use immunity for the information pro-
vided, care must be taken to delay collection until the prosecutor has gathered the evidence to
use in the juvenile proceeding, so that the termination proceeding is not affected by the collec-
tion of medical and social history. See infra text accompanying note 443.
357. One expert suggests that the following sources be investigated when a biological par-
ent cannot supply all of the necessary information: (1) Adult siblings of the parent; (2) grand-
parents or other significant relatives; (3) ex-spouses of the parent; (4) adult children of the
biological parents; (5) physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, or other medical personnel who
have treated the biological parents, siblings, or the child to be adopted; (6) the local welfare
department; (7) school records; (8) a local church, parish, or synagogue; or (9) the local police.
Knight, supra note 356, at 57.
358. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 36-58 and accompanying text.
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tiflable third party necessitates disclosure.361 The same rationale would
justify release of information about the medical history of a parent or
other family member that might be contained in the child's medical
records. If such information is contained in the child's records, the re-
corder considered it relevant to the care or treatment of the child. If it
was provided in the context of a confidential communication to the
child's physician or school, the purpose of the communication is served
by making it available to future health-care providers. Physicians have
considerable latitude to make disclosures to family members when the
patient's health requires the disclosure, and to discuss confidential infor-
mation with other health-care professionals directly involved with the
treatment of the patient.362 Acquiring information on family members
that is contained in the child's medical records for transmission to adop-
tive parents and future medical caregivers is consistent with these
principles.
More difficult questions are raised by statutory authorization for
medical personnel to disclose without the patient's consent the medical
records of a parent or other biological relative to an adoption agency or
other adoption intermediary. Unlike information found in the child's
records, this information was not initially disclosed to the medical
caregiver for the purpose of treating the adoptee. Instead, the parent or
other relative was the patient who established the confidential relation-
ship. Although specific statutory authorization should obviate any tort
liability for disclosure in these circumstances,3 63 the wisdom of such au-
thorization requires balancing several considerations. First, one of the
primary purposes of medical confidentiality is to encourage patients to
seek treatment and to provide their physicians full and truthful informa-
tion.364 Proliferation of statutory exceptions could inhibit this communi-
cation. In addition, numerous exceptions thwart the privacy interests of
the patient. Furthermore, this particular exception could persuade a bio-
logical mother who was aware of it to choose abortion or black market
adoption. Neither of these alternatives is preferable from the viewpoint
of the child's best interests, which of course must justify the exception in
the first place. On the other hand, certain information, as discussed in
previous sections,"' is vital to appropriate diagnosis and treatment of the
361. Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:352; see ANNAS, supra note 40, at 181-82; THOMAs A.
SHANNON & Jo ANN MANFRA, LAW AND BIOETHics 279 (1982).
362. ANNAS, supra note 40, at 185, 187; see Zelin, supra note 58, at 711-12.
363. Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173, 177-78, 150 S.W.2d 648, 650 (1941); see Home v. Patton,
251 Ala. 701, 706-07, 287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1974); ANNAS, supra note 40, at 181-82; Zelin,
supra note 58, at 713.
364. Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:351.
365. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
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child in future years, and to an appropriate placement.
In view of all of these factors, a narrow statutory authorization is
warranted. When accurate information cannot be obtained from, or with
the permission of, birth parents, the courts should be authorized to order
the release of medical information that could have a significant effect on
the adoptee's health from records of a birth parent. Such information
should include genetic disorders; records of prenatal treatment and care,
labor, and delivery; information on maternal disease, substance abuse, or
exposure to other high-risk factors during the pregnancy; and informa-
tion on medical or psychological conditions that have a significantly
higher rate of incidence within families where they have occurred previ-
ously. The requirement of a court order provides some protection that
the request will be limited to matters that could significantly affect the
future placement, medical diagnosis, and treatment of the adoptee. Such
limited invasion of a parent's privacy interests fits within a well-recog-
nized justification that the invasion is necessary to prevent harm to an
identified third party, who in this instance would be the adoptee.366
The effect of this limited disclosure exception on the mother's
choices remains a serious concern, one that is difficult to quantify com-
pared with the risks posed by no information. Adoption of immunity
provisions367 may diminish the risk that knowledge of an investigator's
ability to obtain medical records might coerce a mother otherwise favor-
ing legal adoption to choose another course. Also, the fact that in most
states the identity of biological parents may not be revealed without their
consent to anyone outside the adoption agency or other intermediary,
including the adoptive parents or adoptee,368 might reassure a parent
that the revealed medical information cannot be linked to her.
Moreover, appropriate limitations on the use of the authorization
should avert the potential for abuse. The statutory guidelines should di-
rect the courts to order release of a parent's medical records only when
there is some indication that the information would have a significant
effect on the health of the adoptee, and cannot be obtained accurately
from or with the consent of the parents or other relatives. Obtaining
copies of a parent's medical records thus should not become routine in
366. See Gauthier, supra note 60, at S:352. Treatment of the child should also satisfy the
"reasonable public interest" standard, which allows various governmental data collection prac-
tices to survive constitutional scrutiny and avoid tort liability for invasion of privacy. See
supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
367. See infra notes 432-43 and accompanying text.
368. Only two states, Alaska and Kansas, allow the identity of the biological parents to be
released to an adult adoptee without the consent of the biological parents. ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.50.500 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1985); see ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 76, § 13.01[3], at 13-21 (Supp. 1991).
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every adoption. Application for such a court order should not take place
until after a child has been surrendered for adoption (or termination has
otherwise taken place) to avoid unnecessary invasion of parental privacy
in cases in which no adoption would ultimately occur. The parent whose
records are sought should be notified of the hearing on the application
and afforded opportunity for counsel.369
Finally, the authorization to compel disclosure should be limited to
the parents' records, absent compelling, life-threatening circumstances.
If a broader authorization were extended to the records of all biological
relatives whose health would be relevant, this would tremendously ex-
pand the exception and thus risk eviscerating confidence in medical con-
fidentiality. It seems unfair to allow the invasion of the medical and
psychological records of all biological relatives, since such relatives
would rarely have had any role in the events that precipitated the adop-
tion, and therefore no control over the subsequent need for disclosure.
Moreover, while it seems justifiable to impair the parents' right to pri-
vacy to serve their child's interests, given societal recognition of a partic-
ular duty on the part of parents to promote the welfare of their
children, 7 0 all biological relatives whose medical status might be rele-
vant bear no similar responsibility. An authorization allowing invasion
of their records would be unwarranted. Unlike parents, who in most
states wield control over the revelation of their identity to adult
adoptees,371 biological relatives have no similar control. Information of
a highly personal nature, such as diagnosis of schizophrenia or other
mental illness, alcoholism, or Huntington's Disease, might be conveyed
to persons not of the relative's choosing if the adult adoptee, through
registries or mutual consent statutes, reunites with the adoptee's birth
parents or siblings.372
In addition, the existence of some indication that the information
369. If the child is in the custody of the state at the time the records are sought, the state
should pay the attorney's fees for representation of the parent at the hearing on the applica-
tion. If the child has been relinquished to an agency, the agency should pay these fees and
build the cost into its fee structure. In a private adoption, the fees should be paid by the
prospective adoptive couple, analogous to the cost for an independent counsel to represent the
relinquishing parent in the adoption itself.
370. Parents are legally responsible for the support of their children, see CLARK, supra note
214, § 6.2, at 259, and they have a duty to provide them with medical and psychiatric care, id.
§ 9.3, at 342-43.
371. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
372. For example, a great-aunt who has been treated for manic depression should not have
her records subject to disclosure, even though a history of manic depression in the family
would be relevant to the child's history. The risk to the child is not as high as it would be if a
parent had the disorder, and the information could be revealed to other family members or
friends if the adoptee, as an adult, found his birth family through the registries.
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would have a significant effect should be a prerequisite to obtaining the
parents' medical records. If that clue exists, it seems less likely that thor-
ough investigation, possibly including interviews of many family mem-
bers, would not reveal enough information even without the records of
other relatives to alert adoptive parents and adoptees to a risk. This may
not be as true for birth parents, particularly birth mothers, whose health
can affect a child in ways other than genetic disorders. As important as
medical information is, the right to privacy of extended relatives who
refuse to disclose their records voluntarily should not be invaded, absent
compelling reasons to do so.
c. Applicability of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Other
Specific Nondisclosure Statutes
An aspect of invading parents' medical records that merits special
attention is whether a parent's human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
status should be subject to disclosure. The vast majority of states now
prohibit by statute the disclosure of information related to HIV testing or
diagnosis of specific individuals.373 The proposed limitations on the cir-
cumstances under which a parent's records could be released would pre-
clude any need for an exception to the HIV nondisclosure statutes for
information on the father's HIV status. HIV is not genetically transmit-
ted, nor has there been any indication that perinatal transmission can
occur from an infected father.374
Whether an exception to these statutes should be created for release
373. David A. Hansell, HIV Antibody Testing: Public Health Issues, in AIDS PRACTICE
MANUAL, at 3-14 n.63 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 3d ed. 1991), lists 45 jurisdictions with HIV
confidentiality protection statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
374. Cf. S. Sheppard, Medical and Public Health Overview of HIVInfection, in AIDS PRAC-
TICE MANUAL, supra note 373, at 2-9 to 2-14 (summarizing known modes of HIV transmis-
sion).
Of course, in cases of incest or needle-sharing between an HIV-infected father and a child,
transmission could occur. Many states include exceptions in their nondisclosure statutes that
would permit disclosure to sexual partners or needle-sharing partners. See Hansell, supra note
373, at 3-15 to 3-16. These circumstances would be highly unlikely to involve an infant, how-
ever. Performing a blood test on an older child should provide the necessary information. See
Sheppard, supra, at 2-25 (90% of infected people register antibody-positive on standard tests
12 weeks after exposure; 95% register positive after six months). The extent to which a prob-
lem of false negative results can be alleviated with other tests is currently being explored. Id.
at 2-26. If false negatives remain a significant problem, however, states should consider an
exception to the disclosure statutes for all child incest victims, whose rights to critical medical
treatment must clearly override their abuser's right to privacy.
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of a birth mother's records, however, requires closer examination.
Transmission of HIV from an infected mother to a child can occur in
utero, during the birth process, and through breast feeding.375 Experts
currently suggest that between twenty to fifty percent of babies born to
HIV-infected mothers will themselves contract AIDS.37 s The current
status of HIV testing of infants would render invasion of the mother's
medical records unnecessary in many instances. A child who was relin-
quished for adoption at birth could be given a blood test shortly after
birth that would indicate whether the mother was HIV infected. v Be-
cause the child may carry the mother's antibodies for up to fifteen to
eighteen months after birth, this test will not determine conclusively
whether the child is HIV positive,37 ' but it would provide the same infor-
mation on HIV status as the mother's medical records. Recently, a new
test has been developed, which detects a protein in the infant's immune
system known as IgA.37 9 Scientists have reported that this test can relia-
bly detect HIV infection in infants as young as three to six months old. 381
Because the IgA test detects a protein formed only by the infant and not
by the mother, it can confirm whether the infant (as opposed to the
mother) is infected.3"' Unfortunately, this test is not 100% accurate, 38 2
but it would provide a reasonably reliable method for determining HIV
status for most children over six months of age.
375. Sheppard, supra note 374, at 2-10.
376. See Sheppard, supra note 374, (rate of transmission from infected mother to infant is
25% to 50%); Mandatory Screens of Pregnant Women, Babies Opposed in Report by Institute
of Medicine, AIDS PoL'Y & L., Jan. 23, 1991, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Mandatory Screens of Preg-
nant Women] (reporting 25% to 35% risk of transmission); Michigan Study Says Black
Mothers Are More Likely to be HIVInfected, AIDS POL'Y & L., Feb. 6, 1991, at 7, 7 (25% to
35% of infants will become infected); NIH Agency Begins Study of ,4ZTfor Effectiveness in
Pregnancy, AIDS PoL'Y & L., May 29, 1991, at 2, 2 [hereinafter NIHAgency Begins Study of
4ZT (70% to 90% of infants born to HIV-positive women are not infected with the virus).
377. "All babies born to HIV-positive mothers initially have HIV antibodies." Infant Di-
agnosis Difficulty Outlined at Medical Meeting, AIDS PoL'Y & L., Feb. 24, 1988, at 7, 7;
Telephone Interview with Jerry Kudlac, Director of Immunology and Metabolic Diseases
Screening, Public Health Laboratory, Oklahoma Department of Public Health (July 3, 1991).
The standard HIV test given to newborns is an HIV-antibody test that does not "differentiate
between truly infected babies and those who are carrying passively acquired maternal antibo-
dies." Mandatory Screens of Pregnant Women, supra note 376, at 1.
378. Sheppard, supra note 374, at 2-26 (up to 18 months); Mandatory Screens of Pregnant
Women, supra note 376, at 1 (mother's antibodies may persist for up to 15 months after birth).




382. Id. Researchers performing IgA tests on infants ranging from one day to six months
and older found that of 47 infants confirmed HIV positive at 15 months old by HIV antibody
testing, 45 were determined HIV positive by the earlier IgA test. Id.
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The question then becomes whether an exception to the HIV non-
disclosure statutes is warranted for access to a birth mother's records in
circumstances in which adequate information cannot be obtained from
these tests. It is. Although HIV antibodies from the mother can be car-
ried by the child for up to fifteen to eighteen months, an infant could also
stop carrying those antibodies as early as two to three months old, and
thus the HIV antibody test is most reliable if performed at or shortly
after birth.383 Thus a hiatus of several months exists between the time
when the HIV antibody test may not be reliable and the period when the
IgA test is not yet reliable. Moreover, access to information on the
mother's positive HIV status, when she was unavailable or unwilling to
volunteer it, might give some indication of risk in instances in which a
test on the child showed a false negative.384 Disclosure of her HIV status
would only be possible, of course, if the birth mother had not chosen an
anonymous testing site, and in such cases it could be argued that disclo-
sure to one adoption agency or intermediary would not greatly widen the
circle of those with access to the information, at least in a "closed adop-
tion" in which her identity was unknown to adoptive parents. A partial
analogy for such an exception may be found in many states' exceptions
allowing physicians or public health officials to notify spouses or partners
so that HIV testing and early treatment may be attempted.385
In examining the benefits of such a disclosure exception, it must be
acknowledged that there is some debate about whether infants should be
treated until their own HIV status is confirmed. Many pediatricians be-
lieve that because current therapies for HIV expose infants to significant
toxicity and substantially fewer than half of infants born to HIV-infected
mothers are likely to be infected, the medical benefits do not outweigh
the risk of treatment.38 6 Other experts point to recent studies which sug-
gest that combining azidothyidine (AZT) with other drugs can mini-
mize the drug's toxicity, and conclude that "early intervention with
383. Telephone Interview with Jerry Kudlac, supra note 377.
384. See Altman, supra note 379, at A5, regarding initial reliability studies on the IgA
tests. Available information indicates that the commonly used HIV antibody tests for both
adults and children can yield false negatives, during a period shortly after infection, Sheppard,
supra note 374, at 2-25 (reporting that 90% of infected persons register positive 12 weeks after
infection and that 95% register positive six months after infection), and also during dormant
states when the antibodies may temporarily disappear, see ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note
86, at 130. In one instance a child of an HIV-infected mother did not test positive until the
child was five years old. Telephone Interview with Professor Leonard Sandier, University of
Iowa College of Law (June 20, 1991).
385. Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-15 to 3-16.
386. See Mandatory Screens of Pregnant Women, supra note 376, at 2 (possibility and ef-
fects of long-term toxicity uncertain); NIH Agency Begins Study of AZT, supra note 376, at 2
(AZT may create risk of cancer in fetus).
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certain drugs can be beneficial in the treatment of infants with AIDS."' 87
Knowledge of the possibility of HIV infection, however, would at least
alert adoptive parents to the need to repeat testing and to watch for early
symptoms, so that treatment can begin as early as possible.
Although proper medical care for the infant would be the para-
mount justification of a limited birth-mother exception to nondisclosure
statutes, in cases where adequate information could not otherwise be ob-
tained, another consideration is making an appropriate placement for the
child. One scholar clearly opposed to broad disclosure exceptions con-
cedes that the burden, both emotional and financial, of caring for an
HIV-infected child may justify full disclosure of the child's HIV status to
prospective adoptive or foster parents.388 At least two states have spe-
cific exceptions to their HIV nondisclosure statutes that allow disclosure
of information to adoptive parents, exceptions that could be read broadly
to apply to disclosure of a biological mother's HIV status.389
Given the limited circumstances under which disclosure of the
mother's records would be necessary, the negative effects of creating an
exception to the nondisclosure statutes must be carefully weighed. Be-
cause AIDS creates an extraordinary risk of discrimination,390 the con-
cern that knowledge of the exception might prompt a birth mother to
forgo HIV testing, or alternatively, choose an option other than legal
adoption, is of special significance. In many states, of course, HIV test-
ing is available anonymously; in others, anonymous testing is accom-
plished through the use of pseudonyms.391 A mother considering
relinquishing her child might choose this option rather than avoid test-
ing. Nonetheless, if the exception significantly affects the willingness of
pregnant women to be tested, the adverse consequences to their own
387. Newborn Testing Treatment Under Study in New York State, AIDS POL'Y & L., Oct.
17, 1990, at 4, 5 [hereinafter Newborn Testing] (reporting that National Cancer Institute's
Pediatric Branch could not definitively conclude, based on current studies, that an antire-
troviral agent should be given to newborns with AIDS, but there is support for such a
strategy).
388. Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-17.
389. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656(l)(1)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2782(l)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
390. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See generally Mark Barnes, Discrimination
in Places of Public Accommodation: Access to Health Care, Education, and Other Services, in
AIDS PRAcMcE MANUAL, supra note 373, at 11-1 (reporting denial of admission to schools,
refusal of medical and dental care); Geoffry S. Cline, Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS
in Employment: Issues for Practitioners and Clients, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note
373, at 10-1 (isolation from coworkers); John Hammell, Housing Discrimination, in AIDS
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 373, at 12-1 (refusal to repair, refusal to rent, refusal to assist
in resale).
391. Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-4. For example, in Colorado it is reported that "Nancy
Reagan" has received hundreds of HIV antibody tests. Id. at 3-4 n.9.
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health as well as their babies' health 92 would not justify it. In truth, the
disclosure exception itself probably would not greatly affect a mother's
choice regarding adoption, because a mother who is knowledgeable about
the exception would also in all probability be aware that subsequent test-
ing of the child might reveal her own infection.3 93
On balance, the current deficiencies of infant testing make it worth
the risk to adopt a very limited disclosure exception for a mother's HIV
status to adoption agencies or intermediaries, only upon court order and
only when equivalent information cannot be accurately obtained by test-
ing the child. Nevertheless, the decision will be a difficult one for each
state. Indeed, the rapid advances in the field of infant testing may soon
alter the balance and render such an exception unnecessary.
A similar analysis must underlie consideration of exceptions to
other specific nondisclosure statutes. For example, most states require
that the results of testing for venereal disease be kept confidential.394
Some maternal venereal diseases, such as syphilis, can have devastating
health consequences for a child.395 Although newborns can undergo
screening and confirmation tests that can detect a mother's antibodies in
an infant for up to six to ten months, 396 these tests may report false nega-
tive results. 97 Because the treatment for infants, penicillin, is nontoxic
and can be given safely when there is an indication that the child is at
risk for syphilis, it is important to know whether there is any risk, so that
infants may be treated promptly. Experts recommend that infants who
cannot be evaluated fully be treated anyway.3 98 A more detailed analysis
of the current sophistication of syphilis and other venereal-disease testing
and treatment is necessary to determine whether testing would fully obvi-
392. Although most experts at this time oppose mandatory screening of pregnant women,
they stress the importance of encouraging and making available voluntary testing to enhance
the early treatment for both the mother and the child. See Mandatory Screens of Pregnant
Women, supra note 376, at 1-2. Moreover, knowledge of infection assists mothers in making
appropriate choices about breast feeding and other health care issues for their newborns.
393. For a discussion of the justification for such testing, see infra notes 399-409 and ac-
companying text.
394. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West Supp. 1991); see Gostin, supra
note 67, at R:47 to R:48.
395. Francis Livingston, Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Pregnancy, STD BULL., Apr.
1990, at 3, 3-10 (noting that congenital syphilis can cause mental retardation, blindness, defor-
mities, blood disorders, and death).
396. Telephone Interview with Kay Holt, Manager, Clinical Services, STD-HIV Division,
Oklahoma Public Health Department (July 3, 1991).
397. David H. Dorfman & Joy H. Glaser, Congenital Syphilis Presenting in Infants After
the Newborn Period, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1299, 1301 (1990).
398. Centers for Disease Control, Sexually Transmitted Disease Treatment Guidelines, 38
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 10-11 (Supp. 8 1989).
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ate an exception to the nondisclosure statutes for syphilis or other vene-
real diseases.
d. Conducting Diagnostic Tests Upon the Adoptee
"Reasonable efforts" to investigate may, and in many instances
should, include the obligation to direct that certain diagnostic tests be
administered to the adoptee. For example, an agency handling the adop-
tion of a newborn should take steps to ensure that the standard newborn
diagnostic testing has been performed.399 Failure to ensure that these
tests are performed can lead to inappropriate medical care by adoptive
parents and pediatricians and has caused tragic results. 41 Moreover, it
may be important in some instances to obtain these results early in the
process in order to avoid inappropriate placement. 40' When older chil-
dren are placed for adoption, the agency should ensure that a recent
physical and psychological examination has been conducted. 4 2 When-
ever available information suggests that a child may be at risk for some-
thing not detectable by standard screening, the agency or adoption
intermediary should be responsible for ensuring that necessary testing
takes place.' 3
399. Because agencies handling infant adoptions often have legal custody of an infant from
shortly after birth, and have sole access to the medical records, it is critical that they be respon-
sible for ensuring that all standard newborn testing is performed and for communicating the
results to adoptive parents. Adoptive parents and pediatricians often assume testing has been
performed and that they would be notified if results were adverse. Without access to the
child's name at birth, they have no means to double-check. It is similarly critical in independ-
ent adoptions for the attorney representing the prospective adoptive parents to undertake this
task.
400. See Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 969-71 (Miss. 1990) (relating that adopted child
suffered permanent brain damage from phenylketonuria (PKU) because adoptive parents and
child's pediatrician assumed test for PKU had been performed).
401. For example, if a child tests HIV positive, it is important to know this information
early. Only through such early disclosure can the adoption intermediary provide appropriate
counseling and ensure that the prospective adoptive family understands the risks and is capa-
ble of meeting the needs of the child. Although this knowledge may make placement more
difficult, there are families willing to adopt babies who are HIV positive. See San Francisco,
supra note 140, at 7 (noting that program in Yonkers, N.Y. placing HIV-positive children
abandoned by parents reports 52% of foster families were willing to adopt HIV children
placed with them).
402. Older children often become available for adoption through parental rights termina-
tion proceedings. This suggests that such children may be at particularly high risk for medical
or psychological problems that must be assessed.
403. Both agencies and private attorney adoption intermediaries are capable of building the
cost of such testing into their fee structures. It is important that they, and not just the adoptive
parents, have the responsibility for ensuring that necessary testing is conducted. Making an
appropriate placement is the responsibility of the agency or intermediary, and adoptive parents
may not be sufficiently informed of the child's previous care or relevant history to assess the
testing that is needed. If the need for further testing comes to light after the child has already
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Because medical testing of a child in many cases reveals information
concerning the medical history of other family members, most frequently
the mother, privacy concerns must again be considered. Testing for HIV
status and syphilis, for example, will reveal the mother's infection.' It
may seem ludicrous to examine thoroughly the circumstances under
which a mother's medical records can be obtained," 5 and yet advocate
routine testing of her child that will disclose the same information. Nev-
ertheless, the child is an independent person with his own right to appro-
priate medical care, and the fact that information about another is a
byproduct of testing the child should not restrict the child's access to
proper medical treatment. To forgo syphilis testing, for example, would
subject a child to the risk of severe retardation, blindness, or death, all of
which can often be prevented by timely treatment, and thus could never
be justified out of respect for a mother's privacy rights." 6 Medical
ethicists are now debating whether mandatory HIV testing of newborns
would be an unwarranted invasion of the mother's right to privacy.'
Even if this is determined to be the case, adoption creates special circum-
stances which dictate that such testing be conducted. A child placed for
adoption will no longer be cared for by the birth mother, whose knowl-
edge of her own lifestyle might prompt her to seek appropriate medical
care for the child earlier than an adoptive parent, who does not know
that HIV infection might exist. The need for the information to facilitate
appropriate placement is, of course, absent for children who will remain
in a parent's care. Moreover, fairness to prospective adoptive parents,
who should be advised of the potential emotional and financial burden
been placed, but before the adoption is finalized, the adoption intermediary's obligation could
be satisfied by ensuring that the prospective adoptive parents are appropriately counseled and
obtain the proper tests.
404. See supra notes 377-82 (HIV), 396 (syphilis) and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 364-69, 375-98 and accompanying text.
406. Livingston, supra note 395, at 3, 6, 9. Almost all states now require that pregnant
women be tested for syphilis, so that the mother can be treated with penicillin as early during
the pregnancy as possible. Id. Because these tests may report false-negative results or infec-
tion may occur thereafter, experts recommend that all infants be tested at birth, and that
additional tests be performed on all febrile infants, including those who tested negative at
birth. Dorfman & Glaser, supra note 397, at 1299, 1301.
407. The Institute of Medicine's Committee on Prenatal and Newborn Screening for HIV
Infection opposes mandatory HIV antibody screening of newborns because the current new-
born tests reveal the mother's infection status, finding it "ethically unacceptable" to conduct
such a test without the mother's consent. Mandatory Screens of Pregnant Women, supra note
376, at 1-2. The Committee concluded, however, that its recommendation should be "re-eval-
uated if either a definitive neonatal test or 'safe, effective treatment that cured infection' is
developed." Id. at 2.
At least one state, Rhode Island, does require testing of newborns of high-risk mothers
even without the mother's consent. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-14(a) (1989 & Supp. 1991); see
Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-10.
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
and receive appropriate counseling," 8 dictates that HIV testing be
performed. 4° 9
e. Mandatory Testing of Biological Parents or Relatives
Some might propose that if dissemination of health information is so
vital in the adoption context, biological relatives, and particularly
mothers, should be compelled in certain circumstances to undergo diag-
nostic testing, either prior to childbirth or even after delivery and relin-
quishment.4 I° - While conveying accurate medical information to
adoptive parents and adoptees is vital, this is where the line should be
drawn. Any effort to force biological parents to undergo medical testing
would constitute an outrageous invasion of their right to privacy and
personal autonomy.
American courts have often recognized, both under the common
law and the federal Constitution, that the right to privacy includes a
right of bodily integrity, and a right to accept or forego medical treat-
ment.4" I The United States Supreme Court has afforded the highest level
of constitutional protection to the privacy interest in autonomous per-
408. See ADOPTION FACrBooK, supra note 86, at 131; Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-17.
409. Some adoption agencies currently test all newborns; others test only those who are
considered high risks. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 86, at 131. Comprehensive testing
would appear to be the safer course, as accurate information on high risk factors (multiple sex
partners, intravenous drug use) may be difficult to obtain. The cost may not be much of a
factor in many states, as several already test all infants anonymously for the HIV virus at birth.
Scott H. Isaacman, Neonatal HIV Testing: Governmental Inspection of the Baby Factory, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 571, 572-574 (1991) (almost all states and territories now participating in
joint neonatal HIV serosurveillance program with the United States Department of Health and
Human Services Centers for Disease Control); Newborn Testing, supra note 387, at 5; Tele-
phone Interview with Jerry Kudlac, supra note 377.
410. Lest this section appear to be tilting at windmills, during a meeting of commissioners
in the summer of 1990 it was suggested that a proposed revision of the Uniform Adoption Act
require blood testing and DNA profiles of biological parents, and that parents refusing such
tests should be "punished" in some way. Telephone Interview with Joan Hollinger, supra note
16. Some adoption agencies now require all birth mothers to undergo HIV testing, while
others now require high risk mothers to submit to the test. ADOPTION FACTBooK, supra note
86, at 131; see also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989) (permitting investiga-
tor to request parental medical examination).
411. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1243-47 (D.C. 1990); eg., United States v. Charters, 829
F.2d 479, 491 & nn. 18-19 (1987), aff'd on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216, 1218 (D.C. 1988); Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d
558, 561-62 (D.C. 1982); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905);
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914); see
Lawrence J. Nelson, Reproductive Choices, I BIOLAW, at R:87 to R:89 (James F. Childress et
al. eds., Supp. July 1989). For additional authorities discussing the right of bodily integrity
and the right of autonomy as elements of the right to privacy, see supra notes 40-41.
1992] HEALTH DISCLOSURES IN ADOPTION
sonal decisionmaking,412 from which the right of bodily integrity is de-
rived.413 Statutes impairing this interest have undergone greater scrutiny
by the Court than those that allow collection and disclosure of personal
information.4 1 4 Concededly, all of the arguments justifying invasion of a
birth parent's medical records, accessing HIV data, and testing the infant
could also be made to justify the requirement that birth parents be forced
to undergo testing. Yet the greater protection that the Court has given to
the autonomy interests included in the right to privacy implicitly recog-
nizes that a forced invasion of one's body would constitute a far greater
invasion of the birth parent's personhood.
That a child is or may be adopted does not warrant evisceration of
the parent's right to bodily integrity under circumstances in which such
testing could not be performed if the child were not to be adopted. "Rea-
sonable efforts" to investigate415 should in most instances provide adop-
tive and prospective adoptive parents with the information available to
the birth parent. Legally416 and ethically,4" 7 forced diagnostic testing of
412. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
413. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
414. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (employing strict scrutiny
analysis) and Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (same) with Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 458, 462-65 (1977) (state-mandated collection, retention, and disclosure of per-
sonal information subjected to less rigorous review) and Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602,
605-06 (1977) (same). In Whalen and Nixon, statutes were upheld if they served reasonable
public interests and contained procedures protecting against unwarranted disclosure. See
supra notes 44-48, 70-72 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 342-409 and accompanying text.
416. Recently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that in determining the
course of treatment for a dying pregnant woman, "in virtually all cases the question of what is
to be done is to be decided by the patient-the pregnant woman-on behalf of herself and the
fetus." In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990). The court rejected an approach that
would balance the interests of the mother against those of the fetus and the state, declaring
instead that if the mother is competent and makes an informed decision, "her wishes will
control in virtually all cases." Id. at 1252. In support of this position, the court observed that
courts have consistently honored the principle that a significant intrusion upon one person's
bodily integrity cannot be compelled for the benefit of another person's health, nor even to save
another's life. Id. at 1243-44 (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and
McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978)); see also Taft v. Taft, 388
Mass. 331, 334-35, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983) (vacating order that required pregnant women
to submit to "purse string" surgery, concluding that no compelling circumstances justified
overriding her religious objections and her constitional right of privacy). Although it is true
that the invasions in these cases involved surgery, which may be more significant than coerced
diagnostic tests, the consequence of noncoercion involved a high risk of death to another. In
the adoption context, the availability of other avenues for information gathering and investiga-
tion militates against intrusion. But cf. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (ordering mother to undergo transfusion, in part because
of her duty to her living children), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Jefferson v. Griffin Spald-
ing County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 90, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1981) (per curiam) (ordering
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the birth parents should not be required.41 Agencies and other adoption
intermediaries should instead be encouraged, and in fact obligated, to
provide appropriate counseling to birth parents to encourage voluntary
testing where such testing would prove beneficial for the health of either
the mother419 or the child, but must respect a birth parent's refusal to
consent to testing.
f. Inefficacy of Statutory Parental Duty to Disclose
Several state statutes include a general directive that a person who
surrenders or places a child for adoption should complete a medical his-
tory form.420 None of these statutes, however, appear to create a statu-
cesarean delivery over mother's religious objections where medical testimony indicated
cesarean would improve both mother's and infant's chance of survival); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.L 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (per curiam) (or-
dering blood transfusion over religious objection of mother, to save life of both mother and
fetus), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 1007-08, 491
N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering blood transfusion over mother's religious
objections, finding state's interest in fetus outweighed patient's); Crouse Irving Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 102-03, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444-45 (Sup. Ct. 1985)
(ordering transfusion over mother's religious objections to save both mother and child).
417. The Committee on Prenatal and Newborn Screening for HIV Infection, organized by
the federal government's Institute of Medicine, has concluded that ordering mandatory testing
of pregnant women in general for HIV infection would be "ethically unacceptable."
Mandatory Screens of Pregnant Women, supra note 376, at 1; see Hansell, supra note 373, at 3-
9 n.34 (opposing mandatory HIV testing for pregnant women and noting that only two states,
Delaware and Florida, currently require pregnant women to undergo HIV testing). But cf.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 708 (Supp. 1990) (requiring HIV testing for pregnant women);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.31 (West Supp. 1991) (same).
418. Although there might be general consensus that requiring birth parents to undergo a
DNA profile or battery of genetic tests would be wrong, a far more difficult issue is presented
by a requirement that a birth mother undergo HIV testing. As discussed previously, there are
circumstances in which tests on the infant will reveal false negatives. See supra notes 382-84
and accompanying text. Even though I have argued that the risks to these infants justify
invading the birth mother's records in cases in which this is suspected, there is a qualitative
difference between obtaining results of a test she took voluntarily and forcing her to take the
test. Forced testing creates information that did not otherwise exist, information that could
cause the birth mother extreme anxiety and stress. Medical ethicists note that the right of
autonomy includes the right to choose not to receive information. Huggins et. al., supra note
244, at 6 (describing ethical and legal considerations in testing for Huntington's Disease). The
current status of testing and treatment of infants for HIV is such that mandatory testing of all
pregnant women is not generally approved. See supra note 417. While adoption does create a
different situation, information about the mother's lifestyle can be transmitted, and adoption
intermediaries could follow a policy of recommending to adoptive families repetition of the
HIV test in those cases in which a birth mother chooses after appropriate counseling not to
submit to the test.
419. For example, voluntary testing for HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases would
facilitate medical treatment that the mother might need.
420. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(3)(a) (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13(B)(2)
(West 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A (West 1987).
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tory duty to disclose requested information that would be punishable if
violated.421 One commentator has suggested that imposing a duty on
parents to disclose their own health histories would constitute a signifi-
cant invasion of privacy.422 Although it is clearly desirable for birth par-
ents to cooperate in the collection of a complete medical history, an
attempt to impose sanctions for incomplete compliance by criminal pros-
ecution or contempt proceedings would likely prove ineffective and could
raise significant privacy concerns.
Requiring that only trained professionals collect information,4 2 3 de-
veloping protocols that enhance cooperation, and placing the above-de-
scribed "reasonable efforts" duty on intermediaries are more positive and
effective methods of acquiring complete and accurate information than
sanctions. If properly approached by a sensitive and well-trained profes-
sional, most birth parents should be willing to provide medical history.424
It seems unlikely that those who refuse would comply due to a remote
threat of enforcement, and compelled cooperation could create a signifi-
cant risk that parents would offer inaccurate information.425 The diffi-
culty of proving that parents intentionally provided inaccurate or
incomplete information would dissuade prosecutors from initiating en-
forcement proceedings. Moreover, publicity from a few token enforce-
ment prosecutions or contempt proceedings as a way of motivating
421. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A (West 1987) (mandating that person
required to consent to adoption complete medical history form when ordered by the court).
But see statutes cited infra note 491 (creating sanctions for noncompliance with investigation
and disclosure statutes); cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-19 (Bums Supp. 1991) (creating a mis-
demeanor, possibly applicable to birth parents, for knowingly supplying false information to a
medical history).
422. Schiffer, supra note 33, at 719; see also ASHG Report, supra note 290, at 1010 ("right
to privacy includes the right of any party to refuse to enter into or cease to participate in the
process of gathering genetic information").
423. See supra notes 334-38 and accompanying text.
424. One report examining independent adoptions indicated that 65% of birth fathers
agreed to supply medical/genetic information. Thomas J. Mick, Social Work Practice Issues,
in GENETIC FAMILY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 31, 35. While parents who relinquish a child
voluntarily are in all likelihood going to be the most willing to cooperate, cooperation under
other circumstances can be enhanced by adopting more intensive efforts than have heretofore
been undertaken, and acquiring information early in the process in involuntary proceedings.
See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
425. A parent who simply does not want to take the time or be bothered (for example, a
birth father who has had no significant relationship with the mother and feels no connection to
the child) could in all likelihood be persuaded to comply if approached properly and persist-
ently. A parent with a more deep-seated reason for refusal, such as fear of HIV discrimination
to the parent or fear that the child will be unadoptable, might be persuaded through appropri-
ate counseling regarding confidentiality of the information or availability of adoptive homes.
Nevertheless, a parent whose serious concerns cannot be identified or overcome is unlikely to
risk discrimination, criminal prosecution, or other adverse consequences because of a remote
chance of sanctions for noncompliance.
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compliance might simply deter birth parents from considering legal
adoption.42 6
Imposing criminal sanctions against parents or other relatives for
failure to disclose their own medical histories also unnecessarily invades
privacy. Individuals possess no absolute right to withhold information of
a personal nature, absent a threat of self-incrimination.427 Governmental
agencies, for example, frequently require disclosure of health information
on applications for employment or other benefits. Nevertheless, the ad-
verse consequence to a job or benefits applicant from failure to provide
medical information is denial of the job or benefits, a situation not closely
analogous to adoption because adoption benefits the child and denial
would not be appropriate.42 Courts may require testimony from wit-
nesses regarding their own medical and psychological history when rele-
vant to the issues before the court. In judicial proceedings, however,
particularly in discovery42 9 and to some extent under the rules of evi-
dence,430 the court considers the adverse consequences of ordering dis-
426. An indication of the deterrence factor can be seen in the concern of professionals in
drug treatment programs that publicity surrounding prosecutions of maternal substance abus-
ers will discourage women from seeking prenatal care or drug treatment. Roberts, supra note
273, at 1449-50 & n.157; Kennedy, supra note 273, at 577; Rubenstein, supra note 273, at 151-
52.
427. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, of course,
prevent both the federal and state governments from compelling a person to respond to gov-
ernmental inquiry when disclosure could give rise to criminal liability. See EDWARD W.
CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 119, 121(a) (3d ed. 1984).
428. For an example of statutes limiting the effect of nondisclosure on finalization of the
adoption, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(5) (Anderson 1989) (providing that
neither failure of an investigator to obtain history "nor the refusal of a biological parent to
supply information shall invalidate, delay, or otherwise affect the adoption").
429. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) authorizes a court to prohibit discovery of cer-
tain matters through issuance of a protective order if justice so requires, in order to protect
either a party or a nonparty from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. FED. R. CIv. P.
26(c). The Supreme Court has specifically approved the use of protective orders to protect the
privacy interests of both litigants and nonlitigants. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. 20, 30-36 (1984); see also Williams v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 343 F. Supp. 1131, 1132
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (refusing to require defendant hospital to supply names of women who had
received abortions in 1969 on grounds that women's privacy interests outweighed possible
impeachment benefit to plaintiff); cf. Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545,
1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (granting protective order to nonparty, Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), denying plaintiff in product liability case access to names of women who participated
in CDC toxic shock syndrome study and who had not consented to disclosure); Coleman v.
American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (denying motion to compel and
granting protective order to prohibit disclosure of name of HIV-infected donor in suit against
blood supplier).
430. FED. R. EVID. 611(a); see GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S FEDERAL Ev-
IDENCE § 611.1, at 250 (1987) (commenting that rule 611 is "designed to encourage flexibility
in the reception of evidence by promoting the efficient determination of the court without
unnecessary abuse of the dignity of the witness").
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closure-potential embarrassment, risk of harassment, invasion of
privacy-and weighs these against the necessity that information be dis-
closed by the witness to determine whether disclosure should be com-
pelled. Given the alternatives for obtaining information in an adoption
investigation and the potential ineffectiveness of sanctioning nondisclo-
sure, privacy concerns outweigh any slight benefits to be gained. 3'
g. Confidentiality and Immunity for Information Disclosed
To ensure accurate collection of complete medical and social his-
tory, state statutes must include provisions that ensure the confidentiality
of the information. Specifically, legislatures should prohibit the disclo-
sure of medical and social history to anyone other than those specifically
authorized to receive it.43 It must be clear that other access to these
records must be limited to the adoption agency or intermediary responsi-
ble for collection and retention, court personnel involved in the adoption
action, and, if a central registry is established, those personnel necessary
to operate the registry. Specifically, law enforcement personnel or
prosecutorial staff should not have access to these records or to the infor-
mation contained therein.
Furthermore, these statutes must provide clearly that none of the
medical or social history supplied as part of the adoption investigation
can be used in any criminal prosecution or civil suit against the birth
parents or another biological relative. Prosecution of mothers for sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy is a relatively recent phenomenon that
could have an alarming effect on the willingness of birth mothers, their
relatives, or medical personnel to reveal information that might aid pros-
ecution. Recent studies indicate that since 1987 more than fifty criminal
cases on such charges as child neglect, delivery of drugs to a minor, or
criminally negligent homicide have been brought against women for sub-
stance abuse during pregnancy.433 The specter of prosecution would neg-
atively affect any mother's willingness to reveal substance abuse or any
431. It may seem odd to advocate a limited ability to compel medical personnel to release a
parent's medical records and yet disfavor sanctions for a parent who refuses to supply that
information directly. Nevertheless, sanctions against an uncooperative parent would be less
effective than a court order to medical personnel when disclosure is authorized by statute.
Medical personnel would be far more likely to reply accurately. Moreover, by analogy to the
Fifth Amendment, requiring a person to disclose her own medical and social history seems
more intrusive from a privacy standpoint than requiring, in a limited context, a third party to
release that sensitive information.
432. See supra notes 226-62 and accompanying text.
433. Roberts, supra note 273, at 1421 n.5; Rubenstein, supra note 273, at 130, 157-60 (cit-
ing American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom Project, State by State Case Sum-
mary of Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women and Appendix of Public Health and
Public Interest Groups Opposed to These Prosecutions (Oct. 29, 1990) (memorandum)).
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other activity that might create fetal risk during pregnancy.4 34 Informa-
tion suggesting physical or sexual abuse by a parent or other relative
could also prompt criminal charges. An additional concern is the emerg-
ing recognition of civil liability in favor of a child against a biological
mother for prenatal injury due to allegedly negligent conduct.435 The
possibility that a parent might not provide this type of information is of
particular concern because information regarding prenatal substance
abuse or child abuse is crucial to the child's proper diagnosis and medical
treatment.436 Use immunity, which would preclude subsequent use of
the "testimony," Le., the statements or recorded information given to an
adoption intermediary for purposes of collecting medical and social his-
tory, and derivative evidence, i.e., evidence obtained by using the immu-
nized statements or records,437 Le., might foster more accurate and
cooperative responses.
These cases are often referred to collectively as "fetal abuse" cases, although the specific
charges brought will vary. Roberts, supra note 273, at 1421 n.5.
434. Following several publicized prosecutions of substance abusers for "fetal abuse," pro-
fessionals in drug treatment programs reported that many clients suggested they would not
divulge substance abuse to their obstetricians for fear of prosecution, or would decline prenatal
care. Rubenstein, supra note 273, at 151-52.
435. In Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980), the Michigan
Court of Appeals found that a mother could be held liable to her child for a negligently in-
flicted prenatal injury. Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871. The mother in Grodin was alleged to
have taken the medication tetracycline during pregnancy, causing damage to the child's teeth.
Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869. The case was remanded for a determination whether the
mother's actions were negligent. Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871. Several commentators have
applauded recognition of a right of a child against the mother for prenatal injuries. See, e.g.,
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
birth, 69 VA. L. Rnv. 405, 448-49 (1983); Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse:
The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209, 1237 (1987);
Kennedy, supra note 273, at 555; Barbara Shelley, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next
Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights?, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 691, 710-11 (1988).
More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court flatly rejected recognition of a cause of action
by a child against his mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries. See Stalman v.
Youngquist, 125 IMI. 2d 267, 280, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (1988). The court found that recogni-
tion of liability would create a legal duty to "effectuate the best prenatal environment possible
... subject[] to State scrutiny all decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry a
pregnancy to term, and infringe[] on her right to privacy and bodily autonomy." Id. at 276-
78, 531 N.E.2d at 359-60. A number of commentators have taken a similar position against
recognition of maternal liability. See Ron Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Wo-
man's Tort Liabilityfor Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325,
362-70 (1984); Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience: Forsaking a Duty of Care
to Her Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 807, 809 (1987). See generally
Thomas N. Flemming, Annotation, Right of Child to Action Against Mother for Infliction of
PrenatalInjuries, 78 A.L.R.4T 1082 (1990) (analyzing cases recognizing and refusing to rec-
ognize cause of action by child against mother for prenatal injuries).
436. See supra notes 114-18, 270-73 and accompanying text.
437. CLEARY et a]., supra note 427, § 143, at 355.
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Transactional immunity, defined as "immunity from prosecution for
those transactions about which the witness testified under immunity, 4 38
is tempting to consider. Transactional immunity would avoid the prob-
lem of explaining fine legal distinctions to birth parents, who by and large
would have no legal training, and the comprehensiveness of the immu-
nity would provide more reassurance. It is particularly appealing for ma-
ternal fetal-abuse prosecutions, which have been widely criticized by
scholars as racist, elitist, sexist, violative of a constitutional right to pri-
vacy and equal protection, and totally ineffective.4 39 Nevertheless, pro-
viding transactional immunity could create a significant risk that
mothers who perceive themselves at risk for prosecution, particularly
those who are substance abusers, might be coerced, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, to place their babies for adoption. Because transactional im-
munity would have the effect of subjecting a mother to risk of
prosecution only if she chooses to keep her child rather than place the
child for adoption, it would unconstitutionally burden her fundamental
right to the companionship, care, custody, and "management" of her
child. 40 It is likely that this risk of coercion would disproportionately
affect poor and minority mothers." This risk outweighs any benefits
that transactional immunity might engender. A further undesirable by-
product of a broad transactional immunity is that it could hinder prose-
cution of child abusers.' 2
The inclusion of a use immunity provision will require special care
regarding the timing of collection of medical and social history for adop-
438. Id.
439. See, e.g., Kary L. Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartum Infants and
Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406,
140-13 (1990); Roberts, supra note 273, at 1432-37, 1442-56, 1462-76; Molly McNulty, Note,
Pregnancy Police" The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for
Harm to their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 303-17 (1987-88); Rubenstein,
supra note 273, at 146-51. But see, e.g., Robertson, supra note 435, at 438-39 (arguing that
fetal interests outweigh maternal freedom during pregnancy).
440. The right to participate in the rearing of one's child was recognized as fundamental by
the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 758-59 (1982). This argument,
of course, is analogous to Dorothy Roberts's persuasive argument regarding fetal abuse prose-
cutions in general, that the risk of prosecution for "fetal abuse" if a child is born alive uncon-
stitutionally burdens the fundamental right to bear a child. See Roberts, supra note 273, at
1462-71. Such prosecutions, she observes, do not criminalize the same conduct during preg-
nancy if the mother chooses to abort. See id.
441. Several scholars have noted that prosecutions for "fetal abuse" fall disproportionately
on poor women of color. See Moss, supra note 439, at 1407, 1412; Roberts, supra note 273, at
1421 & nn.5 & 6, 1432-36; Rubenstein, supra note 273, at 141-42.
442. If reporting physical or sexual abuse by a partner as part of the adoption process could
create transactional immunity for that partner, a potential exists for women to be coerced by
their partners to place an abused child for adoption, if the partner fears that prosecution is
imminent.
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tions that follow involuntary termination of parental rights. Ideally, the
process of collecting medical and social history to be used in the event of
a subsequent adoption should have no effect on the decision regarding
termination. It would be unfair and inappropriate for that information
to be used against the parents, but it would also be undesirable for the
collection of medical information to block termination and subsequent
adoption when this is the appropriate outcome otherwise. Collection of
information prior to termination facilitates cooperation," 3 but care
should be taken that collection occurs after the prosecutor has already
gathered the evidence to be used in the juvenile proceeding, so that im-
munity does not hamper the state's efforts. Furthermore, care must be
taken not to confuse or mislead parents by the collection of medical his-
tory. If they are represented in juvenile proceedings, notifying and seek-
ing their attorneys' participation in the collection effort might ensure that
their interests are not impaired by the process.
3. Manner of Collection and Retention
a. Initial Collection
To facilitate comprehensive collection and complete disclosure to
adoptees and their adoptive and biological families, the method and tim-
ing of the collection and retention of social and medical information need
more attention. Several states that have addressed the manner of collec-
tion merely require that forms be provided to biological parents or to
other persons with information. 4 It is far better to require a trained
professional affiliated with an adoption agency, attorney, or obstetrician
to conduct a personal interview with the biological parents, legal custodi-
ans, or relatives and to prepare a written report or to assist the source of
the information in completing these forms." Much of the information
sought will require some medical expertise and familiarity with terminol-
ogy beyond that of the average lay person." 6 Social workers, attorneys,
443. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
444. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.185 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West
1991) (providing that a person who surrenders a child "shall execute therewith a written state-
ment of family history"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5A (West 1987).
445. Requiring a personal interview is the strong recommendation of a social work profes-
sional who trains social workers involved in adoption in Wisconsin. See Mick, supra note 424,
at 34. Ohio suggests that information be obtained through interviews with biological parents
or other persons, as well as from available records. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.12(D)(3) (Anderson 1989).
446. Words like "hydrocephalus," "cystic fibrosis," "Huntington's Chorea," or "myas-
thenia gravis," to name just a few that are contained in Wisconsin's medical history form, may
be foreign to even an educated birth parent. See Wisconsin Medical/Genetic Form, supra note
268.
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paralegals, or nurses, on the other hand, could be trained not only to
understand the terminology, but also to ask the follow-up questions that
commonly are required to obtain complete information.' 7
It is also important that social and medical information be collected
early in the adoption process.448 Although most states that address the
issue do require collection efforts at the time of surrender," 9 prior to
placement,450 or prior to filing the adoption petition,451 many states fail
to address the issue in their statutes or require only that the information
be collected prior to finalizing the adoption.452 Information should be
collected much earlier in the process so that it can be transmitted to
prospective adoptive parents before placement.453
b. Duty to Update Information
It is extremely important to provide a reliable conduit for informa-
tion relevant to genetic disorders that surfaces after the initial investiga-
tion.454 To accomplish this most effectively, both the adoption agency or
intermediary who initially conducted the investigation and some govern-
mental entity should be required to add to their records information vol-
untarily provided by the birth family, the adoptive family, the adoptee or
447. Often, parents or relatives may not provide accurate information because they are not
knowledgeable about the significance of particular symptoms. Questioning about factors such
as missing fingers, or a history of infant deaths in the family, or certain unusual facial charac-
teristics may elicit clues to genetic disorders. See generally Reiser, supra note 239, at 63-67
(outlining basic genetic principles). Explaining the importance of collecting adequate informa-
tion, as well as applicable confidentiality and immunity provisions, may also overcome initial
reluctance to disclose. This type of explanation can be performed far more effectively in per-
son than in print. See Mick, supra note 424, at 34.
448. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
449. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13 (West 1991) (at time of voluntary surrender);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5 (West 1987) (when consent is taken).
450. See Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (1989) (prior to adoption); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-9-505(a) (Michie 1991) (prior to placement for adoption); CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 222.26,
224.70 (West Supp. 1991) (prior to placement or, if private adoption, as part of home study);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a) (West Supp. 1991) (prior to placement); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West Supp. 1991) (prior to placement).
451. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.185(a) (1991) (to be filed "at the time a petition for
adoption is filed"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-5-207(2) (Supp. 1991) (petition to include medical
and social history); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (Supp. 1988) (medical information to accom-
pany petition).
452. See, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991) (not later than date
of finalization of adoption); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(4)(a) (Michie/Bobbs Merrill
1991) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(e) (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(1) (1991)
(same).
453. See infra notes 463-70 and accompanying text.
454. See Ball & Omenn, supra note 4, at 277-78; Black, supra note 85, at 198-99.
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the adoptee's descendants,455 medical personnel, or anyone who provided
information in the initial investigation.456 The agency or adoption inter-
mediary responsible for preparing the initial report should assume this
obligation because it is the entity most likely to be contacted by the sup-
plier of supplemental information. It is also wise to require this agency
or intermediary to fie the supplemental information with the adoption
records in the office of the clerk of the court that granted the adoption,
and place upon the clerk the same duty to receive and file supplemental
information, because the agency or intermediary may not always be
known to the person who wishes to supply supplemental information, or
to some of the persons entitled to receive it.457 Unfortunately, only a
minority of state statutes currently address this issue.458
To provide optimal access to social and medical history, several
states have created a central registry,459 where copies of the medical and
social history records are filed for all adoptions taking place in the state,
whether through public or private agency or an independent intermedi-
ary. A central registry would spare interested parties who may not know
the identity of the agency or intermediary or the location of the court
from contacting every county court in the state to supplement or request
disclosure of medical and social history. At a minimum, if a comprehen-
sive central registry is not created, states should require agencies that
cease to function to transfer their records to a designated government
department,' 0 and should further require any nonagency adoption inter-
455. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(2) (1989).
456. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Anderson 1989).
457. See id.
458. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(2) (1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224.73 (West
Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63-
162 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-14 (Bums 1987); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS cl. 210, § 5A (Law. Co-op. 1981);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.67(2) (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.47-.49
(West 1987 & Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53 (Michie 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-16 (1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(4) (Anderson 1989); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 2905 (Supp. 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA.
CODE § 48-4-10 (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991).
459. ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31 (Supp. 1991) (state department of human resources);
ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500(a) (1991) (state registrar attaches information to original birth cer-
tificate); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-1-2, -4-12 to -4-15 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1991) (state regis-
trar); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2130 (Supp. 1990) (secretary of social and rehabilitation
services); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-107 (Supp. 1990) (Bureau of Vital Statistics); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-24 (1991) (Department of Human Resources); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17
(1987) (Bureau of Vital Statistics); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West Supp. 1991) (Department
of Health & Social Services).
460. See, ag., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(1) (1989); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.032 (West Supp. 1991).
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mediary to file a copy of all medical and social history reports and sup-
plemental information with this department."' -
Finally, any entity charged with retaining medical and social history
information should be required to keep the records for a period of at least
ninety-nine years, to ensure their availability throughout the lifetime of
the adoptee and to the adoptee's descendants. Several states have en-
acted this requirement.462
4. Method and Timing of Disclosure
a. Disclosure of Information Collected in Pre-adoption
Investigation
In order to achieve appropriate adoptive placement and render ap-
propriate medical care, social and medical history must be disclosed to
prospective adoptive parents as early as possible in the adoption process.
Unfortunately, many states require only that the medical and social his-
tory be provided prior to or upon issuance of the final decree of adop-
tion." 3 A final decree may be issued as late as nine months to a year
after placement. 4 Were anyone, adoptive parents or the court, to de-
cide that the placement was inappropriate at that point, disruption would
cause substantial pain both to the child and to the adoptive family.
Moreover, during the time that the child had been in the care of the
adoptive family, medical diagnosis and treatment would have taken place
without the benefit of the information.
The better approach is therefore to require, as many states have,465
that medical and social background information be provided to prospec-
tive adoptive parents prior to placement. A particularly sensitive ap-
proach is to require, as Texas currently does, that this information be
461. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a), (1), (g) (West Supp. 1991). Such a provision
makes great sense because private attorneys who handle independent adoptions retire, change
firms, move, and die; thus, it could become difficult within even a few years to track down
records if the attorney were the only repository.
462. See, ag., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(1) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para.
1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (West Supp. 1991).
463. See ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-19 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63-162(f) (West Supp.
1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578.14.5(c) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520(4)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 533 (West Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-25(e)
(1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342(4) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-17(1) (1987).
464. For example, Oklahoma requires a minimum of six months after the issuance of an
interlocutory decree, which often is issued several months after placement, before a final decree
of adoption may be issued. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.15 (West 1987).
465. See, ag., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(A) (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.33.380 (West Supp. 1991).
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provided "as early as practicable prior to the first meeting of the adoptive
parents with the child. '"4" 6 It may not be practicable, however, to com-
plete every aspect of "reasonable efforts"467 prior to placement, particu-
larly in the case of an infant. It may not be feasible or appropriate to
contact the birth father or, when necessary, other relatives prior to
birth." 8 The results of certain medical tests may not be available, and it
may not be appropriate to obtain parental medical records until after
relinquishment.469 Forcing an infant into foster care for a lengthy period
to complete all aspects of the investigation may not be in the child's best
interests. 7 It seems reasonable, however to require that, at a minimum,
an interview with the relinquishing parent, guardian, or other custodian
be conducted and that all available information be provided prior to
placement, even if completion of the investigation and report does not
take place until later. The statutes should require, of course, that in such
event the report must be completed as soon as practicable.
Whenever social and medical history is transmitted to adoptive par-
ents, it should be sent in writing and receipt should be acknowledged in
writing by the adoptive parents.471 Providing a copy of the report, with
identifying information redacted, of course, allows the parents to refer
back and reflect upon the contents. Relying solely on verbal communica-
tion is risky, particularly when the communication takes place during the
few days between the call that a child is available for adoption and the
physical placement of the child472 -a time of high emotion for all con-
cerned. Moreover, the requirement that a copy of the report signed by
the adoptive parents be placed in the court file provides both assurance to
466. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(0 (West Supp. 1991).
467. See supra notes 342-409 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 349-56 and accompanying text.
469. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
470. One approach is to exclude nonagency adoptions from the requirement that the infor-
mation be provided prior to placement. California, for example, requires disclosure prior to
placement for agency adoptions and with the home study for a private adoption. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 220.26(a) (West Supp. 1991). Adoption intermediaries in independent adoptions,
however, also have a duty to facilitate appropriate placement, and prospective adoptive parents
in such adoptions have a similar need for access to the information. Adoption intermediaries
in private adoptions should therefore have a similar obligation to insure that social and medi-
cal history information is provided to prospective adoptive parents prior to placement, to the
extent feasible.
471. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(h) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring that copy of
social and medical history report, signed by the child's adoptive parents, be filed in court
records of adoption).
472. It has been the author's experience, based on two of her own adoptions and adoptions
by numerous friends and acquaintances, that the call that a child is available for adoption is
often the day before, or just a few days before, the infant is to be sent home with the adoptive
parents.
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the parents that they will receive complete information, and legal protec-
tion to the agency or intermediary should an issue arise in the future
about whether certain information was communicated. 473
Several states require that the cost of providing medical and social
information be paid by the person requesting it.474 When such a provi-
sion is adopted, a cap or some other mechanism should be included to
ensure that the fee is not prohibitive,4" and an in forna pauperis proce-
dure should be available so that no one authorized to receive information
is precluded by inability to pay.
When requests for disclosure are made after adoption by adult
adoptees, biological relatives, or other authorized recipients, it is wise for
the statute to require that proof of identity be provided to ensure that the
confidentiality of the information is maintained.476
b. Disclosure of Updated Information
Statutes that create a duty to update medical and social history vary
significantly in their descriptions of the scope of the duty to transmit
supplemental information. Some provide that supplemental information
will be disclosed only upon request by an authorized recipient;477 others
473. One attorney recommends that, to protect child welfare agencies from liability, disclo-
sure statements should contain an acknowledgment that the adoptive parents have received the
information contained in the statement, that the forms be signed and dated by both the disclos-
ing social worker and the adoptive parents, and that more than one social worker be present
during the disclosure process as witness. Amadio, supra note 335, at 30; see also Meracle v.
Children's Serv. Soc'y, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 23, 437 N.W.2d 532, 533 (1989) (describing "wrongful
adoption" suit against private adoption agency for transmission of inaccurate medical informa-
tion; dispute arose over the precise nature of the information that was provided).
474. Private agencies or private attorneys supplying information to prospective adoptive
parents would, of course, account for the cost of investigating and disclosing information in
their fee structure. Such statutes would thus be most applicable to disclosures to other per-
sons, supplemental disclosures, and disclosures by governmental entities. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-505(c) (Michie 1991) ('actual and reasonable cost of providing nonidentify-
ing health history and genetic and social history shall be paid by the person requesting the
information"); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (1989); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(k)
(West Supp. 1991).
475. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.68(18) (West Supp. 1991) (fee of $60 or the
actual cost of supplying the information, whichever is less).
476. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(j) (West Supp. 1991) ('copy of the report may
not be furnished to any person who cannot furnish satisfactory proof of identity and legal
entitlement to receive a copy").
477. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129(B)(3) (1989) (available on request); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1991) (available on request); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.162(f)
(West Supp. 1991) (furnished upon request); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-53(D) (Michie 1989)
(available upon application to clerk of court); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(3) (1991) (avail-
able upon request of adult adoptee); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Anderson 1989) (may
inspect upon request to clerk of court).
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state that supplemental information should be furnished to adoptive par-
ents automatically.-78 A third approach is to require affirmative steps by
the agency to notify an adoptee or other authorized recipient only in life-
threatening situations and to disclose supplemental information other-
wise only upon request.479 One state allows retention and release of sup-
plemental information only upon court order following petition by the
agency due to necessity for medical emergency or diagnosis.480
The transmission of supplemental information acquired after the ini-
tial investigation should not be limited to life-threatening emergencies.
Information that may be relevant to future diagnosis or reproductive
choices may not appear life-threatening, yet adoptive parents during the
minority of the adoptee, the adult adoptee, and the adoptee's biological
relatives and descendants all need access to the information. Thus, all
supplemental information should be available on request to those statuto-
rily approved for disclosure. To avoid the necessity of numerous re-
quests to discover if information has been added, Ohio has developed a
particularly useful mechanism whereby adoptive parents and others with
a statutory right -to access can file a single request to be notified of any
supplemental information that is added to the records. When the addi-
tion is made, notification is forwarded automatically to the parents.481
Even with a good "continuing request" system, however, it is still
important to place upon an agency, adoption intermediary, or the gov-
ernmental agency serving as repository for the records, a duty to take
affirmative steps to notify an adoptee or biological relative of medical or
genetic information that threatens life or could seriously affect physical
or mental health, or when a biologically-related person could give life-
478. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.47(2) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that agency must
initiate contact to transmit information about a medical or genetic condition that could affect
physical or mental health); id. § 259.253 (on consent of party agency will transmit nature of
death or terminal illness of genetic parent or adoptee); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(1)
(West Supp. 1991) (supplemental information shall be furnished to adoptive parents); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 1987) (health information generally available on request, but in-
formation on genetically transferred diseases automatically will be transmitted to adult
adoptee or minor adoptee's adoptive parent).
479. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.68 (West Supp. 1991).
480. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (Michie 1991).
481. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.17(E) (Anderson 1989). The form requesting no-
tification of any correction or expansion of social and medical history information is filed with
the permanent adoption records of the court clerk's office. The statute requires all investiga-
tors who prepared the initial report or the Department of Human Services to file with the
court clerk any supplemental information supplied to them. When supplemental information
is filed with the court clerk, the clerk then notifies anyone authorized for disclosure with a
request form on file that additional information is on file and available for them to inspect.
The statute further provides that when a final decree of adoption is filed, the court must give a
request form, with an explanation of its purpose, to the adoptive parents. Id.
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saving aid. Such circumstances obviously should not go without remedy
simply because a request was not made for supplemental information.
Another meritorious option is to require that the agency or some govern-
mental entity forward all supplemental information to adoptive parents
when it becomes available, rather than initiate a request system that gives
the adoptive parent a choice about whether to seek it. While this system
has much to recommend it, particularly the assurance of availability of
information for future diagnosis, professionals caution that unexpected
and unsolicited genetic information can throw an adoptive family into
turmoil.482 More extensive counseling involvement by social workers,
however, beyond the simple conveyance of information, might help fami-
lies cope with this stress.4 83
The need for sensitivity and counseling suggests the final aspect of
transmission that must be considered-the mechanism for conveying
supplemental information. Information that biological parents or rela-
tives or adoptees will consider significant enough to add to the records
will probably be serious. Conveying such information by mail is neither
the most compassionate nor the most effective method of communicating
anxiety-provoking news.484 Such information should be communicated
in person by a trained professional who can provide or refer the recipient
to appropriate counseling.
485
F. Enforcement: Sanctions and Civil Liability
Despite the good intentions of both state legislatures4 86 and agen-
cies48 7 in embracing reform, significant pressures, both benevolent488 and
bureaucratic, 489 may cause individual workers, agencies, or other in-
termediaries to withhold or alter vital information. States therefore must
consider imposing sanctions against government employees, agencies, or
other intermediaries who fail to fulfill the statutory duty to investigate or
disclose information properly. Noncompliance with the disclosure stat-
utes should be a significant factor in the licensing evaluation of adoption
agencies and should be grounds for disciplinary proceedings against pri-
482. Black, supra note 85, at 199.
483. Id.
484. For example, Michigan requires that notice of life-threatening information be sent by
first class mail to adoptive parents or an adult adoptee. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.68
(Vest Supp. 1991). First class mail provides no assurance that the message will be received, or
that it will not be opened by others with no right to the information.
485. Black, supra note 85, at 199-200.
486. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
487. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
488. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
489. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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vate attorneys who handle independent adoptions. An additional possi-
bility is to consider such violations as grounds for disciplinary action,
including possible discharge for public employees.4 90 As a last resort,
criminal sanctions might be imposed upon agency personnel or profes-
sionals, acting as adoption intermediaries, who knowingly violate these
statutes.
491
The imposition of civil liability will probably continue to play a sig-
nificant role in the enforcement of disclosure duties.4 92 State legislatures
therefore should either statutorily recognize a cause of action for persons
harmed by inadequate disclosure or avoid imposing any statutory restric-
tions upon the recognition of such liability by the courts. 493
490. Cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-19 (Burns 1987) (outlining penalties for supplying false
information to medical history, for disclosing information beyond authorization of statute, or
for recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally allowing employee to commit such violations).
491. See IowA CODE ANN. § 600.8(11) (West 1981) (establishing misdemeanor offense for
"any person who assists in or impedes the placement or adoption of a minor person in viola-
tion of" the statutory requirements for placement, investigation, and disclosure of medical
background information); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.13(D) (West 1991) (providing that
failure to comply with provisions of disclosure of family history statute "shall be a breach of a
fiduciary duty which shall be punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars"); see also UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 10-e(c) (Tentative Draft
1990) (creating a misdemeanor for persons who knowingly fall to provide background infor-
mation to prospective adoptive parents or who intentionally destroy such information); cf
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-19 (Bums 1987) (establishing class A misdemeanor for knowingly
supplying false information to medical history, or recklessly or intentionally allowing an em-
ployer to do so).
492. For a list of several cases that have been instituted seeking damages for false or incom-
plete disclosure of health-related information in adoptions, see supra note 113.
493. Several of the recently enacted disclosure statutes include a limitation or preclusion of
liability for disclosure made under the statutes. The intent of at least some of these provisions
may be simply to clarify that disclosure of what would otherwise be confidential information
creates no liability for breach of confidentiality or the right of privacy if it is within the scope of
disclosure authorized by statute. Unfortunately, the language of some provisions appears
broad enough to exclude liability for disclosure that is incomplete or inaccurate. See Act of
September 27, 1983, ch. 1162, §§ 13-14, 1983 Cal. Stat. 4393, 4400 (not codified) (placing a
maximum liability on the state or any licensed adoption agency of $250 for damages caused by
acts or omissions of their employers with regard to programs authorized by the act); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (no liability for "acts or efforts made
within the scope of the act"). Others, while arguably applicable to intentional nondisclosure or
misrepresentation, would appear to preclude liability for reckless or negligent incomplete, in-
accurate, or unauthorized disclosure. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(9) (Michie 1991) ("de-
partment employer or employee of any placement agency who releases information or makes
authorized contacts in good faith and in compliance with this subsection shall be immune from
civil or criminal liability for such release of information or authorized contacts"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-16(14) (1991) ("child-placing agency discharging in good faith its responsibili-
ties under this section is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might
result"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432(8) (West 1987) (civil and criminal immunity for persons
who participate in good faith in the requirements of the disclosure statute).
The proposed discussion draft of the revised Uniform Adoption Act takes a better ap-
proach, stating simply that its criminal penalties for nondisclosure "do not preclude an adop-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Adopted children, their families, and their offspring have for many
years paid a staggering price as a result of the policy of secrecy surround-
ing their medical history and social background. Failure to provide ade-
quate information to adoptive parents has prevented adopted children
from receiving critically needed psychiatric and medical care, so that
many children suffered irreversible damage and many adoptive families
were devastated. Their tragic experience has taught us that full disclo-
sure of medical and social history of adopted children is essential to en-
sure that they receive appropriate medical and psychiatric care and to
enhance their development of a personal sense of identity. Full initial
disclosure and an effective mechanism to update information facilitates
the diagnosis and treatment not only of the adoptee, but also of biological
relatives and offspring who discover that they are at risk for certain dis-
orders. Accurate transmission of information also allows adoptees and
their biological relatives to make informed choices about their own
childbearing.
Finally, complete disclosure of a child's medical and social history
plays a vital role in placing a child with an adoptive family capable of
meeting the child's special needs. Adoptive parents with realistic expec-
tations and good preparation are far more likely to cope successfully with
challenges. Moreover, the financial burdens of caring for a child with
special needs can be lessened if parents have the information necessary to
qualify for federal and state adoption assistance benefits.
In recent years the majority of state legislatures have responded to
the disastrous effect of earlier adoption practices by enacting legislation
requiring release of some background information. Nevertheless, most
states still need significant reform to serve the goals of full disclosure
adequately.
Disclosure statutes must be mandatory, their provisions must apply
to all adoptions, and they should apply retroactively to those adopted
prior to enactment of the statutes. They should require that information
be disclosed not only to adoptive and prospective adoptive parents, but
also to adult adoptees, their descendants, their biological family, and to
unadopted adults whose parents' rights were terminated. To ensure that
all necessary information is provided, statutes must be more specific in
describing the content of the information to be collected and disclosed,
tive parent or adoptee from bringing a common law action in tort against a person who
negligently or intentionally fails to perform the duties required under" the sections regulating
disclosure of background information. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 10-e(d) (Tentative Draft
1990).
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which must include the medical and psychological history of the child, of
the birth parents, and of other biological relatives, as well as the social
and educational history of the child, of birth parents, and of ancestors.
More attention must be paid to the manner in which information is
collected and stored. Responsibility for collection should rest with an
agency or adoption intermediary and should be delegated only to trained
professionals. A "reasonable efforts" requirement that would delineate
the necessary collection efforts should be imposed by statute. These ef-
forts should include conducting interviews with both birth parents and
obtaining complete medical records of the child. If necessary, interviews
also should be conducted with other family members, anyone who has
had physical custody of the child, and medical personnel. Statutes
should authorize medical-care providers and schools to release the
child's records to the investigator. They should further authorize the
release of medical records of a birth parent, under court order, if the
information could significantly affect the child's health. The medical
records of other biological relatives, however, should not be subject to
disclosure without their consent, absent compelling circumstances. Such
a wide exception to medical confidentiality would be an invasion of their
right to privacy.
Many states have enacted statutes prohibiting the disclosure of in-
formation related to an individual's contraction of HIV or venereal dis-
eases. A very limited exception to these statutes should allow courts to
authorize disclosure of records indicating a birth mother's HIV status,
but only when adequate information cannot be obtained from testing per-
formed on the child. Such an exception is necessary to alert prospective
adoptive families to the need to repeat testing and initiate medical treat-
ment when appropriate.
"Reasonable efforts" frequently include an obligation to ensure that
the child receives diagnostic testing. While conducting tests upon an in-
fant may reveal personal information concerning the birth mother, such
as HIV status or venereal disease, such testing is justifiable due to the
importance of pursuing appropriate medical care for the child. Compel-
ling birth parents or other relatives to submit to diagnostic testing, how-
ever, exceeds the bounds of appropriate investigation and invades their
constitutionally protected right to privacy and bodily integrity.
Imposing sanctions through contempt or criminal proceedings upon
birth parents who fail to provide complete information would be ineffec-
tive and would invade their privacy unnecessarily. Statutory provisions
that protect confidentiality by prohibiting unauthorized disclosure and
that establish use immunity in both criminal prosecution and civil suits
would be far more effective.
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Information must be collected and disclosed to prospective adoptive
parents prior to a child's placement in their home, to facilitate informed
decisionmaking on their part and to increase the chances for a successful
placement. States also must create an effective system for collecting, re-
taining, and transmitting information relevant to hereditary disorders
that surfaces after the initial investigation.
Much progress has been made since the days of total secrecy, when
only caseworkers knew the facts about an adoptee's origins and pre-
adoptive environment. To provide adoptees and their families the pro-
tection they deserve, however, states must reexamine their disclosure
statutes to ensure that they are sufficiently comprehensive to meet the
needs of all whose interests are affected, with due regard to the privacy
interests of all concerned.

